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Abstract 
 
This thesis assessed the costs and benefits distribution of improving drinking water 
quality through a land set-aside payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme in a 
watershed of Honduras. The benefits of improving drinking water quality were 
determined using a contingent valuation survey for a stated willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for improved drinking water quality through a PES scheme; and a revealed 
WTP was determined as the sum of averting expenditure and illness damage costs. 
Likewise, the costs of water conservation were determined through two 
approaches, the flow and rent opportunity costs of upstream landholders. 
 
Both WTP measures evidenced that beneficiaries could afford and were willing to 
pay for improved drinking water quality. The two WTP measures were not 
correlated, but this could be due to biased estimates or context-dependent 
preferences for each approach. Conversely, the cost of water conservation came to 
an overall flow net return of US$ 1,410 ha-1, with coffee exhibiting the highest 
returns. However, the median positive returns without coffee, US$ 140, are used 
and they are correlated to the rent opportunity costs. Identifying a reliable, 
accurate and cost-effective method to determine opportunity costs is challenging, 
but the two methods employed provided valid estimates. This study identifies and 
discusses several distributional issues for PES schemes; these are the upstream-
downstream externality framework, peoples’ perceptions, unequal water 
governance, and fair targeting of payments to service providers. 
 
The WTP for improved drinking water quality is not sufficient to compensate the 
opportunity costs of landholders. The WTP would only cover 6% to 10% of the 
estimated cost of the water conservation. Thus, a user-based PES scheme at the 
study site is not feasible. Water conservation is more likely to be possible if 
substantial external support is obtained or through a sustainable land 
management-based scheme.  
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  Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the motivation, aim, objectives, and structure of this research. 
The research motivation section (1.1) briefly introduces the importance and gaps 
being addressed by this study on costs and benefits distribution of ecosystem 
services through payment for ecosystem services schemes. Section 1.2 outlines the 
aim and objectives, developed from an academic and policy-oriented focus 
described in the research motivation section and in the literature review (chapter 2). 
Finally section 1.3 outlines the general structure of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
There is a long-standing debate about how to achieve conservation and at the same 
time maintain or even improve the livelihoods of local communities (Adams et al., 
2004). This is due to human activities progressively reducing the planet’s life-
supporting ecosystem services, while unprecedented rising human consumption 
makes increasing demands on them (Wells, 1992). This threat is particularly 
experienced in developing countries, where there is an obvious drive for economic 
development through increased investments and more intensive use of ecosystem 
services (Kramer et al., 1997). Protected and rural areas, and the ecosystem 
services they provide, are especially under mounting pressure as they are expected 
to directly contribute to both development and poverty reduction (Adams et al., 
2004; Coad et al., 2008).  
 
Reducing poverty or more generally inequity, is one of the main challenges in 
determining the impact and long-term success of conservation interventions (MEA, 
2005; Goldman and Tallis, 2009). The provision of ecosystem services through 
protected areas generally has resulted in a lack of equity because these areas often 
don’t take account of local communities and have reinforced existing conflicts and 
unfairness in access and control of ecosystem services (Arrow et al., 2000). Equity 
has been defined as a measure of the fairness of distribution (Brown and Corbera, 
2003; Corbera et al., 2007a; Fisher et al., 2008).  Rarely have studies analysed both 
costs and benefits in conservation and it is still unclear how they are distributed 
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within and among different stakeholder groups (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Chan et al., 2007). Factors affecting distributional issues can include the nature of 
the ecosystem service, its governance, and property rights, among others 
(Sommerville et al., 2010a). Inequity in distribution is a problem that is yet to be 
adequately addressed in protected area and ecosystem service management (Coad 
et al., 2008; Balvanera et al., 2012).  
 
One of the most vital and threatened ecosystem services is water provision, which 
supplies the benefit of drinking water quality for humankind. Currently 780 million 
people worldwide are said to be without access to an improved drinking water 
source (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). The most affected by contaminated water are the 
populations in developing countries, living in poverty, normally peri-urban dwellers 
or rural inhabitants (Alberini et al., 1996; Dwight et al., 2005). There are many 
waterborne diseases and the most common one, diarrhea, causes about 2 million 
deaths every year, most of them children less than 5 years of age (WHO and UNICEF, 
2014). Although substantial gains have been made in the provision of drinking 
water supply and sanitation globally (UNICEF and WHO, 2012), many inequities are 
masked behind national statistics (Pullan et al., 2014) and binary categorisations 
(Yang et al., 2013). Inequities in drinking water quality have been found for social 
(e.g. rich-poor), generational (e.g. age cohorts), spatial (e.g. urban-rural) and gender 
attributes (Rangel Soares et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2013; Pullan et al., 2014). The 
literature contains an increasing number of developing country estimates of water 
services. However, the value of water quality improvements in developing country 
settings deserves much more study (Olmstead, 2010).  Inequity between and within 
communities in allocation of water resources and the corresponding outputs also 
remains a serious challenge (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). A detailed study on the local 
costs and benefits distribution of drinking water quality in rural communities can 
provide important insights to address present and future equity issues. 
 
To address distributional or fairness issues in conservation, incentive-based 
initiatives have been promoted within and outside protected areas to complement 
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command and control actions. Currently, Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes 
are deemed to be cost-effective at providing ecosystem services and efficient at 
conservation (Miles and Kapos, 2008; Fisher et al., 2010), but debate still stands on 
if and how PES can best maintain and improve equity and livelihoods (Jack et al., 
2008; Kosoy et al., 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Fisher et al., 2010; Muradian et 
al., 2010; Nkhata et al., 2012). Payments for water services are the most developed 
across Latin America (Balvanera et al., 2012) in line with the persistent water 
provision challenges across the region. A study on how the distribution of local 
costs and benefits of water services can determine contracting in PES schemes can 
therefore provide insight on developing more equitable schemes and reducing 
future distributional issues. 
 
Economic valuation is commonly used to determine the costs and benefits of 
ecosystem service use for PES scheme design and contracting. These methods are 
favoured because they allow protected areas and the services they provide to be 
valued in equal terms as other forms of land use (either direct or indirectly) and can 
reveal costs or benefits that might otherwise remain hidden (Troy and Wilson, 
2006). However, there is still substantial debate in the application of these methods 
that requires further research, importantly the accuracy and robustness of 
estimations (e.g. Harrington and Portney, 1987; Pattanayak et al., 2005; Jalan and 
Somanathan, 2008; Wünscher et al., 2011). So, a study employing several 
approaches to estimate the benefits and the costs of water services can first of all, 
contribute more accurate estimates, and also enhance the understanding of their 
design and application. 
 
Honduras is the poorest country in Latin America (ECLAC and UN, 2011) and has a 
long history of inequity, mainly affecting rural areas (Székely and Hilgert, 1999; 
Rangel Soares et al., 2002; Klasen et al., 2012); thus making it particularly 
vulnerable to water provision issues.  Honduras has ample hydrological capacity 
(GWP-Centroamerica, 2011) but it is characterised by unsafe drinking water mainly 
due to domestic and agricultural activities, e.g. only 20% of the country’s water 
sources are deemed safe to drink (Mejia Clara, 2005; CONASA, 2006; Leiva Castillo, 
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2010; Acosta, 2011). It seems that water provision problems will continue into the 
foreseeable future due to it being a developing country with a growing population 
and prevailing high levels of corruption and inequality (EC, 2010; TI, 2013; Casey, 
2014). Deaths and illness due to waterborne diseases, and its accompanying effects 
on quality of life, are widespread in Honduras (Varela, 2011; Halder et al., 2013). 
The west of the country is particularly vulnerable, as the department of 
Ocotepeque has one of the highest poverty rates in the country (OPHI, 2011), is one 
of the areas with most water provision problems (GWP-Centroamerica, 2011) and 
highest incidences of diarrhea cases (Halder et al., 2013). Thus rural communities in 
the west of Honduras are particularly interesting for the study of local costs and 
benefits distribution of drinking water quality. The findings of such a study could 
also contribute to the understanding of inequity issues in other parts of the world 
with similar environmental and socio-economic conditions. 
 
In summary, despite considerable studies on poverty and inequity issues in 
protected and rural areas relating to ecosystem service, there hasn’t been sufficient 
examination of both the costs and the benefits distribution of drinking water quality 
in rural, protected areas. As well as on how this distribution affects the design of 
PES schemes for water conservation. Furthermore, more understanding is needed 
on estimations derived from and the application of economic valuation methods. 
This thesis aims to contribute to an increased understanding of these issues and, in 
particular, on the situation in Honduras. Overall, based on empirical evidence this 
thesis contributes to current debates on equity in PES contracting and economic 
valuation methods by enhancing understanding on the costs and benefits 
distribution of water services, the factors affecting this distribution, the contracting 
opportunities and challenges in PES schemes, and the valuation methods for costs 
and benefits. 
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the costs and benefits distribution of the water 
provision service for contracting in a Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme in a 
Honduran Reserve. To achieve this aim, the specific objectives are: 
 
1. to determine the costs and benefits of drinking water quality use in fifteen rural 
communities, their distribution and the factors determining this distribution; 
2. to analyse how the distribution of costs and benefits may influence contracting 
Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes; and 
3. to contribute to the understanding of different economic valuation methods and 
their use to determine the costs and benefits of ecosystem services. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters as set out in the table of contents. After this 
introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent literature on the ecosystem 
services approach to conservation, the valuation of ecosystem services and 
Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes. Chapter 2 also highlights the literature 
existent on equity in PES schemes, specifically focused on the distribution of costs 
and benefits. Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology, including 
the methods used to collect data and the data analyses followed.  
 
Chapter 4 applies a stated preference method – contingent valuation – to obtain a 
measure of the benefits of improving drinking water quality. This method is used to 
capture users’ stated willingness-to-pay for improved drinking water. In Chapter 5, 
a revealed preference method – averting expenditure plus illness damage costs – to 
assess the benefits of improving drinking water quality is applied. This method is 
used to identify the household expenditure to avoid and treat the effects of 
contaminated drinking water. These two chapters also analyse factors that 
determine the distribution of benefits among users according to each method. 
 
In Chapter 6, opportunity costs of landowners and farmers are estimated using 
both the flow and the rent-based approach. This chapter also assesses the farmer, 
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plot and land characteristics that may influence the level of opportunity costs 
obtained per hectare of land. Chapter 7 provides a synthesis of the key findings in 
the empirical chapters and evaluates the implications of the findings in the context 
of the externalities framework, imperfect information, disparate water governance 
and fairness in targeting payments to providers. Chapter 8 summarises the main 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a general review of the literature on four key areas, namely the 
ecosystem services approach, cost-benefit distribution, valuation and payment for 
ecosystem services schemes; highlighting the state-of-art and the gaps and weaknesses in 
the literature, identifying the areas of contribution of this thesis. Section 2.1 outlines the 
trend for conservation through protected areas and the ecosystem services approach, and 
the challenges faced in these approaches. Section 2.1.1 defines and describes the 
characteristics of ecosystem services. Section 2.2 reviews the equity concerns that arise 
with ecosystem service use and section 2.2.1 discusses the gaps in cost and benefit 
distribution studies. Section 2.3 describes payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes 
and section 2.3.1 discusses how PES schemes can be designed to improve equity. Section 
2.4 reviews the different valuation methods used to value ecosystem services. Finally, 
section 2.5 concludes by summarising this chapter and identifying the research gaps that 
this thesis addresses. 
 
This chapter presents the general baseline of relevant topics to the research as a whole but 
the more detailed aspects of the literature are presented in each of the three empirical 
chapters: 4, 5 and 6. This was done to facilitate readability, considering that this research 
applies several methods and covers different themes. At the same time it allows for the in-
depth assessment of the specific themes of each empirical chapter.  
 
2.1 Conservation and the Ecosystem Services Approach 
Protected areas (PAs) now cover over 14% of the world’s land area (WB, 2013) and they 
form the cornerstone of conservation and the supply of ecosystem services (Balmford et al., 
2002; MEA, 2005). The effect of protected areas on their human inhabitants is arguably the 
most controversial debate in conservation policy (Andam et al., 2010). In most developing 
countries, large numbers of people live within PAs (Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Cunningham, 
2001). For example, 50% of Latin American national parks have human occupation (Amend 
and Amend, 1995). Until relatively recently protected area management has changed from 
focusing on protectionist approaches (Wells, 1992; Amend and Amend, 1995; Brockington, 
2004; Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006), to recognising the rights and needs of local 
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communities. Currently the rapidly growing conservation planning literature indicates that 
protected areas are not only expected to protect the environment but to directly 
contribute to development and poverty reduction (Margules and Pressey, 2000; Coad et al., 
2008; Naidoo et al., 2008; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011). So much so that reaching the most 
equitable design, along with economic and environmental benefits, is considered a 
requirement and the ideal outcome of conservation (Blaustein, 2007; Ehrlich et al., 2012). 
 
Matching the need for conservation, through protected areas, with equity concerns is a 
compelling challenge. Many authors have employed different focuses and methods to 
study equity issues in PAs. For instance, Halpern et al., 2013) assessed different types of 
equity in three marine protected areas using the Gini coefficient. Munthali, 2007) discussed 
how transfrontier conservation areas in southern Africa contribute to both biodiversity 
conservation and poverty alleviation. Andam et al., 2010) evaluated how protected areas 
reduced poverty in Costa Rica and Thailand by using matching methods to estimate the 
effect of protected areas on poverty in communities near protected area. Despite the rising 
number of publications on this topic many aspects of equity or fairness in protected areas 
are only partly understood and considerable problems persist. 
 
Currently, policy and research are increasingly oriented towards internalizing ecosystem 
service concerns into conservation and land use planning (Cowling et al., 2008; Jack et al., 
2008). This is known as the ecosystem services approach or framework. This approach calls 
for an integrated view of nature’s complexity and its problematic relationship with 
anthropogenic activities; thus, it can provide a useful argument for conservation (Vira and 
Adams, 2009) and communicate society’s dependence on ecological life support systems 
(Daily, 1997; de Groot et al., 2002). So far, the development of the ecosystems services 
approach seems to have led to a better understanding and management of natural 
resources; unlike past conservation efforts focused on individual components of an 
ecosystem independent from human well-being. Nowadays, the ecosystem services 
approach is applied to many purposes, such as the development of environmental 
accounting and performance systems (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007), education (MEA, 2005), 
economic valuation as an aid to environmental decision-making, landscape management, 
public policy and equity in human welfare (Wallace, 2007), or multiple purposes at once 
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(Fisher et al., 2009). In the case of protected areas, the approach can be useful as their 
boundaries were not designed to encompass the flows of ecosystem services across the 
landscape, such as water and organisms (Scott et al., 2001). Most protected areas have also 
been designed without taking full account of people’s vital dependence on ecosystem 
services.  
 
The concept of an ecosystem services approach is used here to address the issue of equity 
through cost and benefit distribution. This concept states that people are integral parts of 
ecosystems and that a dynamic interaction exists between them and parts of ecosystems. 
Furthermore, changing human actions drive, both directly and indirectly, changes in 
ecosystems and thereby cause changes in human well-being. Criticism of the ecosystem 
services approach has included its conceptual and methodological incompatibility with 
governance and management (i.e. with on the ground implementation; Cook and Spray, 
2012; Baker et al., 2013). However, this approach is useful as it focuses on the indivisible 
linkages between ecosystems and human well-being; and in particular, the services or 
benefits that ecosystems provide to humans (MEA, 2005). Also, this approach already 
seems to have led to better conservation and management practices as it views people as 
potential partners in sustainable development strategies (Brown, 2002). However, as yet, 
the literature has scarce comprehensive studies assessing both costs and benefits applying 
an ecosystem services approach.  There is still uncertainty about how to utilise this concept 
to enhance equity in different management and conservation practices. 
 
2.1.1. What are Ecosystem Services? 
Ecosystems constantly generate services: “the aspects of ecosystems utilized to produce 
human well-being” (Fisher et al., 2009). In general terms, ecosystem services are the 
benefits that nature provides to humans (MEA, 2005; Goldman and Tallis, 2009) and can be 
divided into provisioning (such as food and water), regulating (such as those affecting 
climate and water quality), cultural (such as those providing recreational and aesthetic 
benefits) and supporting services (such as nutrient cycling; MEA, 2005). Ecosystem service 
trade-offs can arise when the provision of one service is enhanced at the cost of reducing 
the provision of another service, and ecosystem service synergies can arise when multiple 
services are enhanced simultaneously (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). For instance, actions 
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to enhance the supply of some ecosystem services, mainly provisioning services such as 
food and timber, have led to declines in other ecosystem services, including regulating 
services such as water provision (MEA, 2005; Fisher et al., 2009).  
 
Ecosystem services are anthropocentric, benefit-dependent, heterogeneous in space, 
evolving through time, and associated with (or hindered by) a variety of property rights and 
other institutional arrangements (Costanza et al., 1997; de Groot et al., 2002; Fisher et al., 
2008; Turner and Daily, 2008; Fisher et al., 2009). Their benefit-dependency means the 
benefits of interest will dictate what is understood as an ecosystem service (Boyd and 
Banzhaf, 2007). For example, water regulation services can provide the service of clean 
water provision or fish production. Since different stakeholders perceive different benefits 
from the same ecosystem processes they can at times be conflicting (Turner et al., 2003; 
Hein et al., 2006).  
 
Ecosystem services provide a benefit when human welfare is directly affected and where 
other forms of capital (built, human, and social) are likely to be needed to realize the gain 
in welfare (Boyd, 2007; Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Turner and Daily, 2008; Fisher et al., 2009). 
How an ecosystem service is conceptualized and valued is very important, as this will 
influence beneficiaries understanding and decisions. Humans measure their wellbeing 
either in terms of tangible benefits, such as food, water, property; or in terms of abstract 
benefits such as a sense of being loved or contentment. If a wide range of people are to be 
engaged in decisions relating to ecosystem services, then the measures used to evaluate 
options must be overtly relevant to the daily lives of people. Ultimately, the relative 
weighting of services is a socio-political assessment shaped by the specific context in which 
a particular decision is made (Wallace, 2007). 
 
A key characteristic of ecosystem services is their excludability and rivalness, also known as 
the public-private good aspect. A rival service is one for which consumption by one person 
reduces the amount of service available to others. An exclusive service is one from which 
consumers can be excluded unless they meet the conditions prescribed by the party 
controlling the service. A non-exclusive service can be regulated or provided by the 
government, as is the case with ecosystem services (Brown et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2009). 
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Some ecosystem services may have a variety of agents with entitlements to different 
aspects of the service simultaneously (Paavola, 2007). The public-private good aspect can 
determine how the main types of property rights that affect ecosystem service provision 
can be classified.  
 
Private goods are goods with rival consumption and low exclusion costs (Engel et al., 2008; 
Paavola, 2009). Common property refers to a regime that determines rules under which 
the members of a community may access and use a common pool resource (Brink et al., 
2009). Common-pool resources are of rival consumption and high exclusion costs, e.g. 
fisheries, aquifers (Paavola, 2009). If there is no regime it becomes an open-access resource 
with absence of property, because of low benefits or high exclusion costs (Paavola, 2007; 
Lant et al., 2008). Pure public goods are jointly consumed goods with high exclusion costs. 
Consequently, public goods tend to be underprovided because the producer is unable to 
take full advantage of their value by charging for them and it is hard to identify and delimit 
the users (Engel et al., 2008). If nothing is done to constrain free-riding, receiving benefits 
without paying for them or investing in their long-term availability, nobody will make an 
effort to provide the good. Ecosystem services fit all of these property rights categories 
(Arrow et al., 2000; Lant et al., 2008; Paavola, 2009).  
 
The spatial characteristics of ecosystem services, that determine heterogeneity and 
patterns, are to some extent subjective but conceptually important. Spatial categories can 
describe relationships, between service production and where the benefits are realised (in 
situ, omni-directional and directional), their scale (local, regional, global or multiple), or a 
combination of categories. Ecosystem services scarcity, substitutes and complements 
likewise are spatially differentiated (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007). These characteristics 
recognize the spatio-temporal dynamics of ecosystems, further explain the public-private 
good aspect and the benefit-dependence of services, and can also highlight potential PES 
schemes. For instance, water provision has generally been referred to as a rival service that 
can be exclusive or non-exclusive and it has specific directional benefits accruing at a local 
level. However, services may not fit neatly into these spatial categories and the above 
mentioned property rights, as they do not accommodate all formal governance solutions 
that are used in practice (Paavola, 2007).  
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All these key ecosystem service characteristics (anthropocentricism, benefit-dependence, 
spatial dynamics, and property rights), and other potential factors, will significantly 
influence what is considered equitable and how equity issues are dealt with in the use of an 
ecosystem service. This is particularly the case for non-market services, those that are not 
properly regulated by markets (Freeman III, 2003); which is often the case of the vital 
service of water provision. 
 
2.2 Equity issues in Ecosystem Service Use 
It is widely accepted that achieving a balance between conservation of ecosystem services 
and development is far from realised (Oldekop et al., 2010; Ferraro et al., 2011; Martin-
Lopez et al., 2011; Gross-Camp et al., 2012; Halpern et al., 2013; Krause and Loft, 2013). 
The many challenges this aim faces can be grouped into the three commonly used 
evaluation criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and equity (Bardhan, 1996; van Wilgen et al., 
1998; Adger et al., 2005; Angelsen, 2008; Angelsen and Brockhaus, 2009; Kasterine and 
Vanzetti, 2010).  Issues pertaining to the efficiency and effectiveness of ecosystem service 
use have been substantially studied, providing considerable understanding on them 
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Drechsler et al., 2007; Wunder, 2007; Barton et al., 2009; 
Morse et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Gauvin et al., 2010; Groom and Palmer, 2010; OECD; 
Narloch et al., 2011). These studies have made significant contributions to understanding 
how cost-efficient PES schemes can be achieved, such as through targeting discriminate 
payments to service providers. However, the study of equity issues arising for ecosystem 
service use is more limited and is still a compelling challenge fraught with conflict, trade-
offs and incomplete understanding (Blaustein, 2007).  
 
There has been quite a debate about what equity is in different settings, who defines it and 
how it is implemented in practice. According to several authors (Daly, 1992; Gleick, 1998; 
Costanza, 2000; Brown and Corbera, 2003; Corbera et al., 2007a; Fisher et al., 2008) equity 
is a measure of the fairness of the distribution or at least when inequity is limited within 
some acceptable range. These two definitions arise in the context of social welfare policy, 
were equity can be proportional - resources should be distributed according to people’s 
efforts or deservedness - or egalitarian - everyone should be treated equally (Syme et al., 
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1999). For example, if proportionality is considered, service providers would be 
compensated based on their contribution to service provision or their opportunity costs; 
and, if egalitarianism is considered, all service providers would be compensated the same 
amount irrespective of service provision or opportunity costs. On the whole, equity is 
perceived differently according to varying bargaining positions or values which are dynamic, 
linked to time and the larger environment (Savas, 1978; Wegerich, 2007). This study makes 
no claims on which approach to equity is pre-eminent, but provides insight into the 
application of both approaches described above. 
 
Ignoring issues of equity in conservation planning can produce suboptimal social outcomes, 
and risk failure in prioritization efforts and durability of actions (Halpern et al., 2013). Many 
equity or fairness issues have been reported in the conservation literature, such as  the 
perpetuation or exacerbation of poverty traps (Gilson et al., 2000; Coad et al., 2008; Krause 
and Loft, 2013), unequal distribution of payments or outcomes (Ghazoul et al., 2009; 
Narloch et al., 2011; Matthews et al., 2013; Narloch et al., 2013), loss of livelihoods and 
income (Börner et al., 2007; Corbera and Brown, 2010; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Mahanty 
et al., 2013), reproduction of power asymmetries (Kosoy et al., 2008), exclusion of the 
poorest (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Corbera et al., 2007a), among others. Furthermore, 
perceived or real inequity can create opponents to conservation efforts, leading to 
noncompliance or destructive actions. Thus, equity can be a critical component of 
ecosystem service management and conservation success (Halpern et al., 2013). To date, 
the issue of equity has largely been addressed indirectly, through implicit assumptions 
about spreading costs or benefits, or as a secondary concern, as with post hoc comparisons 
of the equity of outcomes (White et al., 2012). Thus, further study and understanding of 
equity issues related to ecosystem service use is warranted. 
 
Several approaches have been implemented to try to integrate equity and conservation 
goals into economic and social contexts at the local, regional and global scale (Brown, 
2002). More recent approaches can include integrated conservation and development 
projects, community-based natural resource management, pro-poor conservation, as well 
as market-based approaches such as direct payment schemes (Adams et al., 2004). These 
approaches have evidenced mixed outcomes and many challenges still prevail. For instance, 
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integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), have been commonly critiqued 
because conservation activities tend to be strongly overpowered by development activities 
(Browder, 2002; Baral et al., 2007). Sommerville et al., 2010b) found that a community-
based PES scheme in Menabe, Madagascar was overall positive, but still presented a lack of 
adequate benefit distribution. A review of World Bank economic projects that had 
environment and natural resources management as a major theme, showed that relatively 
few (16%) had substantial gains in terms of their stated environmental and poverty 
alleviation outcomes (Tallis et al., 2008). Thus, the integration of equity and conservation, 
particularly regarding ecosystem service use, remains a challenge. 
 
2.2.1 Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
Although there are many studies looking at the impacts of conservation and ecosystem 
service use on the poor, this is a narrow view not comprising the broader quantitative 
distribution of costs and benefits (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005). An 
understanding of the local costs and benefits of ecosystem service use is particularly 
important to further equity in developing countries (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). In most 
cases, these benefits and costs are both poorly understood and poorly quantified (Costanza, 
2000), and they are not evenly spread over all people, places and time (Arrow et al., 2000; 
Chan et al., 2007). As Brockington, 2004) and Kramer and Sharma, 1997) have noted for 
conservation, just as the failure to measure benefits can lead to suboptimal policies, the 
failure to measure the local costs may lead to unworkable policies. There are a number of 
studies investigating the costs and benefits of diverse conservation strategies such as 
activities in protected areas (Ferraro, 2002; Ezebilo and Mattsson, 2010), community-based 
projects (Sommerville et al., 2010b), incentive-based programmes (Spiteri and Nepal, 2006), 
and market-based mechanisms like PES schemes (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006). Despite these 
studies, there are many gaps in the knowledge and understanding of costs and benefits of 
ecosystem service use and conservation.  
 
The costs of conserving ecosystem services range from economical transaction costs, 
opportunity costs, costs of implementing conservation actions, and monitoring costs; plus 
more indirect costs such as increased competition for land, social tension, reduced 
employment and food security, weakening of local community institutions, to name a few 
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(Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Coad et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2008). It has been found that most 
conservation costs are felt in terms of access to natural capital (Igoe, 2006) or restrictions 
on the use of forests and its resources (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). For instance, although 
richer members of forest communities are often the biggest harvesters of forest products, 
the poor can be more dependent on these resources and thus suffer the most from 
restrictions (Coad et al., 2008). Knowledge on the costs of conservation will provide vital 
information on where to best allocate conservation funds and efforts (Balmford et al., 2003; 
Naidoo et al., 2006; Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006).  
 
Conversely, conservation strategies have generally aimed for environmental and social 
benefits, or at least not to compromise or even increase poverty (Balmford et al., 2002; 
Adams et al., 2004). Benefits are frequently experienced in terms of financial and physical 
capital (Igoe, 2006); such as amounts of income, diversification and stabilization of income 
sources, capacity building, technical support for livelihood activities, community 
empowerment and of course, the maintenance of ecosystem services (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005; Coad et al., 2008). However, benefits of conservation are often difficult to identify, 
slow to materialize, diffuse, or discouraged by high transaction costs (Spiteri and Nepal, 
2006; Chan et al., 2007). Also, some groups are better positioned to take advantage of 
benefits than others and these are often not the same groups who have borne the biggest 
costs of conservation (Wells, 1992; Igoe, 2006). According to the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment report (MEA, 2005), “ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems”. In this study benefits are defined as the economic value that humans derive 
from an ecosystem service. Knowledge of benefits will help estimate the economic value of 
lands and ecosystem services identified for conservation and to identify who may be willing 
to pay for these services (Balmford et al., 2003; Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; Reid et al., 
2006).  
 
Both costs and benefits need to be understood to estimate the value of conservation lands 
and ecosystem services (Balmford et al., 2003; Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; Jack et al., 2008). 
Many studies focus on one or the other, costs or benefits, seldom both and rarely on their 
distribution. Distribution refers to the relative division of the resource flow, as embodied in 
final goods and services, among alternative people (Daly, 1992; Haab and McConnell, 2003), 
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considering both social and environmental concerns (Brink et al., 2009). The distribution of 
costs and benefits has been found to vary between male and female, providers and users 
of a service, intergenerational (current and future people) and intra-generationally (among 
and within communities and individuals) and between different time periods based on the 
extent of dependence on ecosystem services (Arrow et al., 2000; Coad et al., 2008; Farley 
and Costanza, 2010). So far studies looking at equity in ecosystem service use and 
conservation through the distribution of costs and benefits have been relatively limited and 
with varied methodologies (Igoe, 2006; Tallis et al., 2012). However, understanding the 
distribution of economic costs and benefits, and the factors affecting such distribution are 
important and need special attention (Spiteri and Nepal, 2006; He et al., 2008). 
 
A few studies have looked at the costs and benefits of ecosystem services and suggest that 
unequal distribution is the trend (e.g. Briscoe et al., 1990; Wegerich, 2007; He et al., 2008). 
This trend in the distribution of costs and benefits is probably due to them accruing to 
beneficiaries and providers in different ways depending on several characteristics. The 
literature has already reported equity implications and trade-offs due to spatial location, 
poverty levels, opportunity costs, as well as many forms of market failure: externalities, 
insufficient knowledge and information, public goods nature, and imperfect property rights 
(Arrow et al., 2000; Chan et al., 2007; Corbera et al., 2007a; Jack et al., 2007; Engel et al., 
2008; Jack et al., 2008; Lant et al., 2008; Brink et al., 2009; Paavola, 2009). Many of these 
factors are influenced by macro-scale issues usually out of stakeholders’ control, but local 
scale factors are more flexible to change. Thus, how the local context determines the 
distribution of costs and benefits requires careful consideration, as well as the possible 
effect of conservation strategies on this distribution.  
 
In this study, the focus on the distribution of economic costs and benefits is used as a 
characterisation of equity and to understand the factors influencing this distribution. This 
focus considers both costs and benefits with proportionate significance, and the way they 
relate to each other. An emphasis on a broader quantitative distribution of costs and 
benefits is needed as many studies have had a narrow view looking at the poor only (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005). This distribution needs to be understood and 
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considered to better deal with inequity and to inform conservation policy design (e.g. 
Nyahongo et al., 2005; Berentsen et al., 2007; Hope and Castilla-Rubio, 2008).  
 
2.3 Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes  
The management of ecosystem service use has been dealt with through numerous means, 
such as the public provision of ecosystem services, market or incentive-based mechanisms, 
voluntary efforts by firms and individuals, direct government regulation, and hybrid 
mechanisms. Market-based instruments are commonly referred to as the most effective 
way to conserve nature, and thus research has grown in their design (e.g. Daily, 1997; Heal, 
2000; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2002; Engel et al., 2008; Boisvert et al., 
2013). Market-based mechanisms work by creating or changing prices, making 
environmentally beneficial activities more profitable and environmentally harmful activities 
more costly (Sommerville et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 2013).  
 
Market-based initiatives are important because they translate external, non-market values 
of the environment (correcting market failure) into real financial incentives for local actors 
to provide public good and common-pool type ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008; Engel 
and Palmer, 2008; Lee and Mahanty, 2009; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Mohammed, 2012; 
To et al., 2012). The initiatives also change economic incentives towards conservation, 
change the behaviour of private actors involved in ecosystem service use, ensure that the 
beneficiaries of ecosystem services pay the full cost of service provision, and may facilitate 
environmental goals more efficiently than by regulation alone (Brink et al., 2009). Leading 
market-based instruments are markets for ecosystem services (regulatory or voluntary) and 
payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes.  
 
PES schemes have been defined broadly as voluntary and conditional transactions over 
well-defined ecosystem services between at least one supplier and one user (Wunder, 
2005). The basic idea behind these mechanisms is that the beneficiaries of service provision 
compensate the providers. PES schemes have commonly covered carbon sequestration, 
provision of habitat for endangered species, protection of landscapes and various 
hydrological functions (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). These schemes can increase local 
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people's incentives to self-enforce resource-use restrictions, by raising the value of the 
conserved resource to beneficiaries, thereby helping to overcome a lack of state 
enforcement (Engel et al., 2008; Engel and Palmer, 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010). They 
also represent a growing trend in conservation policy as they offer a more direct method 
for achieving environmental outcomes above other approaches (Jack et al., 2008; 
Zilberman et al., 2008).  
 
Critics challenge PES schemes’ ability to reduce poverty and enhance social justice in the 
distribution of income and wealth, as well as whether they can achieve its objectives of 
nature conservation and environmental protection (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Muradian et 
al., 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). PES does primarily focus on cost-
effectiveness and efficiency, by offering economic incentives to foster more efficient and 
sustainable use of ecosystem services. These schemes were not originally designed to 
reduce poverty (ForestTrends, 2008; McDermott et al., 2013). There are, however, 
opportunities for designing PES which can enable low-income people to earn money by 
restoring and conserving ecosystems. In certain contexts, PES can present new incentives 
for sustainable management, in the form of regular payments for ecosystem services. 
These regular payments can provide both a reliable source of supplemental income and 
additional employment in the community (ForestTrends, 2008). Water PES schemes are 
particularly likely to have pro-poor impacts, more so than most other environmental 
management interventions. This is because they can be designed to minimise trade-offs 
between poverty reduction and watershed services goals, they involve transfers of wealth, 
and because they can empower the poor by recognizing them as valued service providers 
(Asquith et al., 2008; Bruijnzeel and Noordwijk, 2008).  
 
Despite the potential benefits of PES schemes and successful cases contributing to poverty 
alleviation, PES is not a panacea. PES schemes pose many challenges and are not feasible 
everywhere (ForestTrends, 2008). Furthermore, PES schemes can take many forms and 
resemble a suite of different incentive-based mechanisms, some schemes fulfilling PES 
criteria more often than others (Sommerville et al., 2009). This study considers a straight-
forward form of PES scheme, following Wunder, 2005) definition, as land set-aside for 
water conservation. Land set-aside in this study refers to landholders halting any land uses 
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for a contracted period and receiving a payment for the benefits obtained from improved 
drinking water quality. The focus of this study is on assessing how equity can be advanced 
through PES schemes, as a way of enhancing this policy’s goals but also to promote greater 
equity in ecosystem service use.  
 
2.3.1 Designing PES Schemes for Improved Equity 
The likelihood of achieving equity in PES schemes will mainly depend on the scheme design 
and the local context where it is implemented. Variations in the design of PES schemes 
include which services are provided and their characteristics, who the providers or sellers 
are, who receives the benefits, who are the implementers and intermediaries, the 
participation and contracting eligibility, the form of the incentive or payment, and how the 
payments are funded (Babcock et al., 1997; Kroeger and Casey, 2007; Ferraro, 2008; 
Sommerville et al., 2009). Ecosystem services and their distinct characteristics were 
considered in section 2.1.1, so only the knowledge on PES schemes will be discussed here.  
 
The wide variety of buyers and providers in PES schemes and their possible relationships 
are important to consider in the design of any intervention (Sommerville et al., 2009). The 
potential providers of an ecosystem service are those actors, often private landholders, 
who are in a position to safeguard the delivery of the ecosystem service through ownership 
of the rights over the ecosystem service and the land (Sommerville et al., 2009). Ecosystem 
services are generally difficult to privatise or control; so suitable property rights need to be 
ensured and cooperation strategies negotiated between formal and informal providers 
(Arrow et al., 2000; Engel et al., 2008). Governments can also be landholders, and local 
communities can have joint property or management rights, raising issues of intra-
community distribution (Rojahn and Engel, 2005). Whoever the providers may be, PES 
seeks to take advantage of their knowledge of the cost of ecosystem service provision and 
to seek out the low-cost providers where appropriate. As long as participation is voluntary, 
ecosystem service providers are unlikely to accept a payment lower than their cost of 
providing the ecosystem service, while conditionality ensures that they actually comply 
with their contracts (Engel et al., 2008). Landholders have better information than 
conservation agents and service users about the opportunity costs of supplying ecosystem 
services. Landholders can thus secure higher payments by claiming their costs are higher 
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than they are; but society benefits more if the payments just compensate the landholders' 
opportunity costs of contract compliance and nothing more (Ferraro, 2008; Sommerville et 
al., 2009). Thus, estimating accurate opportunity costs for all landholders providing a 
service is vital for scheme feasibility and design, but it is also a challenging objective.  
 
Who the buyers of an ecosystem service are is also important, particularly if they are the 
actual users of the service or a third party (typically the government, an NGO, or an 
international agency) acts on behalf of the users. Pagiola and Platais, 2007) argue that user-
financed PES schemes are particularly likely to be efficient above other types, as the actors 
with the most information about the value of the service are directly involved, have a clear 
incentive to ensure that the scheme functions well, can observe directly whether the 
service is being delivered, and have the ability to re-negotiate (or terminate) contracts if 
needed. When benefits accrue to a small number of actors, incentives to free-ride and 
transaction costs are also relatively low. However, sometimes the conditions for user-
financed schemes do not hold, and third party involvement may be the only way that PES 
can be implemented. In third party-financed PES schemes the buyers are not the direct 
user of the service, they have no first-hand information on its value, and generally cannot 
observe directly whether it is being provided. They also do not have a direct incentive to 
ensure that the scheme is working efficiently and are often likely to be subject to a variety 
of political pressures (Pagiola and Platais, 2007; Wunder et al., 2008; Corbera et al., 2009). 
However, these schemes may be more cost-effective because of economies of scale in 
transaction costs and they can overcome free-riding problems by charging compulsory user 
fees. The key distinction between user-financed and third party-financed schemes, then, is 
not just who is paying the bills, but who has the authority to make decisions about paying 
the bills. However, these are just two classifications of PES schemes, there are other 
possible classifications ranging  between these two (Pagiola and Platais, 2007). 
 
It is important to try to ensure that existing inequities in providers and beneficiaries are 
dealt with in any scheme. Considerations must be taken for those beneficiaries who can’t 
pay, such as excluding them from paying or granting concessions (Brink et al., 2009; 
Paavola, 2009). Also, poor potential service providers need to be made more competitive 
versus the better-off providers. This could be achieved by reducing transaction costs, 
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simple contracts, have donors subsidised start-up costs, among others (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005). PES schemes are likely to make a true improvement in poverty outcomes only if they 
pay landholders an amount substantially higher than they would otherwise have earned 
with the land. PES schemes have the advantage of offering payments that are relatively 
certain compared to more variable and uncertain income sources, such as from agriculture. 
Providers are also likely to prefer a PES scheme over traditional regulation because it offers 
compensation for service improvements and participation is voluntary (Jack et al., 2008). 
 
PES schemes do not only involve beneficiaries and providers, but also the wide variety of 
institutional contexts where they operate (Sommerville et al., 2009). The institutional 
structure or rules of a PES scheme include property rights or entitlements, monitoring (i.e. 
additionality assurance), enforcement, exclusion, governance, decision making, and 
contracting arrangements (Paavola, 2007; Corbera et al., 2009; Clements et al., 2010). This 
structure guides the practice and ultimate effectiveness of any intervention (Engel and 
Palmer, 2008; Corbera et al., 2009). It also greatly influences actor relationships, funding 
sustainability, and the nature of PES outcomes (Corbera et al., 2009). The PES literature has 
begun to explore many institutional structure choices based on early PES experiences 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2009). Wunder, 2007) suggests that effective implementation of 
PES schemes may be considerably more difficult where institutions are weak. However, 
schemes driven by non-state actors may be able to partially compensate for weak state 
institutions. Informal institutions can provide security to landowners in receiving 
compensation, where this security is not given by state legal institutions (Jack et al., 2008).  
 
Within the past two decades a number of government-financed PES schemes have been 
established in developing countries with similarly well-defined institutional frameworks 
(Engel et al., 2008). Examples include Mexico's payments for hydrological environmental 
services program (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008) and Costa Rica’s program initially aimed at 
reducing deforestation rates (Pagiola, 2008). In addition, there are a growing number of 
user-financed programs, such as payments for watershed services between downstream 
users and upstream forest owners in Ecuador (Wunder and Albán, 2008) and Bolivia 
(Asquith et al., 2008), and contracts brokered between organisations and private 
landowners, communities or governments (Milne and Niesten, 2009; Clements et al., 2010). 
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The number of PES studies and schemes implemented has steadily increased over the last 
decade, but in-depth research on the institutional processes mediating service provision 
through incentive schemes has only started to emerge (Corbera et al., 2009). 
 
Incentives can be classified as positive or negative based on whether a decision maker 
perceives a gain or loss from their baseline. This study only focuses on PES schemes as a 
source of positive incentives for conservation. A PES scheme should aim to provide a net 
gain for participants through the use of positive incentives to bridge the gap between 
needs of users and landholders (Wunder, 2007; Garbach et al., 2012) and provide critical 
ecosystem services. In the most straightforward PES approach, individuals have legal 
control over the service provision and incentives are transferred to influence the decision 
to produce the service (Sommerville et al., 2009). PES incentives can be in cash or in kind 
(Wunder, 2005; Asquith et al., 2008; Engel et al., 2008), but there has been an 
overemphasis on monetary payments within the general PES discourse and practice (Jack 
et al., 2008). This is probably due to monetary payments being considered a more direct 
way of ensuring conditionality, as they are amenable to adjustment (Fisher, 2012).  The 
roles and interactions of a range of potential positive and negative incentives throughout a 
scheme’s lifespan need to be considered (Wunder, 2005; Kosoy et al., 2007; Sommerville et 
al., 2009; Garbach et al., 2012).  
 
PES scheme payments present a wide range of payment types, but are overall based on 
conditionality and additionality. Conditionality refers to giving payment if and only if the 
provider secures the provision of the ecosystem service; and additionality means that the 
payment stimulates new conservation that would not otherwise take place (Morrison and 
Aubrey, 2010; Muradian et al., 2013). The payment can be for conditionality measures as 
defined actions or as a general state of the system (Musters et al., 2001; CREC and CJC-
Consulting, 2002; Engel et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 2009). The size of the payment is 
conditional on performance relative to others or individualised specific criteria. The 
payment time horizon can be annual or at the end of an agreement (Marland et al., 2001; 
Wunder, 2005; Peskett et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 2009). The openness of spatial and 
participation incentives can be inclusive or targeted (Wätzold and Drechsler, 2005; Ferraro, 
2008; Wünscher et al., 2008; Barton et al., 2009; Sommerville et al., 2009). The scope and 
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design of incentive payments, including how contracting is done, is crucial to the levels of 
equity achieved and maintained in any scheme. Sometimes it is not the level or amount of 
payment that defines fairness but the actual distribution of payments (Gross-Camp et al., 
2012). Thus, the distribution of costs and benefits associated with any PES scheme need to 
be identified and understood to inform scheme contracting. 
 
The viability of any PES program requires that the maximum amount that users of 
ecosystem services would be willing to pay for improvements in a service exceed the 
minimum amount that service providers would be willing to accept. Most PES programs 
base payments on the (opportunity) cost of the providers’ adoption of particular land uses 
or management activities (cost-based approach). When additional management activities, 
such as reforestation are involved, the PES payment equals the sum of opportunity cost, 
transaction cost, and conservation cost. Benefit-based PES programs do exist, but they are 
exceptions. The focus on cost-based approaches has been due to markets for ecosystem 
services often not being competitive, or equity concerns that may require uniform rates. 
Very importantly, there is a lack of information on benefit estimates due to time and 
resource constraints, and they are often harder to estimate. A major problem with the 
cost-based approach is underpayment, whereby the payment is not high enough to attract 
potential providers to the most important areas of ecosystem service conservation. A 
future direction for PES is to establish schemes considering both benefits and costs 
supported by ecosystem service valuation (Liu et al., 2010). 
 
2.4 Valuing Ecosystem Services 
Most of the literature analysing costs and benefits of conservation and ecosystem service 
use have done so with methods such as literature reviews, case studies, cost-benefit 
analysis, among others. For instance, Bräuer, 2003) and Zheng et al., 2009) evaluate 
conservation using cost-benefit analyses. Both Balmford et al., 2003) and Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005) reviewed case studies to compare global costs and benefits of conservation, and to 
explore poverty issues, respectively. Xue and Tisdell, 2001) used opportunity costs and 
alternative cost methods to determine the monetary value of services in a Chinese reserve. 
However, there are gaps in studies applying valuation methods to understand costs and 
benefits of ecosystem services based on human preferences and values. 
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Ecosystem service valuation methods are increasingly promoted as a means for 
documenting the values humans place on ecosystems and the services these provide (de 
Groot et al., 2002; Chee, 2004; Groffman et al., 2004; Eamus et al., 2005; Kremen, 2005; 
MEA, 2005; Farber et al., 2006). This is an important trend as these values are often 
difficult to describe in economic terms and are rarely well-explained in conservation and 
development decisions (Wallace, 2007). Several studies have employed valuation methods 
to assess the costs and benefits of ecosystem services, but rarely both and seldom their 
distribution (e.g. Xue and Tisdell, 2001; Bruner et al., 2004). Valuation of ecosystem 
services highlights the important link between human and ecological systems (Liu et al., 
2010); and it has become an essential analytical tool in protected areas (Chan et al., 2006). 
The estimated value of an ecosystem service can provide a basis for establishing PES 
schemes, substantiating a conservation claim (especially against an imminent threat), 
improving environmental knowledge and concerns, and hopefully inspire the local 
government and stakeholders to be more concerned about limited resources (Chen et al., 
2009). In this study valuation is employed as a way of accounting for the role and economic 
value of ecosystem services, as well as the true benefits they generate for human wellbeing.  
 
Some argue that valuation of ecosystems is either impossible or unwise, that we cannot 
place a value on such intangibles as environmental aesthetics or long-term ecological 
benefits. But in fact, we do so every day, e.g. when we set standards for infrastructure or 
life insurance. Valuation is useful as money demonstrates to the public the social 
importance of conservation; it promotes a de-emotionalisation in decision-making; it 
provides knowledge of the real costs; it provides information about the potential damage 
to be internalised; and green accounting needs an economic valuation of ecosystem 
services (Bräuer, 2003; Liu et al., 2010). Nowadays, with unprecedented and intensifying 
pressures to deplete ecosystem services, the traditional arguments in support of ecosystem 
conservation alone are not sufficient. They do not capture the complete dependence of 
human wellbeing on nature. The socioeconomic focus of valuation is a vast improvement 
over business as usual (Brown et al., 2007; Badola et al., 2010). Although ecosystem 
valuation is certainly difficult and fraught with uncertainties, we are forced to make choices 
and these are enhanced when informed by valuation techniques (Costanza et al., 1997). 
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Individuals and societies allocate their limited resources so as to obtain the maximum 
welfare possible. To make decisions, they need to assess the relative value of services in 
order to choose those that provide the highest value per unit of costs incurred in attaining 
them (Figueroa and Aronson, 2006). Value can be defined as the contribution of an action 
or object to a user’s goals or utility (Costanza, 2000). Thus, value is the result of people’s 
expressed tastes and preferences, and the limited means with which services can be 
obtained. The value of ecosystem services is based on the intrinsic value of a service, 
measured by its contribution to maintaining the health and integrity of an ecosystem or 
species, irrespective of human satisfaction, and its instrumental value, that reflects the 
difference that something makes to the satisfaction of human preferences (Edwards and 
Abivardi, 1998; van Wilgen et al., 1998; de Groot et al., 2002; Farber et al., 2002; Straton, 
2006).  
 
Valuation methods can be divided into two main categories, indirect or revealed 
preference and direct or stated preference. Revealed preference methods explore the use 
of existing market and behavioural data to estimate the ex-post willingness to pay for 
various commodities. This is done using methods such as travel cost, hedonic price, 
averting behaviour, production function, or surrogate markets. For instance, averting 
behaviour focuses on expenditures that people make to reduce exposure to disamenities 
(Boyle, 2003b). Stated preference methods are based on the simulation of the market or 
hypothetical data to estimate the ex-ante willingness to pay for various commodities by 
means of questionnaires; such as the contingent valuation and choice modelling methods 
(Eade and Moran, 1996; Whitehead et al., 2008). For instance, contingent valuation 
techniques elicit willingness to pay (WTP) to maintain or improve a service or willingness to 
accept (WTA) its loss. WTP is the factor limiting how much of this value can be translated 
into a monetary flow (Fearnside, 1999; Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001; Nijkamp et al., 
2008).  
 
As the extensive literature on ecosystem services valuation has shown, each of these 
methods has its strengths and weaknesses. The major strength of the revealed preference 
approaches is that they are based on actual choices, better reflecting the values of the 
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population and allowing more valid estimates of willingness to pay. Their major weakness 
though is their reliance on historical data. Stated preference approaches have the strength 
of flexibility to construct realistic policy scenarios but its major weakness is their 
hypothetical nature. The strengths of the revealed preferences approaches are the 
weaknesses of the stated preference approaches and vice-versa; so a more comprehensive 
comparison of both methods offers a better value of the ecosystem service being studied 
(Costanza et al., 1997; Hanley, 1997; de Groot et al., 2002). PES designers have often 
turned to stated preference methods, and particularly to contingent valuation surveys (CV), 
to estimate the benefits provided by ecosystem services. CV can play several possible roles 
in PES design and equity advancement: to assess whether PES would be welfare-improving; 
provide guidance on the price to be charged to service users; and provide reassurance to 
policymakers that implementation of PES is politically feasible, by indicating that users 
would indeed be willing to pay (Whittington and Pagiola, 2012). Other valuation methods, 
such as revealed preference and market approaches, provide similar advantages. In this 
study the benefits provided by ecosystem services and the value ascribed by users to these 
services are used interchangeably. 
 
There is a serious gap in the knowledge of ecosystem service valuation which suggests that 
much original research needs to be done to value ecosystem services (Naidoo and Ricketts, 
2006). Most studies looking at the value of improving drinking water quality have focused 
on one approach or the other, only a few (Alberini et al., 1996; Laughland et al., 1996; 
Pattanayak et al., 2005; Rosado et al., 2006; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Haq et al., 2007; 
Vasquez et al., 2009) have in some way or another compared averting behaviour (revealed 
preference) and contingent valuation (stated preference). And only Dasgupta, 2004) was 
found to include averting behaviour and illness damage costs for a more complete measure 
of WTP.  
The costs of conserving ecosystem services can include transaction costs, opportunity costs, 
costs of implementing conservation actions, and monitoring costs (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; 
Coad et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2008; Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Opportunity costs are 
widely accepted as the main cost of conservation (Sinden, 2004; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 
2006). Opportunity costs are a useful tool employed for a variety of reasons, such as 
calculating conservation costs in protected areas or natural resource management, 
determining their distribution among landholders, assessing trade-offs in land uses, to test 
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methodological issues, and more recently to assess the feasibility and design of PES or 
REDD+ projects (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Estimating opportunity costs is a crucial 
starting point to determine the economic viability of PES schemes to effectively change 
land use practices (Plumb et al., 2012). A large challenge also exists to understand the 
distribution of opportunity costs among and within different ecosystem service provider 
groups as they have been found to be quite heterogeneous (Tallis and Polasky, 2009; 
Adams et al., 2010; Badola et al., 2010). Understanding how opportunity costs are 
distributed will inform who would gain and who would lose from a scheme, which is 
important both from an equity perspective and from a practical one (Pagiola and Bosquet, 
2009).  
 
Three main approaches have been used in the literature to estimate opportunity costs for 
PES schemes and other conservation initiatives. These approaches include the more recent 
screening contracts and procurement PES auctions, as well as more commonly used 
methods based on land attributes or returns, such as costly to fake signals, actual net 
returns from land uses, as well as land prices. First, screening contracts consist of offering a 
contract for each of the different types of landholders believed to exist and letting them 
self-select a contract. However, this method is limited by requiring detailed knowledge 
about the distribution of landowner types and sophisticated calculations by conservation 
practitioners. So far, no applications of this approach exist in practice (Wünscher et al., 
2011). Second, procurement PES auctions consist of a buyer of ecosystem services inviting 
bids from the suppliers for a specified contract and then buying the contracts with the 
lowest bids (Ferraro, 2008; Tóth et al., 2010). Auctions, if designed appropriately, get 
landowners to reveal the distribution of landowner types through their bids. For example, 
Jack et al., 2009) applied a procurement auction to determine how payment contracts can 
be configured during the design-phase of a conservation program for soil erosion control in 
Indonesia. Also, Khalumba et al., 2014) combined procurement auctions for reforestation 
contracts with payments based on contractor performance in Western Kenya. Both studies 
found that this approach helps reveal private landholders’ opportunity costs. However, 
these auctions have disadvantages, such as being quite complex to design and requiring a 
large pool of bidders to be valid.  
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Third, information can be gathered on observable landholder and land attributes that are 
correlated with opportunity costs and use these attributes to determine opportunity costs 
and establish PES contracts. Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006) estimated opportunity costs 
based on observed spatial patterns in conversion of natural habitat to agricultural land and 
observed net benefits from agricultural plots in a Reserve of Paraguay. Notably, collecting 
information on these attributes can be costly and the accuracy of this information will only 
be as good as the strength of the correlations between the attributes and landholder types. 
OCs can also be estimated using generic or average data often from secondary sources, 
most frequently government data. Many studies have applied this approach, most recently 
for REDD+ projects (Börner and Wunder, 2008; Börner et al., 2010; Hunt, 2010; Fisher et al., 
2011b; Fisher et al., 2011c). This approach is useful for studies at regional or national scale, 
but does not capture local variation (Grieg-Gran, 2006) and can yield quite varied results 
depending on the data sources employed. 
 
Furthermore, land use net returns can be estimated at the local or micro level, also 
referred to as the flow approach. Local level opportunity costs have helped develop 
payment levels for many existing PES programs (Plumb et al., 2012). Among the more 
recent studies we find: Borrego and Skutsch, 2014) that quantified the net returns to land 
uses that degrade dry tropical forests in Jalisco, Mexico. Illukpitiya and Yanagida, 2010) 
estimated farm returns to explore the trade-off between agriculture and extraction of 
forest products and to determine the efficiency improvement necessary to compensate the 
current income generated by non-timber forest products in the Badulla district of Sri Lanka. 
Adams et al., 2010) estimated opportunity costs of agriculture and ranching focusing on 
single stakeholder groups at Mbaracayu Forest Biosphere Reserve, Paraguay. This widely 
used flow approach provides detailed local information and variability. However, its 
drawbacks are that it is not suitable for extrapolating to larger areas, it bears the risk of 
strategic bias, can be quite costly, and a lot of data is at a coarse scale and can lack 
important information (Cattaneo, 2002; Grieg-Gran, 2006; Börner et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 
2011b; Wünscher et al., 2011).  
 
Finally, land market prices can be converted into values that can serve as proxies for 
opportunity costs, also referred to as the rents approach. For example, Chomitz et al., 2005) 
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estimated the opportunity costs of conservation in a biodiversity hotspot of Brazil using 
hedonic price model to impute land values. Ando et al., 1998) used county-level data on 
agricultural land values from the USA government to study the effect of heterogeneous 
land prices on the efficient selection of reserve sites. Ma and Swinton, 2011) demonstrate 
how hedonic analysis of agricultural land prices can be used to estimate the private values 
of land-based ecosystem services with data from Michigan, USA. The use of land values to 
determine opportunity costs is commonly used, reveals landholders true value for land and 
is quite straightforward. However, this approach is not recommended when no land market 
exists or it is undeveloped, where land can be obtained for free, or when it may reflect 
returns from potential land use not the actual one (Cattaneo, 2002; Ferraro, 2004; Grieg-
Gran, 2006; Börner et al., 2007).  
 
More comprehensive studies utilise two or more of the above described approaches to 
obtain more accurate and robust opportunity cost estimates (Sinden, 2004; Kosoy et al., 
2007; Wünscher et al., 2011). The authors recommend further research into opportunity 
cost estimations, particularly the flow approach techniques that are applied to deliver farm 
net returns. Particularly because cost-effective and precise estimation of site-specific 
opportunity costs is a major challenge (Wünscher et al., 2011). This study follows the more 
comprehensive studies described above by employing both a flow and a rent approach. The 
flow approach uses local level net returns from agriculture in order to obtain detailed 
insight into the heterogeneity of landowners and variability of opportunity costs. The rent 
approach employs stated land values that potentially reflect more stable longer term 
values. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter first explains the long-standing debate and need for achieving both 
development and conservation goals simultaneously, particularly in protected areas. It also 
highlights how one of the main concerns arising from this challenge is dealing with inequity. 
It then explores how the ecosystem services approach provides a useful view of the link 
between ecosystems and anthropogenic activities, the benefits that ecosystems provide to 
humans and the extent of ecosystem services beyond protected area boundaries. 
Ecosystem services are then defined, as well as the key characteristics that affect 
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ecosystem service use. This research aims to contribute to this debate by considering the 
challenge of improving ecosystem service provision for local inhabitants within a protected 
area setting. 
 
Subsequently, a critical review on how inequity has tried to be addressed and the 
impending challenges that persist is presented. The need for further study is highlighted as 
ignoring issues of equity will likely produce suboptimal outcomes and risk failure in 
prioritization efforts and permanence of actions. It is generally agreed that equity is a 
measure of the fairness of distribution and it is very important that this distribution be 
understood, as costs and benefits are not evenly spread over all people, places and time. 
Many studies have investigated costs and benefits of conservation efforts, but they have 
only assessed costs or benefits (rarely both), and have not studied their distribution.  Thus, 
this study focuses on the distribution of both the costs and benefits of ecosystem service 
use to inform equity outcomes of a potential PES scheme, beyond arguments on poverty 
reduction alone. 
 
This chapter also describes Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes, a market-based 
instrument, as a highly popular means of providing ecosystem services. Then, the potential 
of PES schemes to account for equity in their design, as well as being used to advance 
equity in ecosystem service use above other methods is discussed. This study contributes 
to the understanding of how PES schemes can be designed to advance equity based on 
several of its features, such as governance and property rights. Finally, economic valuation 
of ecosystem services is presented as a mean to assess the costs and benefits distribution 
of ecosystem service use. The use of valuation methods is favoured as it accounts for the 
true benefits ecosystem services generate for human well-being, and it provides the price 
to be paid for ecosystem services in a PES scheme, as well as its potential distribution. This 
study provides methodological contributions by comparing stated and revealed approaches 
to estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for ecosystems service provision. Particularly, a 
more complete revealed WTP is estimated by considering both averting behaviour and 
illness damage costs to deal with contaminated water, which provides a novel context to 
interpreting WTP. Another important methodological contribution of this thesis is the 
comparison of two different opportunity cost methods, the flow and the rent approach. 
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This comparison further strengthens the results obtained but also highlights the challenges 
involved in the estimation of these costs. In brief, this review identifies that the study of 
advancing equity, through studying the costs and benefits distribution of ecosystem service 
use through potential PES schemes, is an important research area, especially for water 
provision at the local scale in developing countries. This study aims to contribute to this. 
 
Specifically, the review highlights that many studies have investigated the costs or benefits 
of conservation. Few of them, however, have examined the distribution of both costs and 
benefits, the factors affecting this distribution, and with an ecosystem services approach. 
Objective 1 of this thesis seeks to contribute to this gap. This chapter also shows that many 
policies have been implemented to try to solve issues of inequity that often arise in 
conservation efforts. Although the market-based instruments of Payment for Ecosystem 
Services schemes were not primarily intended to improve equity, there have been claims 
that they have the potential to do so. Also, these schemes are an increasingly popular and 
widely applied policy, so consideration is needed on how to best design them to improve 
equity. Objective 2 of this thesis strives to contribute to the challenge of how to advance 
equity through PES scheme design and application. Finally, this review shows that 
economic valuation methods are useful means of assessing the value of ecosystem services. 
However, further understanding is needed on how different valuation methods are 
estimated and how they can be utilised in determining costs and benefits of ecosystem 
services. The 3rd objective of this thesis aims to add knowledge in this area. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
This chapter describes the overall research design and the specific methods used to 
collect data to achieve the objectives of this thesis. It highlights why the ecosystem 
service of water provision and the Honduran study site were selected. Furthermore, 
it provides a description of the sampling approach, as well as the providers and 
beneficiaries of the ecosystem service. The chapter also describes how the 
qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analysed. Throughout, the 
strengths and limitations of the various methods are highlighted and the main 
research limitations are presented.  
 
3.1 Ecosystem Service Selection: Water Provision 
Contaminated drinking water is a major health problem in developing countries and 
diarrhoea is the most common illness associated with it (Alberini et al., 1996; 
Dwight et al., 2005). Diarrhoea is particularly a problem for the poor and vulnerable 
as it is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in developing countries 
(LeChevallier and Au, 2004; Guh et al., 2008; Jalan et al., 2009; Halder et al., 2013). 
Each year there are approximately 4 billion cases of diarrhoea worldwide 
(LeChevallier and Au, 2004) and an estimated 88% of diarrhoeal deaths worldwide 
are attributable to unsafe water, inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene (Black et 
al., 2003). It is recognised that diarrhoeal illness is multi-cause and is affected by a 
variety of biological, environmental and social factors (Figueroa, 1990). Thus, the 
provision of clean drinking water in the developing world is an especially pressing 
matter as many people do not have enough of it. 
 
Water provision refers to the filtering, retention and storage of water in streams, 
lakes and aquifers. The retention and storage capacity depends on topography and 
sub-surface characteristics of the involved ecosystem. The filtering-function is 
mainly performed by the vegetation cover and soil biota (de Groot et al., 2002). 
Water provision has been defined as a rival service that can be exclusive or non-
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exclusive depending on land tenure. It also has specific consumptive, directional 
benefits, i.e. the service is produced at one location and the beneficiaries are at 
another, and benefits accrue at local to regional levels. Specifically, water provision 
is the ecosystem service and the actual benefit to society is improved drinking 
water quality.  
 
One reason for selecting water quality as the ecosystem service to study is because 
it has been found that aiming to increase water retention and storage through the 
expansion of forest cover is highly debated and evidence for the link is poor. 
Tackling water quality problems is more likely to be effective since there is less 
technical uncertainty and less divergence between public expectations and 
scientific evidence on the relationship between land use and water quality. Many 
national and local projects are based on a direct relationship between forest cover 
and water availability, such as the Mexican federal government program that pays 
forest owners for watershed protection and aquifer recharge (Muñoz-Piña et al., 
2008). However, it has been found that the prospects for enhanced rainfall and 
augmented base flows as a consequence of forestation in the humid tropics are 
generally poor, and more dependent on site-specific factors (Scott et al., 2005). 
Thus, the empirical scientific evidence on the relationship between forest cover and 
water quantity is still debated (Hamilton and King, 1983; Bruijnzeel, 2004; Ayward, 
2005; Kosoy et al., 2007). Importantly, the positive link between forest cover and 
water quality is much better established than that between forest cover and 
quantity (Bruijnzeel, 2004). Watersheds with a high proportion of land covered by 
intact forests and wetlands are particularly effective at moderating runoff and 
purifying water supplies. The vegetation and soils of forests and wetlands have a 
remarkable capacity to filter out contaminants and trap sediment that would 
otherwise enter rivers, lakes, and streams (Postel and Thompson, 2005). Thus, this 
study only focuses on the regulatory service of water quality provision. 
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The focus of this study is to assess the value of an improvement in drinking water 
quality to a clean or potable level from a contaminated status quo. Thus, the terms 
improved, clean and potable water are used interchangeably in this study, unless 
otherwise stated. The ecosystem service of water quality provision was selected 
based on its usefulness to address the issue of equity in rural protected areas; since 
it offers the clearest and most valued locally perceived benefits (de Groot et al., 
2002; Van Hecken et al., 2012). Also, it is a service present and prioritised in most 
protected areas and it has vital importance for long-term quality of life. Importantly, 
access to safe drinking-water is essential to health, a basic human right and a 
component of effective policy for health protection (WHO, 2011). In 2011, an 
estimated 768 million people did not use an improved drinking water source, 83% 
of which lived in rural areas (WHO and UNICEF, 2014).  
 
3.2 Case Study: Honduras and the Güisayote Biological Reserve 
Latin America and the Caribbean possess about a third of the world’s water 
resources, and yet In 2000, 77 million people lacked access to safe water, 66% of 
which were rural inhabitants (CONAGUA, 2006). Additionally, this region has the 
most inequitable income distribution in the world, hampering the resolution of 
water problems (Canales Davila, 2011). In the 1990s and 2000s the tendency was 
towards dealing with the challenges of increasing water scarcity, pollution and 
climate change, with initiatives such as new water laws (Canales Davila, 2011). 
However, there has been a widespread inability to establish formal institutions that 
are able to deal with water allocation issues, extreme events and water pollution 
under conditions of scarcity and conflict.  
 
In contrast, Latin America has stood out in recent years for its pioneering and 
growing ecosystem services schemes (Pagiola et al., 2005) that have been 
recognised as a potential new form of watershed management in Latin America and 
further afield. National mechanisms have been implemented in Costa Rica and 
Mexico, and independent schemes focusing on biodiversity, water and carbon-
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related services throughout the continent (Herrador and Dimas, 2000; Sanchez-
Azofeifa et al., 2007; Asquith et al., 2008; Kosoy et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Barton 
et al., 2009; Daniels et al., 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). A number of 
payment schemes at the watershed level have already been implemented, allowing 
for preliminary lessons to be learned (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Rosa et al., 
2003; Mayrand and Paquin, 2004; Warner et al., 2004). Nevertheless, there remains 
much to learn before recommendations can confidently be made on how such 
programs should be best designed in developing countries (Pagiola et al., 2008). 
 
Honduras is a small country (112,492 km2) in Central America, with a population of 
over 8 million of which more than half is rural and two thirds live below the poverty 
line (FAO, 2010; GWP-Centroamerica, 2011; INE, 2014). The country has abundant 
water sources but uses less than 10% of its hydrological potential (GWP-
Centroamerica, 2011). Thus, water availability is not an issue, but accessibility and 
quality are. In general, water quality is affected by population growth, the 
prevalence of untreated sewage, deforestation and the use of chemicals in 
agriculture. The government has recognised the importance the water services 
have in creating conditions for economic growth and the alleviation of poverty 
(Canales Davila, 2011). An effort has been made to decentralise natural resource 
management by greater involvement of NGOs, local governments and communities. 
However, despite these efforts and adequate legislation, such as the relatively 
recent 2009 Honduran General Water Law, adequate water management and 
conservation are still lacking (GWP-Centroamerica, 2011). 
 
Honduras has a long tradition of centralised command-and-control style 
conservation, focused on the creation of protected areas. Currently, 95 protected 
areas cover approximately 27% of the country (CIPF, 2009; Figure 3.1). However, 
the limited political will and capacity of government agencies to effectively enforce 
legislation means many protected areas are just paper parks, with limited or non-
existent protection. At the local and national levels Honduras is highly dependent 
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on its natural resources, mainly forests for timber, firewood and other non-timber 
forest products (Jansen et al., 2006; Gareau, 2007; Larson et al., 2007). However, 
unsustainable practices and weak environmental governance threaten its protected 
areas and the livelihoods of their inhabitants (Rivera et al., 2000; Cherrett, 2001; 
Ericksen et al., 2002; Southworth et al., 2004). According to the Google Earth layer 
on deforestation, created by David Tryse, which draws its data from the World 
Resources Institute and Greenpeace, Honduras had the highest deforestation in the 
world between 1990 - 2005. In response, the country has seen the development of 
several initiatives, including some PES schemes. These remain geographically 
dispersed and have had differing effects on local livelihoods (e.g. Martinez de 
Anguita et al., 2006; Kosoy et al., 2007; Ballestero Madrigal and Rodríguez Alpizar, 
2008). The Honduran government, like many developing countries, is unable to 
ensure suitable conservation efforts and guarantee clean drinking water for its 
inhabitants. Thus, Honduras is an ideal setting for this study representing Latin 
American developing countries. 
 
The Güisayote Biological Reserve (referred to as the Reserve from now on; Figure 
3.1) was selected as a representative case study for Honduras and Latin America. 
The Reserve is a protected area with several environmental problems and threats, a 
management category that is not respected, high levels of deforestation (30 - 68% 
forest coverage for the micro-watersheds included in this study; Mendoza, 2002) 
and forest degradation (AESMO, 2010; Magaña Portillo et al., 2010). The Reserve 
offered an ideal research setting to assess in-depth, local level equity issues and 
was selected as representative of rural areas in developing countries due to its 
socioeconomic heterogeneity, population pattern and the size of the watersheds. 
This in turn determines the variety in water use behavioural patterns of domestic 
consumers and thus contributes to assessing the WTP of these users. Furthermore, 
as protected areas are in their majority managed by NGOs on behalf of the 
government, it was important to secure their support and permission to carry out 
the research. AESMO, in charge of the Reserve, proved to be approachable due to 
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current PES scheme explorations and provided the researcher with access to the 
area.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of the Honduran protected area system, showing each management category in a 
different colour and the location of the Güisayote Biological Reserve circled in black (source: AFE-
COHDEFOR 2004). 
 
The Reserve is located between UTM 1586980 - 1603550 latitude north, and 
277850 - 281800 longitude east, in the west of Honduras close to the borders with 
El Salvador and Guatemala. It is 14,479.38 ha in size and crosses the municipalities 
of La Labor, Sinuapa, Fraternidad, San Marcos, Mercedes and San Francisco del 
Valle in the department of Ocotepeque (Figure 3.2). The Reserve is located 
between 1,140 and 2,310 m above sea level, with a strict conservation core zone of 
4,563.87 ha and a managed buffer zone of 9,915.51 ha. Annual precipitation is high, 
between 1,150 and 1,300 mm, with a rainy season from May to October and a dry 
season from November to April. The average mean temperature ranges from 18 to 
22 °C. The highest parts of the Reserve have rain throughout the year due to 
permanent rainforest cloud cover, evidenced by a relative humidity of 82 to 93% 
(AESMO, 2010). 
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Figure 3.2. Map of the Güisayote Biological Reserve, showing the core zone in red, the buffer zone in 
blue and the municipality borders in green (source: AESMO 2006). 
 
A biological reserve is a strict management category for “an untouchable area that 
contains ecosystems, aspects or flora and fauna of scientific value. Its main function 
is to protect, conserve and maintain unaltered phenomena or natural processes, for 
studies and scientific research” (La Gaceta Presidential Agreement No. 921-97, 25th 
of September 1999). The Reserve encompasses seven ecosystems: broadleaf forest, 
mixed forest predominant in broadleaf, intervened broadleaf forest, mixed forest 
predominant in conifers, low forest with bushes, pastures, and agriculture systems 
(see pictures in Appendix 1). However, the Reserve was created in 1987 through a 
government bid to explicitly protect thirty seven rainforests providing key 
hydrological services in the country. The Reserve itself contributes indirectly to two 
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nationally important watersheds, the Ulúa (most important economically) and 
Lempa Rivers (AESMO, 2010). 
 
Most of the Reserve is privately owned, which has hampered its management as a 
strict Biological Reserve. However, since 2003, the Reserve has been co-managed 
by the Asociación Ecological San Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO), with the support 
of the municipalities and the national forestry institute. More recently, AESMO has 
bought forested land in the core zone with own funding and that from the 
municipality of La Labor, the community of Llano Largo, the Ocotepeque area 
project of World Vision, and the Small Grants for the Purchase of Nature of UICN 
and the Dutch Lottery. To date, a total of 268 ha have been purchased and are 
under conservation by La Labor municipality. AESMO has also started an initiative 
to change the Reserve’s management category to a National Park, to allow laxer 
management (AESMO, 2010).  
 
This study specifically covers a watershed in the Reserve formed by the Idolo and El 
Potrero Rivers, and the El Chupadero stream (Figure 3.3), encompassing 
approximately 4,793.4 ha of rugged topography with very steep slopes. This 
watershed was selected as it is subject to the most problems in water provision 
compared to other areas of the Reserve and for covering the two protected area 
zones. The watershed has a history of non-existent protection and is threatened by 
varied and complex problems. Problems of water quality and quantity have been 
reported due to over grazing, land use change (agriculture and cattle ranching), use 
of agrochemicals, forest fires and inadequate extraction of timber and firewood 
(MSMO 2002). The greatest use of water is for domestic activities, followed by 
cattle ranching, agriculture and very rarely for industry.  
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Figure 3.3. Map of the Reserve showing study site with core and buffer zones, rivers and streams in 
watershed, beneficiary communities and water sources; beneficiary communities: 1 = El Portillo, 2 = 
La Granadilla, 3 = Rio Chiquito, 4 = Las Flores, 5 = La Ruda, 6 = Pashapa, 7 = El Anicillo, 8 = El Ingenio, 
9 = Llano Largo, 10 = Santa Lucia, 11 = Santa Efigenia, 12 = Montepeque, 13 = La Labor, 14 = Santa 
Cruz, and 15 = Los Amates.  
 
The user population benefitting from the three watersheds is estimated at 7,725 
inhabitants (PNUD, 2010b) in fifteen communities with low affluence and mostly 
depending on farming for their livelihoods. These communities have a total of 1545 
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households, between 11 and 393 households each, with only the largest considered 
an urban town (Table 3.1). Two communities are located within the core zone and 
three in the buffer zone, at a short distance from water sources, and the rest are 
located outside the Reserve. Furthermore, land ownership of water sources is 
generally insecure and varied, one is owned by the community, three by the 
municipality and the rest verbally donated. The annual water bill ranges between 
Lps. 120 and 500 (US$ 6.35 - 26.46) and is unrelated to the water system or supply. 
The reported proportion of households per community paying their water bill on 
time ranges from 30 – 100%. Each community has a water system independently 
managed by a locally elected water board, as in all cases the water systems were 
built with little or no government support. These community systems cannot 
guarantee water quality as water treatment is rudimentary, i.e. irregular or non-
existent chlorine application. Each water system has a dam and/or collection box at 
the spring source, except El Portillo which uses a bucket system (see pictures in 
Appendix 2), and piping that takes water to a storage tank and then to households. 
Water sources are located between 15 and 180 minutes from the respective 
beneficiary community.  
 
Upstream private landholders cover a large part of the water provision area 
through dispersed plots dedicated to both subsistence and commercial land uses. 
Some land is forested and the rest is used for maize and beans for staple 
subsistence, extensive cattle ranching throughout for subsistence and local 
commerce (of milk and cheese, seldom for meat), vegetables at higher altitudes (e.g. 
potato, cabbage, carrot) and coffee at lower heights for national and international 
commerce (Appendix 3). Generally these different land uses involve the application 
of fertilizers and pesticides, but have low technological inputs due to poverty and 
the irregular terrain. For most land uses, only a couple of communities have 
organised into informal farmer groups. Also, select vegetable farmers get support 
from NGO-based agricultural projects examining sustainable practices, increasing 
productivity, and marketing. Coffee is the main source of employment in the study 
site (PNUD, 2010b), so coffee growers generally receive a lot of support and are 
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organised into local or national associations and cooperatives. In addition to its 
local importance, coffee is the main export of Honduras, making it the second 
largest Latin American producer and the sixth in the world 
(CentralAmericaData.com, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
7
 
Table 3.1. Main characteristics of the fifteen beneficiary communities; note: DA = Donated by an individual from another community, DC = donated by an individual of the 
same community, M = municipality owned, C = community owned. *La Labor is divided into La Mesa and Centro neighbourhoods 
Community 
Location in 
Reserve 
No. of 
houses 
Annual water 
bill (Lps.) 
% pay on 
time 
Time to 
source (min.) 
Water 
source 
ownership 
Water has been 
contaminated 
Water board 
has savings 
La Ruda Buffer zone 11 -- N/A 30 DA Yes No 
El Anicillo Outside 18 240 100 60 M Yes No 
El Portillo Core zone 19 -- N/A 25 DA No Yes 
Los Amates Outside 28 240 90 150 DC Yes Yes 
Las Flores Buffer zone 32 120 80 15 DA No No 
Rio Chiquito Buffer zone 33 372 50 20 DA Yes Yes 
La Granadilla Core zone 35 180 100 30 DA Yes No 
Pashapa Outside 68 150 60 80 DA Yes Yes 
Santa Efigenia Outside 68 240 100 80 DA Yes Yes 
El Ingenio Outside 68 120 100 90 DA No Yes 
Montepeque Outside 71 300 90 95 DC Yes Yes 
Santa Cruz Outside 119 360 40 180 DA Yes Yes 
Llano Largo Outside 260 500 85 90 C Yes Yes 
Santa Lucia Outside 322 180 75 120 M Yes Yes 
La Labor Outside 393 120 30/50* 120 M Yes Yes 
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3.3 Research Design 
The research design developed to address the thesis objectives was based on an 
integrated range of methods including participatory methods to assess the local 
context and test research instruments; two quantitative valuations of water 
provision benefits to users; and two quantitative estimates of water provision costs 
to providers. Data collection comprised three distinct phases: 
i. Understanding the local context and testing research instruments.  
The first phase consisted of three general exploratory methods: focus 
groups, mapping and interviews. Focus groups provided knowledge about 
the local context, views on water-related issues and tested the design of 
survey instruments; participatory community mapping helped determine 
the population and sample size, and facilitated fieldwork logistics; and 
interviews with water boards provided background on water supply and 
governance. 
 
ii. Valuing the WTP of beneficiaries for water provision.  
The second phase was subdivided into two comparable stages: (i) a 
contingent valuation survey was employed to obtain the stated WTP of 
beneficiaries for improved drinking water quality through a PES scheme 
scenario; (ii) averting expenditure and damage costs were estimated to 
obtain a revealed WTP for improved drinking water quality. For both stages, 
the factors explaining the WTP distribution among beneficiaries were 
examined. 
 
iii. Defining the cost to providers of water provision. 
The third phase originally consisted of three corresponding stages. An 
experimental procurement PES auction was implemented, but excluded 
from this study due to very low participation rates of an already small 
sample. Thus, the study includes two stages based on a survey that 
ascertained the opportunity cost of taking land out of production to ensure 
water provision: (i) the net benefits of each land use were calculated for all 
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farmers based on the revenue and costs in a one year period, for a flow 
approach estimate; and (ii) landholders and farmers potential land rental 
and sale values, and the actual purchase price were recorded, for a rents 
approach estimate.  
 
Safeguarding drinking water quality is a complex issue and the use of different 
methodological approaches contributed to a better understanding of the different 
aspects involved in the problem. Qualitative methods such as focus group 
discussions contributed to the understanding of local views and attitudes on water-
related issues. Quantitative approaches such as the contingent valuation and the 
opportunity cost surveys allowed the measurement of the costs and benefits 
involved in drinking water quality improvement. The following section defines each 
of the data collection methods employed in this study, but detailed descriptions are 
deferred to the respective empirical chapters (4, 5, and 6) to aid readability. 
 
3.4 Data Collection  
Data collection commenced with a brief scoping trip between the 28th of March and 
the 7th of April, 2010 to carry out informal interviews with key informants in 
Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras. The trip also included a visit to the field site to 
check its suitability and to meet with AESMO staff. Fieldwork took place between 
21st February and 29th October, 2011. Fieldwork commenced with three exploratory 
methods: focus groups, participatory community mapping and water board 
interviews. These initial methods provided knowledge about the local context and 
views on water-related issues, informed survey design and complemented 
subsequent methods. Two hired interviewers took part in all these methods in 
order to understand the local context and train for survey application.  
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3.4.1 Exploratory Methods 
3.4.1.1 Focus Groups 
A focus group is a small group of stakeholders that brainstorm and discuss their 
interests, influences and other subjects. It is a rapid, cost-effective and adaptable 
method (Reed et al., 2009).  Two focus groups were facilitated by the researcher, 
following Kitzinger, 1995), with representatives of the water boards of each 
community. Water board representatives were invited by a personally delivered 
letter (Appendix 4). Both focus groups were implemented the same day, lasting 
approximately three hours each, with participants divided geographically to obtain 
upper and lower watershed views and to keep group sizes manageable and 
homogenous. The focus groups served to obtain the greatest amount of 
information in a short time period covering views and social dynamics of the local 
water context, and to test the contingent valuation survey questions were 
comprehensible to respondents and appropriate to the study site.  
 
The morning focus group consisted of twenty participants representing ten 
communities, including one community not included in the final sample. The 
afternoon focus group had nine participants representing eight communities, 
including two communities not included in the final sample (Appendix 5). A series of 
open ended questions were used to guide discussions (Appendix 6) and were 
enhanced with PowerPoint slides. Also, the representatives of each community 
were given a study site map to locate their water source, landowners adjacent to 
the source, and contamination threats (Appendix 7). These visual aids were used in 
order to avoid discriminating against people who can’t read or write. Sessions were 
relaxed, in a local cultural venue, with refreshments and lunch provided, and sitting 
in a semi-circle in order to view the PowerPoint slides (Figure 3.4). At the start, the 
researcher explained the aim of the focus group using slides and encouraged 
people to talk. The researcher maintained a back seat, only intervening when 
discussions were going off topic or to ensure all questions were covered within the 
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available time. The focus groups were recorded, with participants’ prior consent, 
and then transcribed in order for the researcher to concentrate on the discussions. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Photograph of afternoon focus group discussion led by researcher at local venue “Casa de 
la Cultura” in La Labor on the 15
th
 of April 2011. 
 
 3.4.1.2 Participatory Community Mapping 
Due to the lack of a land registry for the study site, participatory community 
mapping was carried out (Corbett, 2003). The first phase was carried out at the end 
of a municipal meeting (Figure 3.5a). It consisted on each community’s auxiliary 
mayor (i.e. the community elected representative for municipal meetings) and any 
other community members, locating individual houses (with names), roads/tracks 
and main infrastructures on a draft map (Figure 3.5b). The initial maps were 
enlarged and redrawn from past project documents stored at the municipality 
office. The second phase involved water board committees and key informants 
revising the initial maps. All efforts were made to include relevant users of the 
service and exclude non-relevant users, to ensure representativeness and reduce 
non-response.  
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Figure 3.5. Photographs of a) Auxiliary mayor and community members elaborating their 
community’s map; and b) the completed map for Llano Largo community with household names 
attached on upper right-hand corner. 
 
3.4.1.3 Water Board Interviews and Water Source GIS Mapping 
Each water board committee, generally represented by the president (Figure 3.6), 
answered a structured interview, that is, the wording of questions and their 
sequence is the same from one interview to another (Fielding, 1994). The interview 
consisted of qualitative and quantitative questions, covering the water board 
committee structure, operationalization, accounting, financial security, ecological 
integrity of source, links and networks, and infrastructure (Appendix 8). Water 
board interviews were complemented by a visit to the community water source in 
order to corroborate answers, which also served to map the usual route taken to 
and location of the water source using a hand-held Geographic Positioning System 
(GPS) unit (Garmin Map62s). The aims of these interviews were to develop an 
understanding of local water governance and water conservation problems, and 
obtain spatial data to support findings.  
 
2
6
0
 
 
63 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
Figure 3.6. Photographs of researcher interviewing two community water board presidents, (i) of 
Pashapa at water source (President is standing on water box; left) and (ii) of La Granadilla at the 
community (right). 
 
3.4.2 Valuation of the WTP for Water Provision 
Markets cannot efficiently allocate public goods or resources with pervasive 
externalities, or for which property rights are not clearly defined. Measurement of 
the costs and benefits involved is central to improving allocation and it is typically 
done through tools such as valuation methods. All valuation methods rely on 
people’s innate ability to prefer, to place one object above or below another in a 
given context (Brown, 2003). Valuation is based on obtaining people’s willingness to 
pay (WTP) to avoid a negative change or obtain a positive one, or willingness to 
accept (WTA), to forgo a positive change or accept a negative one. Typically, WTP is 
associated with a desirable change and WTA is associated with a negative change 
(Flores, 2003).  
 
A variety of methods exist to determine the value of each ecosystem service (e.g. 
de Groot et al., 2002; Farber et al., 2002; Costanza, 2003; Chee, 2004; Olschewski 
and Benitez, 2005). In developing countries water quality valuation studies have 
used preference methods, such as contingent valuation and choice experiments, or 
revealed preference methods, such as averting behaviour, production functions, 
opportunity costs, travel cost methods, and hedonic pricing (Briscoe et al., 1990; 
North and Griffin, 1993; Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001; CBM-CCAD, 2002; Kaliba 
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et al., 2003; Hopkins et al., 2004; Ahmad et al., 2005; Bauda et al., 2007; Martinez 
Tuna and Kosoy Daroqui, 2007; Barkmann et al., 2008; Ojeda et al., 2008).  
This study applies the contingent valuation method to estimate a stated WTP and 
the averting behaviour plus the illness damage costs to estimate a revealed WTP. 
The revealed preference methods of averting behaviour and illness damage costs 
are considered the main methods when assessing the cost of illness due to poor 
drinking water quality (Boyle, 2003b).  The stated preference methods of 
contingent valuation and choice experiment are the most commonly used 
nowadays due to their superiority above other methods in this category. Choice 
experiments are popular due to allowing for the estimation of numerous goods 
and/or different combinations of attributes for a single good (Brown, 2003). 
Contingent valuation on the other hand is useful when the estimation of any single 
kind of public good or service is desired (Haab and McConnell, 2003). Contingent 
valuation was selected for this study as there were limited options for the 
hypothetical scenario design for the good being valued, so a more complex method 
like choice experiment was not applicable or necessary.   
 
The major strength of the revealed preference approaches is that they are based on 
actual choices, better reflecting the values of the population and allowing more 
valid estimates of willingness to pay. Their major weakness though is their possible 
reliance on historical data. The stated preference approach has the strength of 
flexibility to construct realistic policy scenarios but its major weakness is its 
hypothetical nature. The strengths of the revealed preferences approaches are the 
weaknesses of the stated preference approaches and vice-versa (Costanza et al., 
1997; Hanley, 1997; de Groot et al., 2002). Thus, a more comprehensive 
comparison of both methods will offer a better value of the ecosystem service 
being studied and inform the validity of using a revealed approach to inform service 
valuation.  
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3.4.2.1 Sampling for Valuation Methods 
The sample of water users to be surveyed for both valuation methods was 
randomly selected following Yamane, 1967) sample size formula at a 95% 
confidence level (Appendix 9). A 30% non-response rate was included in the 
estimated sample size (Macmillan et al., 2001) and households were selected using 
computer-generated random numbers. The unit of measurement was the 
household through the person self-identified as household head. The household 
head was most often male; in line with the male dominant culture of Honduras. 
Data elicitation was an in-person survey, covering both stated and revealed 
preference methods (Appendix 10), as other survey modes, i.e. telephone, mail and 
email, are inappropriate for rural populations that have inadequate communication 
infrastructure and high levels of illiteracy. In-person interviews also were selected 
to provide visual information to respondents and to ensure the interviewer was 
available to answer any questions that arose. 
 
3.4.2.2 Determining a Stated WTP: Contingent Valuation 
Stated preference methods for valuing the environment rely on answers to 
carefully worded survey questions and are often the most effective way to 
understand people’s preferences. These surveys can describe new goods, limit the 
choice set and posit hypothetical policy scenarios. There are three main stated 
preference methods: attribute-based (choice experiments), paired comparison and 
contingent valuation. The first two methods ask respondents about numerous 
goods, allowing for the estimation of a preference ranking. On the other hand, 
contingent valuation is commonly used to value a single good, such as that assessed 
in this study, through a monetary measure (Brown, 2003).  
 
The extensively used stated preference method of contingent valuation (CV), asks 
questions that help reveal the monetary trade-off each person would make 
concerning a change in the quantity or quality of a good or service by providing 
respondents with information about a hypothetical scheme that would bring about 
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the change (Arrow and Solow, 1993; Boyle, 2003a; Haab and McConnell, 2003; 
Carson, 2012). The CV method offers many advantages, such as allowing for a more 
direct valuation of the characteristics of a service, contributing insights into the 
feasibility of potential projects and policies, and the ability to estimate non-use 
values which are not captured in other methods (Bateman et al., 2002). 
 
3.4.2.3 Determining a Revealed WTP: Averting Behaviour plus Damage 
Costs 
a) Averting Behaviour  
Revealed preference methods draw statistical inferences on values from actual 
choices people make within markets, i.e. purchase decisions. Unlike stated 
preference methods, revealed preference methods rely on data that record 
people’s actual choices (Boyle, 2003b). The four most commonly used of these 
methods are travel cost, hedonic models, averting behaviour and damage costs. 
Averting or defensive behaviour and damage cost methods are typically applied to 
value health effects.  
 
The averting behaviour method is the most popular revealed preference approach 
to valuing safe drinking water as it more accurately estimates WTP values over 
other methods (Laughland et al., 1993; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Um et 
al., 2002). The method focuses on expenditures that people make to reduce 
exposure to disamenities or to offset adverse effects of exposure. Averting 
behaviour arises from a household production framework whereby people combine 
market goods that they purchase and their own time to produce a desired outcome: 
improved health or wellbeing from reductions in exposure to a disamenity. The 
purchased inputs and time comprise the implicit price of improved health. This 
method simply assumes that a rational person will take averting behaviours as long 
as the value of the damage avoided exceeds the cost of the defensive action. 
Averting behaviour is considered an adequate estimate or at least a lower bound of 
a measure of economic value like WTP of improving water quality because people 
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may not be able to fully avert or there may be inconvenience in defensive actions 
that is not captured in the monetary cost (Boyle, 2003b; Dickie, 2003).  
 
b) Damage Costs 
Unlike averting behaviour, the damage cost method, also referred to as cost-of-
illness or coping costs, implicitly assumes that there is no behavioural response to 
environmental changes or that behavioural responses are not effective. The 
damage cost method measures attempts to measure the full cost of illness caused 
by environmental contamination, such as the cost of waterborne illness due to 
drinking contaminated water (Boyle, 2003b). The method is straightforward 
because it uses market data on wages, hours worked, prices and quantities that are 
revealed through changes in behaviour in labour and health care markets (Kenkel, 
1994; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997). Damage costs include both direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs are expenditures to treat illness and restore health; 
indirect costs reflect the opportunity costs of reduced productivity or output 
foregone because of environmental contamination (Dickie, 2003). The method has 
the advantages of being relatively simple to employ, involving little subjective 
judgement or interpretation on the part of the researcher and being easy to 
understand by non-economists (Harrington et al., 1989; Whitehead and Van 
Houtven, 1997). This method is not generally assumed to estimate a measure of 
economic value like WTP, and is almost surely less than WTP, but it is a well-defined 
way of determining a lower bound estimate of benefits (Dickie, 2003).  
 
3.4.3 Defining the Cost of Water Provision  
As any human or domestic animal use of upstream land is likely to generate faecal 
contamination of water (Arby, 2008; Jewitt, 2011), besides contamination from 
agriculture, the PES scheme in this thesis was designed to remove land from 
production entirely and opportunity cost estimation is based on this premise.  
Opportunity costs were calculated to determine what would be the cost of 
conserving the study site watershed in order to improve drinking water quality. 
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These costs were chosen as usually they represent the largest portion of 
conservation costs, they provide insights into the drivers and causes of 
deforestation, they can help identify the likely impacts of conservation programs 
across social groups in a specific area, and they help identify fair compensation for 
those who change their land use practices (WBI, 2011). The concept of opportunity 
cost is based on scarcity and exclusiveness, because one course of action prevents 
another one from occurring (Pirard, 2008). Opportunity cost analysis generates a 
money-based representation (e.g. US$/ha) of the trade-off between conservation 
and generating profit from land use.  
 
Opportunity costs can be estimated using various approaches, based on primary or 
secondary data, ranging from economic optimization or general equilibrium models 
(Cattaneo, 2002; Börner et al., 2007) to land prices being used as surrogates for the 
discounted stream of future deforestation returns (Richards et al., 1993; Antle and 
Valdivia, 2006; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006; Börner and Wunder, 2008). Most 
commonly, these costs are based on actual land-use changes, on historic trends or 
on the highest-value alternative land use (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). More 
specifically, opportunity costs can consist of direct, on-site costs (profit difference 
between conserving an area and converting it to another more valuable, land use), 
socio-cultural costs (livelihoods restricted or changed; psychological, spiritual or 
emotional impacts) and indirect, off-site costs (changes in economic sectors, tax 
revenue differences and agriculture and forest product price increases from 
economy feedbacks; Pirard, 2008; WBI, 2011). Due to the study’s local focus on cost 
and benefit distribution, this study uses two bottom-up approaches based on local, 
on-the-ground, empirical data. The flow approach estimates direct, on-site 
opportunity costs and the rent approach includes direct costs likely to take account 
of socio-cultural costs also. Both approaches were covered within one opportunity 
cost survey (Appendix 11).  
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There are some limitations associated with opportunity cost estimations. First, 
estimations can inaccurate, as seemingly similar land use changes may have very 
different opportunity costs and many factors determine opportunity costs, both 
biophysical and socio-economic. Second, they might be considered to be the sole 
costs of conservation, excluding potential substantial costs. If transaction and 
implementation costs are also taken into account, different conclusions regarding 
viable schemes and policies could be reached (WBI, 2011; Rendón Thompson et al., 
2013). Third, they do not always account for all types of opportunity costs; if 
possible, socio-cultural and indirect off-site costs should be considered besides 
direct, on-site costs (WBI, 2011). Therefore, opportunity costs should never be 
applied uncritically.  
 
3.4.3.1 The Flow Approach to the Opportunity Cost  
The flow approach consisted of estimating the micro-level net returns of each land 
use by subtracting from the sum of incoming monetary flows (e.g. from sales of 
agricultural products) the sum of outgoing monetary flows (e.g. through purchase 
of farm inputs such as fertilizer and petrol). This approach is likely to deliver slight 
overestimates of opportunity costs for several reasons: (i) the cost of land 
conversion is not considered, (ii) family labour is deducted at 50% of the local 
worker wage assuming there are few readily available alternative sources of income 
and (iii) data only cover a single year period (Wünscher, 2008; Wünscher et al., 
2011). However, as mentioned in the previous section, this approach might also 
deliver underestimates of opportunity costs as it omits socio-cultural costs and 
indirect, off-site costs.  
 
The opportunity cost survey included questions on farmer socioeconomic data and 
the costs and revenue for each land use to derive profits for a single year (2010 – 
11). Only this period was covered because information on historical land conversion, 
factors influencing conversion patterns and land market prices were unavailable. 
Throughout the survey, no reference was made to the legality of forest resource 
2
6
0
 
 
70 
 
                                                                                    
 
use before or during the questioning, to avoid influencing responses; though some 
respondents may be aware of the legal implications of extracting forest resources in 
a reserve. 
 
3.4.3.2 The Rent Approach to the Opportunity Cost  
In the rent approach, land returns are approximated using annual land rents 
(Wünscher et al., 2011). In this study site land is infrequently rented, and sales 
rarely recorded. Three alternative methods to elicit rental values, namely stated 
sale and rental values, and actual purchase price were therefore used. 
 
3.5 Valuation Data Analysis: Theoretical Background  
3.5.1  Stated Preference Approach  
The valuation of public goods and resources, such as drinking water quality, is 
based on welfare economics. Markets cannot efficiently allocate public goods or 
resources with pervasive externalities, or for which property rights are not clearly 
defined (Haab and McConnell, 2003). An example of this market failure is 
agricultural activities for food production, where farmers do not take account of the 
negative effects of their farming practices on water quality, such as contamination 
from agrochemicals, erosion from certain land practices and deforestation for land 
use expansion. 
 
An improvement in resource allocation requires the measurement of benefits and 
costs, and the former need to exceed the latter. Economists have devised and 
refined methods for measuring benefits and costs; and thus whether and to what 
extent resources are being allocated efficiently. Two basic approaches are used for 
benefit estimation: indirect or behavioural methods (i.e. revealed preferences) and 
direct or stated preference methods. The need for statistical inference and 
econometrics arises because individual actions, whether observed behaviours or 
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responses to hypothetical questions, almost never reveal precisely the economic 
value that needs measurement. First one needs to infer a preference function such 
as a utility function, or behavioural relation such as a demand function, and then 
benefit measures such as willingness to pay are calculated (Rodriguez et al., 2009). 
 
The process of benefit estimation begins with the measurement of the net change 
in income that is equivalent to or compensates for changes in the quantity or 
quality of public goods; and then these are expanded to the relevant population. To 
start, let 𝑢 (x, q) be the individual preference function, where x =  𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑚 is the 
vector of private goods and q =  𝑞1 … 𝑞𝑛 is the vector of public goods. Individuals 
choose their x but their q is exogenous. The individual maximises utility subject to 
income 𝑦 and 𝑝 represents price. The indirect utility function 𝑉 (p, q, 𝑦), is given by 
(equation 3.1) 
 
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑦) =  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
 {𝑢 (x, q)|p ∙ x ≤ 𝑦 } 
 
The minimum expenditure function 𝑚 (p, q, 𝑢) is dual to the indirect utility function 
(equation 3.2) 
 
𝑚 (p, q, 𝑢) =  
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥
 {p ∙ x | 𝑢 (x, q) ≥ 𝑢 } 
 
The indirect utility function and the expenditure function provide the theoretical 
structure for welfare estimation. For stated preferences approaches, the changes in 
these functions are needed. For revealed preference approaches, a conceptual path 
from observations on behaviour to these constructs is needed. There are two 
equally valid ways of describing money welfare measures: compensating and 
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equivalent variation, and WTP and WTA. They measure the same phenomenon, the 
increment in income that makes an individual indifferent to a change in some public 
good. 
 
WTP is the maximum amount of income an individual will pay in exchange for an 
improvement in circumstances, or to avoid a decline in circumstances. WTA is the 
minimum amount an individual will accept for a decline in circumstances or to 
forego an improvement in circumstances. Compensating variation is the amount of 
income paid or received that leaves the individual at the initial level of wellbeing, 
and equivalent variation is the amount of income paid or received that leaves the 
individual at the final level of wellbeing. WTP and WTA relate to the right to a utility 
level; so for this study where individuals are required to pay to achieve a higher 
wellbeing, the right to that level of wellbeing lies elsewhere. Equivalent and 
compensating variation rely on the initial versus final wellbeing for their distinction. 
Recent practice adopts WTP and WTA terms chiefly because contingent valuation 
surveys use the terms, so we follow this focus here (Haab and McConnell, 2003; 
Smith, 2006). 
 
WTP is preferred over WTA for several reasons, including the fact that WTA always 
exceeds WTP in empirical settings but not in behavioural methods, the general 
belief that WTA is not an incentive-compatible measure, and the recommendations 
of the NOAA that researchers should measure WTP. Thus, this study utilises the 
WTP approach to valuation. For an individual, WTP is the amount of income that 
compensates for an increase in the public good (equation 3.3): 
 
𝑉 (p, q*, 𝑦 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃) = 𝑉 (p, q, 𝑦) 
 
The WTP can also be defined with the expenditure function (equation 3.4): 
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𝑊𝑇𝑃 = 𝑚 (p, q, 𝑢) − 𝑚 (p, q*, 𝑢) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑢 = 𝑉 (p, q, 𝑦) 
 
The dichotomous choice approach to asking the question that leads directly to WTP 
has become the presumptive method of elicitation for CV practitioners. This is 
mainly due to this question format being incentive-compatible in theory. Since the 
contingent valuation responses are binary variables, yes or no, a statistical model 
appropriate for a discrete dependent variable is necessary. The aim is to estimate a 
probability distribution for the true WTP in a CV setting, using information on upper 
and lower bounds. The CV responses are analysed using statistical models, but the 
models need to make sense from the point of view of economic theory. This places 
significant restrictions on the statistical models that can be used (Hanemann et al.; 
Haab and McConnell, 2003).  
 
Parametric models provide the most information from an economic point of view, 
but they can be fragile if misspecified. Non-parametric models are more robust and 
offer greater flexibility in the shape of the response function, but they provide less 
economic information (Hanemann et al., 1999). Thus, a parametric model is used to 
estimate the preference function that allows the calculation of WTP given the 
estimated parameters. The basic model for analysing dichotomous CV responses, 
including parameter estimation, is the random utility model (Hanemann, 1984; 
Hanley, 1997). This model assumes that while the individual knows their own 
preferences, these are not observable by the researcher. In the CV case there are 
two choices, so that the indirect utility for respondent 𝑗 can be written: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑗, 𝑧𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗) 
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Where 𝑖 = 1 is the state that prevails when the CV scenario is implemented, that is, 
the final state, and 𝑖 = 0  for the status quo. The factors that determine utility are 
𝑦𝑗  (for income), 𝑧𝑗  (for household characteristics and attributes of the given 
scenario) and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (a component of random preferences known to the individual 
respondent but not observed by the researcher; Hanemann, 1984). Due to these 
unobserved random preferences researchers can only make probability statements 
about yes and no. The probability of a yes response is the probability that the 
respondent thinks that he or she is better off in the proposed scenario, even with 
the required payment, so that 𝑢1 >  𝑢0. For respondent 𝑗, where 𝑡𝑗  is the bid 
amount offered to the jth respondent, the general probability estimation is: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = Pr [𝑣1(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) +  𝜀1𝑗 >  𝑣0(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) + 𝜀0𝑗] 
 
This probability statement is too general for parametric estimation, so modelling 
decisions are needed. In order to understand the decision to answer positively, the 
utility difference between the yes and no responses needs to be examined. That is, 
the probability of a certain response is examined as a function of the differences in 
the utilities at the base and final states. Given that the random term can be 
rewritten as 𝜀𝑗 =  𝜀1𝑗 −  𝜀0𝑗, the probability of a positive response is: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = 1 −  𝐹𝜀  [− (𝑣1(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) −  𝑣0 (𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗))] 
 
where 𝐹𝜀  (𝑎) is the probability that the random variable 𝜀 is less than 𝑎 known as 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF). The above equation is the point of 
departure for all the random utilities with different functions. In the linear utility 
function specification the deterministic part of a respondent’s preferences is linear 
both in covariates and income: 
2
6
0
 
 
75 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
𝑣𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼𝑖𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑗 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes an m-dimensional vector of parameters and 𝛽𝑖 is the marginal 
utility of income. The deterministic utility for the initial and final states are: 
 
𝑣0𝑗(𝑦𝑗) = 𝛼0𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽0𝑦𝑗 
𝑣1𝑗(𝑦𝑗) = 𝛼1𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽1 (𝑦𝑗 −  𝑡𝑗) 
 
and assuming that the marginal utility of income is constant in the quality change 
(i.e. 𝛽0 =  𝛽1 ), the change in deterministic utility for respondent j can be written as: 
 
𝑣1𝑗 −  𝑣0𝑗 = (𝛼1 −  𝛼0)𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽1 (𝑦𝑗 −  𝑡𝑗) −  𝛽0𝑦𝑗 =  𝛼𝑧𝑗 −  𝛽𝑡𝑗 
 
and the probability of a yes response becomes: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = Pr(𝛼𝑧𝑗 −  𝛽𝑡𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗 > 0) 
 
Once the response model to the CV responses is built, a measure of welfare (i.e. 
people’s WTP for the change to be valued) is estimated. The expression for the 
expectation of WTP with respect to preference uncertainty, following Hoyos, 2010) 
is: 
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𝐸𝜀 (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗  |𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑧𝑗) =  𝛼𝑧𝑗/𝛽 
 
Logistic and probit models are both parametric models that play a key role in the 
analysis of discrete CV data. The aim is to estimate a probability distribution for the 
true WTP in the CV setting using information on upper and lower bounds 
(Hanemann et al., 1999). Both models focus on proportions of cases in two 
categories of the dependent variable and they are akin to multiple regression in 
that the dependent variable is predicted from a set of variables that are continuous 
or coded to be dichotomous. They produce an estimate of the probability that the 
dependent variables equal to 1 given a set of independent variables. The difference 
between the two models lies in the transformation applied to the proportions 
forming the dependent variable that, in turn, reflects assumptions about the 
underlying distribution of the dependent variable. In probit analysis each observed 
proportion is replaced by the value of the standard normal curve (𝑧 value) below 
which the observed proportion is found, that is, it assumes a normally distributed 
dependent variable. The assumption of a normal distribution makes probit analysis 
a bit more restrictive than logistic regression. However, the shapes and the results 
of the probit and logit distributions are quite similar (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
Thus, the commonly used probit model is used to analyse the CV data. 
 
3.5.2 Revealed Preferences Approach 
When behavioural methods are used, it is necessary to follow the influence of the 
public good on behaviour, and behaviour on welfare. For this, some structure needs 
to be imposed on the preference function, and the price or quality change (i.e. 
welfare measure) requires some restrictions. The principal restriction for quality is 
weak complementarity, an assumption about an individual’s preference function 
that permits the value of changes in public goods to be traced to private behaviour. 
For more details on the theoretical basis of weak complementarity see Haab and 
McConnell, 2003). Weak complementarity implies that the value of, or WTP for, 
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changes in the public good equals the change in the value of access to the private 
good. The weak complementarity result is (equation 3.5) 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  ∫ 𝑥1
𝑢 (𝑝′, 𝑞∗, 𝑢)𝑑𝑝′ − ∫ 𝑥1
𝑢 (𝑝′, 𝑞, 𝑢)𝑑𝑝′ = 𝑚 (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑢) − 𝑚 (𝑝, 𝑞∗, 𝑢)
𝑝∗
𝑝
𝑝∗
𝑝
 
 
where 𝑥 is the vector of private goods, 𝑞 is the vector of public goods, p is the price 
paid for the private goods, u is the utility, and 𝑚 (p, q, 𝑢)  is the minimum 
expenditure function. Thus, weak complementarity allows the change in the WTP 
for access to the private good to equal the WTP for changes in the public good 
(Haab and McConnell, 2003).  
 
The incidence of illness is a function of the potential for contamination and the 
household's averting behaviour. Contamination is exogenous and averting 
behaviour is endogenous to the household. The household perceives being 
adversely affected by illness and deems the averting behaviour necessary. The 
incidence of illness is modelled as a function of the averting behaviour through a 
bivariate probit model. This model assumes observed independent variables and 
unobserved risk factors, e.g. daily fluctuations in the drinking water quality. Such a 
model captures the effect of behaviour on health and is therefore useful for 
analysing real-world situations, since it treats health and behaviour as interlinked 
variables (Alberini et al., 1996; Dasgupta, 2004). A univariate probit regression 
would yield inconsistent estimates because the hidden risk factor has introduced a 
correlation between averting behaviour and the error term in the damage cost 
equation; implying that the probability of becoming ill is not independent of 
engaging in averting behaviour (see Briscoe et al., 1990). Furthermore, the 
researcher used individuals’ perceived level of contamination in the averting 
behaviour model (a discrete yes or no response), instead of the objective 
contamination measure (contamination magnitude; see Um et al., 2002). 
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The value for water provision obtained from the stated WTP and the revealed WTP 
were compared to the opportunity costs obtained from upstream landowners in 
order to assess the feasibility of a PES scheme. This section presents the theoretical 
background for the two main valuation models used in chapters 4 and 5, but 
detailed descriptions of the statistical models and other statistics used are deferred 
to the respective empirical chapters (4, 5, and 6) to aid readability. 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations and Study Limitations  
This study has important ethical considerations as it includes working with data of 
human participants. In order to safeguard respondents, based on a University 
approved ethical review, participation was entirely voluntary, withdrawal at any 
time was allowed, consent was obtained for all elicitation methods, a project 
information sheet was provided to participants, and all data collected remained 
confidential, i.e. coded. Additionally, permission to do research in the Güisayote 
Biological Reserve was obtained from the organisation AESMO, who co-manages 
the Reserve on behalf of the government.  
 
The usefulness of cost and benefit distribution analyses for research and policy 
applications depends in part on the accuracy of the estimates. This study had some 
limitations, minor ones will be discussed in each relevant chapter, such as survey 
design, valuation of time, and valuation of illness assumptions, among others. Here 
the overarching or central limitations are discussed. The study site presented four 
exogenous factors, outside the researcher’s influence, that in all probability 
affected the results of this study. First, long distances and infrequent transport in 
the rural, mountainous setting meant that there were substantial delays and 
restrictions during fieldwork. Second, many study site inhabitants seemed to be 
very wary of and guarded against the researcher and interviewers. Their wariness 
was evidenced in their unwillingness to provide accurate income and land values, in 
non-response rates to surveys, and some reluctance to sign the consent form 
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despite their willingness to participate, among others. For example, some 
inhabitants in the El Ingenio community refused to answer the CV survey claiming 
that the interviewers worked for the government, who was trying to take control 
over the community water system. Third, some study site inhabitants were interest-
seeking, observed when inexistent houses were included on community maps 
based on the belief that a new water project might be funded (despite clear 
explanations of research goals). Finally, the distinct characteristic of many 
beneficiaries also being providers of the ecosystem service is a complex situation 
that probably influenced respondents’ answers. This dual role needs to be kept in 
mind when considering the recommendations made in this thesis. 
Methodologically, two main weaknesses can be mentioned for this study. Originally, 
the CV question format was double-bounded (i.e. with two WTP questions) but due 
to the survey lacking anticipated warning of the elicitation format (which is believed 
to be best practice), only the first WTP question was used. This issue does not affect 
the contingent valuation results and analysis as the answers to the first WTP 
question were not allowed to be altered after a response was recorded. 
Additionally, the costs of water provision were initially planned to be estimated 
using three methods. The methods to be used for triangulation purposes were a 
procurement payment for ecosystem services (PES) auction, the flow approach and 
rent approach. A procurement PES auction estimates landowners’ willingness to 
accept (WTA) a conservation program by creating a competitive temporary market 
and has been highly recommended in recent literature (Ferraro 2008; Jack et al. 
2008). However, an auction of this type requires a large pool of bidders. Due to an 
extremely low participation level in the auction carried out at the study site, 
stemming from a small sample size, this data was excluded from any further 
analysis. Thus, the flow and rent-based opportunity cost approaches were used as 
the best alternatives, considering the local context and data available. 
 
 
 
 
2
6
0
 
 
80 
 
                                                                                    
 
Chapter 4: Stated WTP and Benefits Distribution for a Water PES 
Scheme 
 
This chapter describes the application of a contingent valuation method to estimate 
the willingness to pay of beneficiaries for a payment for ecosystem services scheme 
to improve drinking water quality. It also examines the factors affecting the benefit 
distribution of ecosystem service provision. Furthermore, it contributes to the 
discussion on contracting opportunities for local beneficiaries, considering their 
WTP and the local context.  
 
This chapter looks at the stated WTP or benefits of improving drinking water quality 
as a direct way of assessing peoples’ preferences. It also contributes information on 
the demand-side of a potential PES scheme in order to determine possible 
contracting opportunities and challenges. In chapter 7, these stated preferences 
will be compared to revealed preferences (see chapter 5), as well as contrasted to 
the opportunity costs of water conservation (see chapter 6) to assess the feasibility 
and challenges of contracting in a PES scheme.  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Poor drinking water quality is a major issue in developing countries due to 
incomplete information, inadequate monitoring and control, and pervasive 
contamination from point and non-point sources and diverse land uses (Soares et 
al., 2002; Jouravlev, 2004; Trevett et al., 2004; Smith and Porter, 2010; Smith et al., 
2012; UNICEF and WHO, 2012). Improving water quality in developing countries 
involves a multifaceted array of challenges and the complexity of most water 
pollution makes it difficult to design cost-effective policies for pollution control 
(Olmstead, 2010). Therefore, an incentive-based approach such as land set-aside 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes could ensure water users have clean 
drinking water through a landscape approach to water conservation. The basic idea 
of these schemes is that the beneficiaries of the service, which has been ascribed a 
value, compensate the providers through voluntary and conditional transactions 
(Wunder, 2005). Land set-aside specifically, entails landholders foregoing the use of 
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their land for a period of time which allows for the conservation of entire 
watersheds. This type of PES scheme could be particularly effective not only at 
improving water quality, but also for other ecosystem services such as flow 
regulation and habitat preservation (Postel and Thompson, 2005). However, these 
policy instruments must be carefully designed otherwise they could easily reduce, 
rather than improve, social welfare (Olmstead, 2010). 
 
Valuation of ecosystem services allows for the estimation and accounting of their 
economic value, which means they are valued in equal terms as other land uses and 
can reveal social costs or benefits that might otherwise remain hidden (Troy and 
Wilson, 2006). Also, valuation reveals the magnitude of threats to ecosystem 
services and how these threats make them potentially subject to trade in market-
based initiatives (Edwards and Abivardi, 1998; van Wilgen et al., 1998; Balmford 
and Whitten, 2003; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Badola et al., 2010). In order to value a 
change in an ecosystem service through a prospective policy such as a PES scheme, 
valuation is often done through stated preference methods based on survey 
questions to understand people’s preferences. Contingent valuation is the most 
commonly used of these methods, where respondents take part in hypothetical 
scenarios and thereby reveal their WTP for ecosystem services provided through a 
specific policy (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Raje et al., 2002; Haab and McConnell, 
2003; Shultz and Soliz, 2007).  
 
In the past, CV has been mainly applied in developed economies (e.g. Piper and 
Martin, 1997; Hite et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2004); but more recently it is being 
increasingly applied in developing countries, especially in Latin America (e.g. 
Johnson and Baltodano, 2004; Martinez de Anguita et al., 2006; Soto Montes de 
Oca and Bateman, 2006). However, many of these studies are focused on urban 
areas with large populations (Raje et al., 2002; Shultz and Soliz, 2007; Vasquez et al., 
2009; Nallathiga and Paravasthu, 2010). Studies show that the value of improved 
water for the rural poor in developing countries varies from place to place and in 
certain contexts it could potentially be large enough to justify a PES scheme 
(Briscoe et al., 1990). Thus, there is still a need for research in rural and also 
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protected areas where many conflicts arise and the feasibility of PES schemes is 
uncertain and context specific.   
 
More recently, the CV method has been used to understand the demand-side 
aspects of locally-financed PES. For instance in Latin America, Johnson and 
Baltodano, 2004) assessed local rural WTP for micro-watershed protection in San 
Dionisio, Nicaragua and obtained a low WTP (maximum US$ 1). Van Hecken et al., 
2012) investigated users’ WTP for improved tap water quality in Matiguás, 
Nicaragua through a PES scheme and compared it to an alternative scenario 
involving infrastructure investments. This paper mainly focused on the institutional 
context and found a lower WTP (median US$ 5) for the scheme than for 
infrastructure. Ortega-Pacheco et al., 2009) assessed rural households' WTP for a 
watershed PES scheme in two Costa Rican communities. Their analysis evidenced 
that all income quintile groups show demand for a PES scheme with a mean WTP of 
US$5. Rodriguez et al., 2009) determined the WTP for a payment for watershed 
conservation in rural Cotachi, Ecuador, finding a low WTP (maximum US$ 2) and 
discussing its policy implications. Thus, studies carried out so far report quite 
diverging WTP results for differing CV survey designs, as well as the factors affecting 
these estimates. Therefore the demand-side of local PES schemes needs further 
consideration in research.  
 
A substantial amount of studies have looked at the impacts of local PES schemes on 
the poor (e.g. Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005), many focused on the 
supply-side of the schemes. However, this is a narrow view not comprising broader 
distributional issues. A persisting challenge in ecosystem-based management is to 
understand the distribution of costs and benefits among and within different 
groups in society (Tallis and Polasky, 2009). This is particularly true in developing 
countries, where a large proportion of the population still remains directly 
dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods (Badola et al., 2010). Research 
is developing on distributional aspects of PES schemes from the beneficiaries’ point 
of view. For instance, Gross-Camp et al., 2012) explore the effectiveness, legitimacy 
and equality of an experimental PES intervention for biodiversity conservation 
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services around the Nyungwe National Park in Rwanda. McDermott et al., 2013) 
presents a systematic framework for the analysis of equity that can be used to 
examine how local equity is affected as the global value of ecosystem services 
changes, with a focus on REDD+ PES schemes. Still, there is a need for research on 
the benefit distribution of ecosystem services at the local scale and how it 
influences contracting opportunities for PES schemes.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the benefits of improving drinking water quality. 
Thus, a contingent valuation survey is applied to water users to obtain the stated 
WTP for improved water quality through a potential PES scheme. Also, the 
distribution of benefits among beneficiaries is discussed, as well as the factors 
affecting this distribution. Finally, this chapter evaluates contracting opportunities 
and challenges for local beneficiaries considering their WTP and the local context.  
 
4.2 Study Site and Methods  
4.2.1 Study Site 
This study was conducted in a 4,793 ha watershed covering parts of the Güisayote 
Biological Reserve in the westernmost region of Honduras. The watershed was 
selected based on its unsafe drinking water. All community water sources have 
been found to be contaminated with agrochemicals, bacteria, and/or faecal 
coliforms at least once in the year preceding the implementation of the contingent 
valuation survey, as observed in water tests presented by the regional health officer. 
The Reserve was created for its key hydrological services and is managed by the 
NGO Asociación Ecológica San Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO). Although having 
Reserve status means that human activities are strictly prohibited in the core zone 
and restricted in the buffer zone. Landowners in both zones rarely follow these 
restrictions, carrying out productive land uses throughout. Also, de facto, illicit use 
is made of public and private forest land for firewood, timber and, cattle grazing, 
among other activities (AESMO, 2010).  
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Private landholders cover a large part of the watershed through dispersed plots, all 
with secure tenure. Although some forested land exists, the rest is used for 
extensive cattle ranching throughout for subsistence and local commerce (milk and 
cheese, seldom for meat), coffee at lower heights mostly for international 
commerce, vegetables (e.g. potato, cabbage, carrot) at higher and colder altitudes 
for national and international commerce, and some maize and beans for staple 
subsistence. Coffee stands out as a long-term cultivar that provides the main source 
of employment at the study site (PNUD, 2010a). 
 
The study site provides drinking water to fifteen communities with an estimated 
population of 7,725 inhabitants (ESNACIFOR and USAID, 2002). Beneficiary 
communities are mostly rural ranging in size from 11 to 393 houses, and only the 
largest is considered urban. They are located mostly outside the Reserve (10), with 
a few of them (5) within the core or buffer zones. The two most distant 
communities are in a completely different municipality. Each beneficiary 
community has an autonomous water system managed by a locally elected water 
board. Land ownership of water sources is varied, but generally insecure. Only 
three sources are legally owned, the rest are verbally donated by different private 
landholders.  
 
The water systems consist of a dam or capture box at a spring, which can be located 
up to 180 minutes walking distance from the community, from where metal or 
plastic piping takes the water to a storage tank. Subsequently, water goes through 
pipes to the community, where it is distributed by individual household tap 
connections. Pipes are located both above and below ground depending on the 
terrain. The age of the water system infrastructure varies between communities 
and ranges between one and 46 years. In one case (the El Portillo community) there 
is only a rudimentary bucket system to collect water from the source, while the 
Santa Cruz community has two wells that are rarely used.  
 
Communities pay a water bill either monthly or annually to their water board, 
amounting to an annual total between US$ 6.35 – 26.46 per household, irrespective 
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of water system or water provision. Two communities, La Ruda and El Portillo, have 
no water fee system in place. Water boards reported payment delays in their 
communities, between 0 - 70% of households do not pay the water fee on time. 
Also, the water boards reported a small percentage of non-participation (14%) 
when labour for maintenance activities of the water system was requested.  
  
This section provides limited study site and methods information relevant to the 
focus of this chapter. For more details on the study site, sampling and methods, see 
chapter 3.   
 
4.2.2 Contingent Valuation Survey Design  
The extensively used stated preference method of contingent valuation (CV), asks 
questions that help reveal the monetary trade-off each respondent would make 
concerning a change in the quality of a service based on information provided 
about a hypothetical scheme that would bring about the change (Boyle, 2003a; 
Haab and McConnell, 2003; Carson, 2012). The CV survey in this study was based on 
the extensive literature available on CV survey design (e.g. Boyle, 2003a; Haab and 
McConnell, 2003), and on the information obtained from two focus groups and 102 
pre-tests in situ (see chapter 3). The pre-testing also served to train three 
interviewers, helped ensure that survey questions were understandable to 
respondents and that they were eliciting the information they were designed to 
elicit (Brown, 2003).  
 
The sample was selected at random from the fifteen confirmed beneficiary 
communities. The CV survey included five different bids: 5, 15, 30, 50, and 80 
Honduran Lempiras (US$ 0.27, 0.79, 1.59, 2.65, and 4.23 respectively). These five 
bids were applied at random to the sample, but in equal proportions. The selection 
of bid amounts was based on the focus groups and the pre-testing, both which 
revealed information of the central tendency and dispersion of the value to be 
estimated (Arrow and Solow, 1993; Champ, 2003). The payment vehicle proposed 
was an increase of the existing monthly community water fee as the only realistic 
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option available in the study area, e.g. taxes are irregularly paid. The final survey 
consisted of the following main sections of information and questions: 
  
i. perceptions of the protected area and environmental awareness; 
ii. water use and water contamination awareness;  
iii. water treatment methods (i.e. averting behaviour and expenditure; 
discussed in chapter 5); 
iv. waterborne illness and treatment costs (i.e. damage costs; discussed in 
chapter 5); 
v. description of the study area and problem;  
vi. hypothetical PES scheme scenario, cheap talk and WTP question; 
vii. understanding and motivation questions; 
viii. socio-economic and demographic characteristics (e.g. income, education);  
ix. interviewers’ evaluation of how the interview went; and 
x. maps and photographs throughout.  
 
The following sections describe the main parts of the CV survey: the PES scheme 
scenario, the cheap talk, and the WTP question. 
 
4.2.3 CV Scenario: Land Set-Aside PES Scheme 
The hypothetical PES scheme proposed in the CV survey entails a legal agreement 
between watershed landholders, the water boards and AESMO. It would provide 
landholders with one-off payments to purchase land or periodic incentives for 
setting aside their land to ensure improved drinking water quality. However, as 
one-off payments for the purchase of land entail the permanent transference of 
property rights and not a PES scheme, only the periodic incentives to landholders 
are discussed here. The scheme would represent a voluntary partial transfer of 
property rights, without change in land ownership, tailored to the landholding 
characteristics and the landholder’s opportunity costs. It is proposed that the 
municipality and AESMO would cover all transaction and monitoring costs of the 
scheme, to reduce participants’ costs. Water boards would collect the additional 
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payment from users through the water bill and would monitor the area. AESMO 
would provide a more structured monitoring of the area through park guards and 
would pay landholders quarterly. As the scheme takes off and compliance is 
ensured, payment could become annual to reduce transaction costs. 
 
By means of a PES scheme the current water market dynamics would change. The 
buyers would still be the community households, but the sellers would not only be 
the water boards, but also the landholders, with AESMO acting as intermediary. The 
explicit involvement of AESMO and the municipality would add weight to the 
scheme, support the work of the water boards and enhance compliance. This would 
mean more secure conservation in the area and thus improved water quality. Also, 
a PES scheme will be vital for strengthening the existing conservation mechanisms - 
at the study site these include protected area status, land purchase for 
conservation and sustainable practices - which are currently carried out with 
limited success. This type of scheme, land set-aside, could ensure access and use of 
other dispersed and complex ecosystem services by beneficiaries, such as 
recreation, carbon and biodiversity.  
 
4.2.4 Cheap Talk and WTP Question 
Inadequate provision of information to the interviewees was avoided by providing 
clear, neutral and specific information aimed at reducing the use of subjective 
perceptions by respondents (Bateman et al., 2002). The hypothetical nature of a CV 
survey lends itself to some participants stating that they would pay for the service, 
when in reality they would not, or pay less, if placed in an actual purchase situation. 
In order to mitigate this potential hypothetical bias, cheap talk is one of the most 
frequently used methods. This instrument informs participants of the tendency to 
overestimate their WTP and asks them to complete the valuation task as if the 
payment was real (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Mahieu et al., 2012). The cheap talk 
utilised has been loosely translated from Spanish, it includes bold text that the 
interviewer was asked to make emphasis on, and reads:  
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“As the majority of people that use the water in this area will have to cover 
the cost of the payment for ecosystem services, we are using this survey to 
ask you if you would accept to pay if you had the opportunity. We have 
found that some people would be in favour of it and others against it. 
 
Sometimes people say they are in favour of the scheme in order to please the 
interviewer or for some other reason, but they can’t really afford it. Some 
people are against the payment because they need the money for other 
things that are more important to them, like clothes or food. And some 
people say that the money they would have to pay is more than they can pay. 
Before answering, please think carefully about your financial capacity. No 
answer is right or wrong and I don’t have a preference for any answer. I 
remind you that you can obtain drinking water from other sources, such as 
bottled water. 
 
This payment for ecosystem services scheme proposal is not real at this 
moment. No one is paying money at the end of this survey. However, I ask 
you to answer the following questions as if the result would involve a real 
monetary payment from you. Please, only agree to pay according to what 
you can afford to pay. This payment will ensure that your home and the rest 
of the communities receive clean drinking water quality all the time. For the 
payment to be implemented it is necessary that 80% of water users agree to 
pay”. 
 
Value elicitation was done through a referendum vote format, which has incentive 
compatibility, i.e. truthful and accurate responses, as is recommended by the 
literature (e.g. Arrow and Solow, 1993). The CV survey had a double bounded 
question format but due to the second question’s ineffectiveness at eliciting an 
upper of lower bound, only the first question, which is unaffected by the response 
to the second question, was utilised in the analysis. Furthermore, the WTP question 
asks about a PES scheme to improve drinking water quality, not specifying the exact 
improvement level. However, during pre-testing and the actual surveying it was 
clear that respondents understood that the improvement of water quality was to a 
potable level. Also, it is clearly stated in the cheap talk, “clean drinking water all the 
time”, which means water at a potable level. The question stated the bid amount in 
a monthly and a yearly format to account for communities that paid their water bill 
monthly and those that paid annually. Thus, the dichotomous or discrete choice 
WTP question was (loosely translated from Spanish):  
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“If the implementation of this scheme to improve drinking water quality 
would cost your home, from now onwards, # Lempiras [of increase in your 
water bill] every month, which equals # Lempiras per year, would you agree 
to pay?”  
 
While dichotomous choice type questions are the most common response format, 
they still have weaknesses despite their potential incentive compatibility. First, 
answers to dichotomous choice questions only indicate whether a respondent’s 
value lies below or above the bid threshold. Other weaknesses include anchoring of 
bids, yea saying and voting like good citizens. Still, a dichotomous choice format is 
the best that can be done as trade-offs are always to be made (Brown, 2003). 
Overall, these weaknesses were controlled for in the study by preceding the WTP 
question by a detailed and neutral scenario description, a cheap talk design 
highlighting the reasons respondents could have for answering yes or no, and a 
decision rule explaining minimum beneficiary participation required for a PES 
scheme.  
 
The incentive compatibility of the WTP question was further enhanced by a 
decision rule, included in the cheap talk, in which at least 80% of respondents were 
required to answer yes to the WTP question in order for the PES scheme to be 
implemented. The decision rule is based on a majority proportion to highlight that if 
most respondents are WTP, then the PES scheme could be implemented. This rule 
is the mechanism used to determine if enough people would vote in favour of the 
scheme and as a measure to reduce hypothetical bias by emphasising that the 
scheme could be implemented (Vossler and McKee, 2006; Schläpfer and Bräuer, 
2007; Moore et al., 2013). 
 
A test of validity asks whether a CV study accurately measures the value it is 
designed to measure (Brown, 2003). The literature describes three approaches to 
assess the validity of a measure: criterion, construct and content validity. Criterion 
validity compares CV estimates to a measurement that is external to the CV study 
or to a behaviourally-based measure that directly represents the construct under 
investigation. This is considered the surest way to assess the validity of a stated 
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preference measure. Content validity asks whether the elements in the design of 
the CV survey and data analyses are consistent with economic theory, established 
practice, and the valuation objective. Convergent or construct validity investigates 
the consistency of CV estimates with estimates provided by another nonmarket 
valuation method (Brown, 2003).  
 
In order to ensure content validity, the survey instrument was robustly designed 
following the literature on the CV method and established practice. First, the survey 
included all the sections recommended by established practice. Second, focus 
groups and ample pre-testing were carried out to ensure the survey was 
meaningful to respondents, that the payment vehicle was reasonable and to set the 
bid values realistically. Third, population size of water beneficiaries was carefully 
determined and sampling was done at random considering all beneficiary 
households. Fourth, the description of the service and its institutional setting were 
designed considering the respondents’ level of education and understanding. Fifth, 
the statistical model is appropriate for the CV survey design. The criterion and 
convergent validity are covered in chapter 7 by comparing the stated and the 
revealed WTP estimates.  
 
4.2.5 Data Analysis: CV Probit Model and WTP Measure 
Individuals have preferences over goods and want to maximise their utility from the 
quantity and quality of each of the goods and services preferred, given their budget 
constraint. The expenditure function considers the dual problem of minimising 
expenditure and at the same time obtaining a given maximised level of utility. The 
indirect utility function and the expenditure function provide the theoretical 
structure for welfare estimation. Contingent valuation is a useful way of estimating 
the change in the expenditure function or the change in the indirect utility function 
by asking WTP or WTA for that change (Brown, 2003). 
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A probit model of the CV responses was estimated using Nlogit - Limdep 4.0 
software to calculate WTP for the PES scheme scenario described and to assess the 
effect of independent variables on the WTP. In a dichotomous question there are 
two choices or alternatives, yes or no to implementing the scenario, so that the 
indirect utility for respondent 𝑗 can be written  
 
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑗, 𝑧𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗) 
 
Where 𝑖 = 1 is the state that prevails when the CV scenario is implemented, that is, 
the final state, and 𝑖 = 0  for the status quo. The factors that determine utility are 
𝑦𝑗 for income, 𝑧𝑗 for household characteristics and attributes of the given scenario, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , a component of (random) preferences known to the individual respondent 
but not observed by the researcher, in what has been known as random utility 
models (RUM) (Hanemann, 1984). Due to these unobserved random preferences, 
researchers can only make probability statements about yes and no. The probability 
of a yes response is the probability that the respondent thinks that he is better off 
in the proposed scenario, even with the required payment, so that 𝑢1 >  𝑢0. For 
respondent 𝑗, where 𝑡𝑗 is the bid amount offered to the jth respondent, the general 
probability estimation for the probit model is 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = Pr [𝑣1(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) +  𝜀1𝑗 >  𝑣0(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) + 𝜀0𝑗] 
 
In order to understand the decision to answer positively, the utility difference 
between the yes and no responses need to be examined. That is, the probability of 
a certain response is examined as a function of the differences in the utilities at the 
base and final states. Given that the random term can be rewritten as 𝜀𝑗 =  𝜀1𝑗 −
 𝜀0𝑗, the probability of a positive response is 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = 1 −  𝐹𝜀  [− (𝑣1(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗) −  𝑣0 (𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗))] 
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where 𝐹𝜀  (𝑎) is the probability that the random variable 𝜀 is less than 𝑎 known as 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF). In the linear utility function specification 
the deterministic part of a respondent’s preferences is linear both in covariates and 
income 
 
𝑣𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼𝑖𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑗 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes an m-dimensional vector of parameters and 𝛽𝑖 is the marginal 
utility of income. The deterministic utility for the initial and final state is 
 
𝑣0𝑗(𝑦𝑗) = 𝛼0𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽0𝑦𝑗 
𝑣1𝑗(𝑦𝑗) = 𝛼1𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽1 (𝑦𝑗 −  𝑡𝑗) 
 
and assuming that the marginal utility of income is constant in the quality change 
(i.e.𝛽0 =  𝛽1 ), the change in deterministic utility for respondent j can be written as 
 
𝑣1𝑗 −  𝑣0𝑗 = (𝛼1 −  𝛼0)𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽1 (𝑦𝑗 −  𝑡𝑗) −  𝛽0𝑦𝑗 =  𝛼𝑧𝑗 −  𝛽𝑡𝑗 
 
and the probability of a yes response becomes 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗) = Pr(𝛼𝑧𝑗 −  𝛽𝑡𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗 > 0) 
 
Once the response model to the CV responses is built, a measure of welfare (i.e. 
people’s WTP for the change to be valued) was estimated. Compensating surplus 
(CS) or WTP for an environmental improvement is the maximum sum of money an 
individual would be willing to pay rather than do without the improvement. The 
equivalent surplus (ES) or willingness-to-accept (WTA) for an improvement is the 
minimum sum of money the individual would require to voluntarily forgo the 
improvement (Brown, 2003). WTP and WTA relate to the right to a utility level 
(Haab and McConnell, 2003). In this study WTP is used as, although national 
legislation favours beneficiaries’ rights to clean water, the de facto rights are 
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ascribed to landowners as is the case in many developing countries. WTP is the 
amount of income that compensates for (or is equivalent to) an increase in the 
public good. Using the expenditure function to measure the monetary value for a 
change in the nonmarket good, the compensating surplus is used as welfare 
measure 
 
𝐶𝑆 (𝑊𝑇𝑃) = 𝑒(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑢) − 𝑒(𝑝, 𝑞∗, 𝑢) 
 
Where 𝑝 is price of market goods, the non-market good is 𝑞 and the improvement 
in non-market good is 𝑞∗. Respondent characteristics are included into the WTP 
function using a welfare measure in order to understand how WTP responds to 
individual characteristics (Brown, 2003; Carson and Hanemann, 2005). 
Incorporating respondents’ characteristics provides information on the validity and 
reliability of the CV method and allows the extrapolation of sample responses to 
the whole population (Haab and McConnell, 2003).  
 
The cumulative distribution function of WTP, 𝐺𝐶, and the corresponding probability 
density function, 𝑔𝐶  , depend on the form of the survey question. In the case of a 
closed-ended question format like the one employed for this study, where 
individuals are asked whether they would pay a certain amount of money, A, the 
probability that their WTP is equal to or greater than this amount is 
 
Pr(𝑊𝑇𝑃 ≥ 𝐴) = 1 −  𝐺𝐶  (𝐴) 
 
Given that the fitted response model was derived from an underlying WTP 
distribution, GC , the underlying WTP distribution can be recovered from the fitted 
response model. However, calculating WTP with linear random utility models 
requires two sources of uncertainty (parameters and preferences) to be taken into 
account as well as the variability induced by the covariates included in the model. In 
dealing with these sources of uncertainty, it is usually assumed that the parameters 
are given. The expression for the expectation of WTP with respect to preference 
uncertainty, following Hoyos, 2010) is 
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𝐸𝜀 (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗  |𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑧𝑗) =  𝛼𝑧𝑗/𝛽 
 
The individual and household characteristics selected for the probit model are 
specified in Table 4.1. Correlation analysis was done to examine any close 
association between independent variables, which might lead to multi-collinearity. 
Significant correlations with a coefficient above 0.4 were examined to determine 
variables to be excluded. The following variables were correlated: years living in 
area and age, family size and presence of at least one child, female and stable job of 
head of household, and female and partner of head works. Age was selected as it is 
expected to provide more insight into WTP estimates than years living in area, child 
was selected as there is a greater tendency to provide clean drinking water to 
children than adults, female was selected as the job variables reflect education and 
income that are already included in the model. 
 
Table 4.1. Independent variables included in the probit model for the WTP for clean drinking water 
obtained from the contingent valuation survey. Note: Opinion scales 1 = excellent, 2 = good, 3 = 
average and 4 = bad; groups include social (e.g. church, school parents), community (e.g. water 
board, community council), municipal (e.g. transparency committee) and producers’ associations 
(e.g. coffee growers). 
Variable 
Expected 
sign 
Explanation 
Bid 
+ As bid amount increases, willingness to pay 
decreases 
Community size in 
houses 
+ Larger communities have higher levels of 
income and education  
Age in years 
- Older people are likely to be less supportive of 
improved water quality 
Education above 
primary school 
+ Education increases the probability of desiring 
improved water quality            
At least one child 
under 15 years 
+ Children’s health is a family concern and  clean 
drinking water is provided to them                                             
                                                               Continues… 
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Variable 
Expected 
sign 
Explanation 
Water quality 
perception 
+ Thinking water is contaminated is one of the 
main reasons for demanding clean water 
Group member 
+ Being in groups facilitates social and 
environmental awareness  
Number of cars 
+ Richer individuals are more likely to support a 
scheme and stimulate desire for 
improvements 
Annual water bill  
- Those paying a high water bill are likely to be 
less willing to accept an increase  
Perception of 
importance of  PES 
scheme for study 
site 
+ Generate a positive probability of willingness 
to pay for a scheme 
Opinion on NGO’s 
work (dummies)   
- Less satisfaction with NGO is likely to mean 
less support for a scheme involving the NGO 
Opinion on water 
board’s work 
(dummies)  
- Less satisfaction with the water board is likely 
to mean less support for a scheme involving 
the water board 
Household income 
+ Richer individuals are more likely to support a 
scheme and stimulate desire for 
improvements 
 
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics and Environmental Awareness of 
Respondents 
Household heads are generally middle-aged males with mostly stable work (e.g. 
farming, own business), but with little education and low affluence, i.e. low income 
and few cars (Table 4.2). A predominance of male household heads is in line with 
the cultural setting where men are in charge of the home. Also, households are on 
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average large, most of them with at least one child and located in small to medium-
sized rural communities. Only a few respondents participate in local and municipal 
groups. Also, a small proportion of households reported free-riding on their 
neighbours’ water source for drinking water.  
 
Table 4.2. Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents (
a
see Appendix 12 for description of what 
constitutes stable and temporal work). 
 
Table 4.3 provides information on respondents’ environmental awareness in regard 
to the Reserve and water contamination. Most respondents know about the 
existence of the Reserve, of the water benefits it provides and don’t perceive 
damages from it. However, less than half knew if their community was within or 
outside the Reserve boundaries. Knowledge of the latter would have clear 
Characteristics Mean/ 
Proportion 
SE SD Range 
Female  0.33    
Age 46.10 0.80 15.10 17 - 85 
Education above 
primary school  
0.15    
Household head has 
stable worka  
0.63    
Presence of at least 
one child 
0.74    
Household size 4.54 0.11 1.99 1 - 13 
House ownership  0.90    
Group member  0.20    
Cars 0.40 0.04 0.82 0 - 8 
Annual water bill (Lps.)                                                                                                 247 7.78 146 0 - 500
Annual household 
income (Lps.) 
61,211.24 4348.54 81,585.8 700 - 1,037,600 
Community size 231.15 7.24 135.89 11 - 393 
Households free-riding 0.05    
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implications for their environmental behaviour in the area. Most respondents knew 
that their water sources originated in the Reserve and many respondents believed 
their water source was contaminated. Consequently, the majority of respondents 
believed that a PES scheme was important for the area.  
 
Table 4.3. Environmental awareness of respondents in regards to the Reserve, their water and the 
PES scheme proposed; note that 13% of respondents do not know if their water is contaminated and 
this proportion is excluded from the table).  
 
Respondents think the work carried out by AESMO is overall good or excellent; but 
a significant proportion (almost 30%) doesn’t know of AESMO’s existence or the 
work it carries out in the area. On the other hand, the opinion respondents’ have of 
their community water board is predominantly good. These results evidence 
general degree of satisfaction with the two local organizations working on water 
and environmental management, but there is scope for improving the work of both 
organizations and disseminating AESMO’s. 
 
Characteristics Proportion 
Knows Reserve exists 0.97 
Knows community’s location in regards to Reserve  0.46 
Community gets benefits from Reserve  0.95 
Community gets water benefits from Reserve  0.92 
Community perceives damages from Reserve  0.01 
All water sources of this area come from Reserve  0.93 
Thinks water source is contaminated  0.72 
Thinks PES scheme is important for study site  0.88 
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Figure 4.1. a) Opinion of AESMO’s work (2 missing observations) and b) opinion of water board’s 
work (4 missing observations; DK= does not know AESMO) 
 
Overall, the sample of water beneficiaries has socioeconomic characteristics typical 
of Latin American rural areas. There is evidence of some environmental awareness, 
such as the knowledge of water contamination and the belief that a PES scheme is 
important for the area. Also, there is a general degree of satisfaction with the two 
main organizations involved with water and environmental management. However, 
there is still scope for improving participation in local groups, the work of the two 
organizations and environmental education. The likely influence of these factors on 
the value beneficiaries ascribe to improvements in drinking water quality is 
discussed below. 
 
4.3.2 WTP for a PES scheme to improve drinking water quality  
The WTP for a PES scheme to improve drinking water quality was estimated for 
each household with the coefficients obtained in the probit model using a welfare 
measure. The mean WTP amounts to Lps. 14.56 (US$ 0.77; S.D. = 26.47) per month. 
This WTP was estimated for all households in the sample, not only for those that 
responded positively to the referendum question, in order to avoid over estimation 
of this value. A total of 352 contingent valuation surveys were completed and there 
was a 28% non-response, 8% refused to participate and 20% were unavailable due 
to frequent travel, illness, or disability. The response frequencies for each of the 
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five bids employed to elicit WTP in the CV are shown in Figure 4.2. As expected, the 
frequencies show a decreasing probability of answering yes to the willingness to 
pay question by respondents as the bid increases; but there is an unexplained 
increase for the highest bid. Although sampling was done at random, a large 
percentage of Lps. 80 bids were applied to the municipal capital of La Labor. This 
urban community is likely to have a higher proportion of affluent and 
environmentally-aware residents than the smaller, rural communities.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Percentage of WTP responses per bid value in the Contingent Valuation survey; striped 
columns= % yes responses and grey columns= % no responses. 
 
It is common that many respondents will be unwilling to pay for an environmental 
improvement. However, it is important to understand the reasons for refusing to 
pay in order to understand the validity of the CV survey responses and respondents’ 
preferences. Over half of respondents (63%) were not WTP at all for a PES scheme 
to improve drinking water quality. The reasons reported for non-WTP were inability 
to pay (73%), followed by the need for the community to decide together (16%), 
and a smaller number of diverse reasons. Only 1% of respondents felt that the PES 
scheme was not necessary. These figures provide validity to the survey design as 
the majority of respondents answered based on ability and willingness to pay and a 
negligible number protested against the proposed scheme. This also provides 
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validity to the WTP question as it shows that respondents did indeed answer the 
question that was asked. 
 
Furthermore, interviewer bias was tested by running a probit model with 
interviewer as a variable, distinguishing between the two interviewers. As can be 
seen in Appendix 13 there is some significance due to interviewer at 5% level. This 
means that respondents were more likely to say yes to the WTP question if they 
were being interviewed by the younger, local interviewer; in contrast to the older, 
foreign (from the capital city)  interviewer. This is likely to be due to feeling more 
comfortable or trustful of the local interviewer. Thus, despite the researcher’s 
intentions to the contrary, it is unlikely that bias was completely eliminated from 
the results, so consideration needs to be taken for some ambiguity in the WTP 
question and interviewer bias. 
 
4.3.3 WTP Determinants 
The probit model of respondents’ WTP for a proposed PES scheme to supply 
improved drinking water is summarized in Table 4.4. The model correctly predicts 
yes and no responses 74% of the time. As expected the bid value is negative with 
decreasing yes responses as the bid value increases. As numbers of cars increases, 
so does the willingness to pay for a PES scheme. Considering the scheme important 
for the area, having education beyond primary school and local group membership 
are the most influential variables, probably linked to greater environmental 
awareness, beyond water conservation, and perceived social welfare. Also, those 
living in smaller communities and younger respondents had a higher willingness to 
pay for the scheme but with a small effect. The CV model could contain other key 
variables mentioned in the literature that were not included in the final model. 
Some were dropped from the regression because they were quite homogeneous 
(e.g. 90% own their house), they were correlated to other variables in the model 
(e.g. years living in area was highly correlated with age, as well as type of work with 
other income proxies), or were not statistically significant (e.g. has land near a 
water source).  
2
6
0
 
 
101 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
Table 4.4. Probit model of WTP for improving drinking water quality and main explanatory variables 
(n = 352); note: *** 0.01 significance, ** 0.05 level significance, and * 0.10 significance level 
 
Generally income is the key variable explaining WTP models, but in this study it was 
not significant and had a small effect on the model (see Appendix 14 for probit 
model including the income variable). A possible explanation as to why household 
income does not appear to influence WTP is that respondents may be unable or 
unwilling to accurately report their family income level, a common problem in CV 
Variable Coefficient SE P value Mean of X 
Constant - 0.06        0.50      0.90  
Bid       - 0.02***        0.00     0.00    35.78 
Age - 0.01*        0.01     0.09    46.05 
Education  0.51*        0.23      0.02     0.15 
Child 0.05        0.19       0.79     0.74 
Community size - 0.00*        0.00     0.08    231.15 
Contamination - 0.26        0.17     0.12     0.63 
Group member      0.46**        0.19      0.02     0.20 
Number of cars 0.22*        0.09      0.01     0.41 
Water bill - 0.00        0.00     0.22    247.12 
Importance of PES 1.16***        0.28      0.00     0.88 
NGO1 
NGO2 
NGO3 
- 0.18 
- 0.00       
0.09 
0.22  
0.21   
0.22               
0.40 
0.99  
0.68            
0.24 
0.26 
0.24 
Water board1 
Water board2 
Water board3 
0.19  
0.11    
0.15                  
0.22   
0.22    
0.23             
0.40 
0.61 
0.50             
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
Chi2 test 89.36    
Prob[ChiSqd > value]  0.00    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.19    
Correct Predictions 74.15%    
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surveys. Most importantly, income is low in the area due to many households 
relying on subsistence activities (i.e. growing and gathering for consumption). For 
the above reasons, it is common practice in livelihood studies in developing country 
settings to use other household measures for wealth. In this model the variable of 
number of cars is used as a proxy for wealth. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This section assesses the WTP of water users for improved drinking water quality 
through a hypothetical PES scheme. The WTP estimate is a measure of the benefits 
that would accrue to water users if the scheme were implemented. This section 
also discusses how these benefits are distributed among users and what local 
factors determine their distribution. Results show that overall there is a low WTP 
for the scheme which is within the range found in similar studies. However, the 
estimated mean WTP is high for the area as it is almost equal to the current average 
water bill and would have little effect on household income. The distribution of 
benefits of improving drinking water quality is mainly determined by socioeconomic 
characteristics, spatial location, and environmental awareness. Key PES scheme 
contracting opportunities and challenges are discussed considering the WTP values 
and the local context.  
 
4.4.1 Stated WTP for Improving Drinking Water Quality  
The monthly average WTP estimated using the CV method is US$ 0.77 per 
household. That the benefit of improving local water quality is relatively modest is 
consistent with estimates from areas close to the study site. Cruz and Rivera, 2002) 
obtained a WTP of US$ 0.71 – 1.351 for the protection of the Calán River watershed, 
and Ballestero Madrigal and Rodríguez Alpizar, 2008) obtained US$ 0.23 – 2.25 for 
drinking water for the city of Copan Ruins, both located in Honduras. These findings 
                                                          
1 All study figures in this paragraph were converted from US dollars of the 
publication year (unless data collection year stated) to 2011 US dollars using the CPI 
Inflation Calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm on 5th of 
November 2013, to make them more comparable to the figures in this study. 
2
6
0
 
 
103 
 
                                                                                    
 
provide insight into the likely WTP range for water provision in Honduras and the 
potential for user-financed water conservation schemes. However, the estimate is 
below other reported WTP estimates for water conservation, ranging between 
US$ 1.20 and 19.10 (e.g. Pattanayak et al., 2005; Shultz and Soliz, 2007; Rodriguez 
et al., 2009; Vasquez et al., 2009; Van Hecken et al., 2012). This is likely due to these 
studies being carried out in highly populated or urban areas, unlike this study 
focusing on relatively small, rural communities with low income levels.  
 
The WTP is almost equal to the average monthly water bill at the study site (86%; 
range 35 – 145%). Studies carried out in similar rural developing country settings 
have wide ranging results, between 5 – 200% of the average water bill (Whittington 
et al., 1990; Kaliba et al., 2003; Ahmad et al., 2005; Ortega-Pacheco et al., 2009). 
Still, the estimated WTP is in line with the water bill proportion of two similar Latin 
American studies proposing watershed management programs. Van Hecken et al., 
2012) found a WTP amounting to 86% of the water bill in Matiguás, Nicaragua. 
Similarly, Shultz and Soliz, 2007) found a WTP of 65% of current water charges in 
the Comarapa watershed, Bolivia. This high proportion evidences an ability and 
willingness to pay above current charges for clean water quality and could be an 
indication of undercharging. Rodriguez et al., 2009) mention that the tendency to 
undercharge for water provision, below operation and maintenance costs, causes 
the quality of drinking water to decline. However, most water boards reported 
having savings (see Table 3.1 in chapter 3), which means the problem of poor 
drinking water quality is not due to a lack of financial resources owing to 
undercharging but water boards’ lack of knowledge or ability to ensure water 
quality. It is more likely that water boards do not charge higher water bills in 
consideration of the low income households in their communities. 
 
The estimated WTP represents less than 0.3% of the average household income, an 
insignificant share of the modest earnings of most households. Notably, this 
proportion is identical to that obtained by Ahmad et al., 2005) when estimating the 
value of arsenic-free drinking water in rural Bangladesh and that obtained by 
Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2012) for an ongoing PES scheme in the Andes of Colombia. 
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However, it is necessary to assess the share of income the WTP would represent for 
the poorest households, as these would be most affected by a water bill increase. 
Still, the WTP estimate amounts to only 1.3% of the average income for households 
in the lowest income quintile and it is believed that an affordability threshold of 2.5% 
of income is a reasonable upper limit for water bills (OECD, 2003). Currently, the 
three highest water bills (of three communities) already exceed this threshold for 
households in the lowest income quintile, amounting to approximately 6% of 
households2. Furthermore, if the water bill were increased by the estimated WTP, it 
would still only affect households in the lowest income quintile but for six more 
communities as well. For instance, the poorest households living in the community 
with the highest water bill (i.e. Llano Largo) already pay 3.8% of their income 
towards water and an increase would take them to 5%. Thus, it is estimated that a 
total of 11% of households2 would definitely not be able to cope with a water bill 
increase. These findings evidence that water bills could be increased but 
consideration would need to be taken of those households in the lowest income 
quintile. This study highlights how household income and water bills can serve as 
measures of affordability for clean drinking water, to identify households at risk and 
to inform affordable water bill increments.  
 
Affordability issues have often been found to be least visible in low income 
countries (Briscoe et al., 1990; Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). Affordability refers to 
the ability of particular consumer groups to pay for a minimum level of a certain 
service. Minor affordability issues at the study site have been made evident by 
assessing the proportion of water bills and income that WTP estimates represent. 
Overall, there is a substantial willingness and ability to pay for clean drinking water 
through a PES scheme. This is without accounting for additional expenditure on 
other sources, particularly bottled water (discussed in chapter 5). Aggregating the 
mean WTP across the entire population of the study site amounts to a potential 
revenue of US$ 14,276 above current water bills. Still, willingness to pay depends 
                                                          
2 Based on the proportion of households per quintile per water bill in the sample 
and extrapolated to the entire study site. 
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on a series of factors, not only ability to pay, that are discussed in the following 
section.      
                              
4.4.2 Stated Benefits Distribution and Implications for PES Contracting 
Results highlight several issues that may arise when assessing the benefits 
distribution of a water service. First, identifying the beneficiaries of a water service 
is not always easy, contrasting the general belief that an upstream-downstream 
externalities framework is straightforward (Van Hecken et al., 2012). This is mostly 
due to beneficiaries’ spatial distribution, e.g. some users reside quite close to their 
water source while others are many kilometres away. Second, beneficiaries often 
value and make use of the ecosystem service in different ways, e.g. some houses 
rely solely on piped water for drinking, others use alternative sources, and some a 
combination of both. Third, many people are unlikely to respond accurately, if at all, 
to questions regarding economic matters, particularly income.  
 
Overall, a user-based PES scheme would entail a voluntary increase in water fees in 
order to ensure water conservation. It has been shown that an increase to current 
water fees is feasible based on beneficiaries WTP, but how this water fee increase 
will be distributed among beneficiaries through a water conservation scheme is a 
fundamental issue. The benefits of improving drinking water quality, reflected in 
the WTP values, vary widely across water users at the study site. Overall, benefits 
are distributed as a function of respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics, spatial 
location, and environmental awareness. Some factors that have commonly been 
found to be significant in the literature (e.g. Choe et al., 1996; Kaliba et al., 2003; 
Pattanayak et al., 2005; Vasquez et al., 2009; Van Hecken et al., 2012), such as 
gender, presence of children, and water bill were not significant in this study.  
 
The most significant variable explaining WTP is the perception that the proposed 
PES scheme is important for the study site. This variable highlights respondents’ 
environmental awareness and knowledge about upstream environmental problems, 
as other studies have mentioned (e.g. Ahmad et al., 2005). Beneficiaries’ 
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environmental awareness allows them to understand the PES scheme proposed 
and believe that it can solve upstream water problems. Their environmental 
awareness is likely to be linked to beneficiaries’ attachment and concern for the 
area. Along with being able to afford to pay, environmental awareness is a key 
factor influencing willingness to pay, without which the ability to pay is worthless. 
However, the variable of thinking their water is contaminated is not significant, 
which is normally one of the main environmental awareness factors determining 
WTP reported in the literature (e.g. Kaliba et al., 2003; Vasquez et al., 2009; 
Beaumais et al., 2010). This contradictory finding indicates that respondents have 
incomplete health risk awareness related to water (as discussed in chapter 5) or 
some other unobserved reason. Respondents who are willing to pay irrespective of 
thinking their water is contaminated or not are likely to perceive co-benefits from a 
possible PES scheme, including water system improvements, increased water flows, 
forest cover, fresh air, habitat conservation, as well as non-use values (Kosoy et al., 
2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Gross-Camp et al., 2012). This study highlights that 
although there might not be sufficient awareness of water contamination issues, 
awareness of other problems and services provided by the watershed might 
enhance support for a PES scheme. However, if a PES scheme were implemented 
care would need to be taken to clarify and manage expected outcomes. 
 
Respondents with more education showed a higher WTP, as commonly reported in 
the literature (e.g. Haq et al., 2007; Shultz and Soliz, 2007). Education is linked to 
income and environmental awareness, as it provides access to information 
obtained during schooling and other sources. It also offers a greater ability to 
understand and make use of information obtained. Although more educated 
respondents are more willing to pay, they are the minority at the study site. The 
generally low levels of schooling at the study site will be a limiting factor for 
contracting in a PES scheme. Improvements in access to long-term education are 
necessary, but in the short-term beneficiaries’ environmental awareness could be 
enhanced through environmental education and disseminating the work carried out 
by the water boards and the NGO. Younger respondents were also more WTP, 
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which could be due to an increased access to education, social media and other 
resources in the last decades.  
 
Water users that are socially active in local or municipal groups showed a higher 
WTP. This is linked to having environmental awareness and ability to access project 
activities (Krause and Loft, 2013), environmental training and information. Group 
members are often also decision-makers and leaders in rural communities, so these 
individuals have a greater influence in project decision making. The fact that some 
respondents were not WTP unless the community decided together is indicative of 
the influence that community leaders have in their communities. This uneven 
participation and decision-making by certain beneficiaries, unless corrected, will 
likely be carried on into a PES scheme where they would influence the governance 
of benefits distribution (Sommerville et al., 2010a). A PES scheme could help 
balance out this inequity in decision-making by having the NGO act as intermediary. 
A scheme could also provide for more participation in protected area management, 
which so far is done largely by the NGO. It is expected that a PES scheme could also 
strengthen local water management by encouraging participation in payment and 
maintenance activities and reducing free-riding of beneficiaries. However, 
discrimination is needed between free-riders due to poverty and those due to other 
reasons, so as to not disadvantage the poor. 
 
Those individuals with a higher economic status had a higher WTP for improving 
drinking water quality, as is usually reported in the valuation literature. More 
affluent households are likely to have higher health standards, greater local 
influence, and better access to resources, such as information and alternative water 
sources. High income does not guarantee environmental awareness, but the ability 
to access information, through media and education, can contribute to awareness. 
Although wealthier households are willing to pay and willing to pay more, they are 
the minority at the study site and most likely located in the larger communities. 
Poor households are disadvantaged because they can’t afford to pay for water 
quality improvements even if they were willing to. Thus, while there is an overall 
demand for improved drinking water quality through increased water bills, a PES 
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scheme needs to account for the poor or it will exacerbate inequity in water 
provision. These findings confirm the need for equitable benefit distribution 
mechanisms, such as differentiated tariffs or subsidies, as suggested in the water 
management literature (Ahmad et al., 2005; Meij et al., 2005; Wichelns, 2013; 
Justes et al., 2014). Furthermore, the proposed PES scheme would need to account 
for the low income levels at the study site by having the NGO cover the start-up and 
monitoring costs to reduce the cost of beneficiary contracting for improved water 
quality. 
 
Community size was also significant at explaining WTP, with smaller rural 
communities showing a higher WTP than larger communities. This result 
contradicts other studies where urban households have a higher WTP for 
environmental benefits, attributed to higher income or education levels 
(Uzochukwu et al., 2010; Mombo et al., 2014). Haq et al., 2007) found that urban 
households are more WTP for improved water services due to their dependence on 
government sources. However, at the study site all water systems are communally 
managed and smaller communities are disadvantaged by insecure water source 
ownership compared to larger communities that have municipally or communally 
owned sources. Larger communities do attract more funding from the government 
and donors, creating an uneven allocation of resources. Additionally, larger 
communities have access to drinking water substitutes, such as bottled water. 
Whereas small communities, usually farther from shops in remote areas, are 
directly dependent on drinking water coming from spring sources at the study site. 
This disparity between communities evidences a current lack of distributive equity 
(Konow, 2001; Corbera et al., 2007a; Proctor et al., 2008), which could be overcome 
with a PES scheme that considers smaller communities. A scheme could ensure all 
water sources are secure and monitored periodically by the water boards and the 
NGO, which would benefit all communities but particularly smaller ones. This study 
highlights a different community size relationship to WTP, than normally mentioned 
in the literature.  
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Access and spatial proximity to water sources have also been mentioned as key 
determinants of the distribution of ecosystem service benefits (Naidoo and Ricketts, 
2006; Tallis and Polasky, 2009; Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2012). Beneficiary 
communities located farthest from their source are likely to be at a disadvantage 
due to spatial disconnection, having problems enforcing rights of access, monitoring 
and protecting their water sources. This situation applies particularly to two 
communities at the study site that are outside the watershed and in a different 
municipality from their water source. They already experience water management 
and benefit distribution complications through dissimilar political agendas and 
priorities. A PES scheme could benefit these communities by ensuring water 
sources are secure and protected through the involvement of the NGO, especially 
monitoring water sources in a challenging setting with steep terrain, vast 
watersheds and remote uninhabited areas. 
 
In summary, there are certain factors that may hinder the implementation of a PES 
scheme for improved drinking water quality at the study site, but there are many 
factors that would contribute to contracting in such a scheme. Overall, the whole 
study area could benefit from a uniform level of clean drinking water and secure 
water sources, as water provision and conservation would be carried out with a 
watershed landscape approach, compared to the current uneven situation. A 
scheme would also change social dynamics by strengthening the work of the water 
boards, increasing benefits to disadvantaged households and communities, and 
providing the support of the NGO.  
 
4.5 Conclusions  
The WTP for clean drinking water through a PES scheme at the Güisayote Biological 
Reserve was estimated with the contingent valuation method. The monthly average 
WTP came to US$ 0.77 per household, which is within the range reported by the 
literature. This estimate represents less than 0.3% of the average household 
income and 86% of the monthly water bill. However, some households in the 
lowest income quintile are already paying above the affordability threshold for 
water and if it were increased, approximately 11% of households will not be able to 
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cope. Overall, there is affordability and willingness to pay above current charges, 
indicating that substantial increases could be made to water bills.  
 
The benefits reflected in the WTP are distributed as a function of respondents’ 
socioeconomic characteristics, spatial location, and environmental awareness. It is 
believed a PES scheme could benefit local water users, both individual households 
and entire communities, but especially small communities and poor households. 
Challenges for contracting in such a scheme include unawareness of water 
contamination, low income and education levels, the availability of water 
substitutes, inequity in decision making, and beneficiary communities in different 
municipalities. Alternatively, opportunities for contracting in a scheme include the 
demand for a PES scheme, perceiving co-benefits from a scheme beyond water 
quality, the participation of the NGO in several aspects of the water provision 
scheme, satisfaction with the local environmental organizations, and the need for 
secure water sources.  
 
Findings show that some factors explaining benefit distribution correspond with 
those reported so far in the literature, but some novel factors were also found. 
Thus, the wide range of factors that has been reported elsewhere to explain WTP 
for water provision and results of this study indicate that case by case analysis is 
needed when trying to understand benefit distribution due to highly context-
specific determinants. Finally, this chapter contributes key information to 
discussions in chapter 7 on the use of different WTP or benefit measures, the 
feasibility of a PES scheme by contrasting with the costs of provision, and 
contracting in PES schemes in a wider context. 
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Chapter 5: Revealed WTP and Benefits Distribution for Drinking Water 
Quality 
 
This chapter describes the application of two revealed preference approaches, 
averting behaviour and illness damage costs, to estimate the willingness to pay for 
clean drinking water. The WTP estimate serves as a measure of the benefits of 
improving drinking water quality for users by reducing expenditure on averting 
actions and illness damage costs; hence this chapter examines the factors 
determining the distribution of these benefits. In addition, it contributes to the 
discussion on contracting in a PES scheme for local beneficiaries, considering their 
revealed WTP through actual market expenditure and the local context.  
 
The focus of this chapter is analysing the revealed WTP or the benefits of reducing 
averting and illness expenditure, as a direct way of assessing peoples’ preferences. 
It contributes information on the key factors affecting benefit distribution and how 
these would influence possible contracting opportunities and challenges of a PES 
scheme. In chapter 7, these revealed preferences will be compared to stated 
preferences (see chapter 4) as another way of estimating WTP of beneficiaries, as 
well as contrasted to the opportunity costs of water conservation (see chapter 6) to 
assess the feasibility and challenges of contracting in a PES scheme.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Contaminated drinking water is a major issue in developing countries (UNICEF and 
WHO, 2012) mainly due to clean drinking water often being a nonmarket ecosystem 
service. Although the literature contains an increasing number of estimates of 
nonmarket water services, the benefits of water quality improvements in 
developing country settings deserve much more study (Olmstead, 2010). Securing 
drinking water quality is a challenge in developing countries (Trevett et al., 2004), 
but household water treatment can lead to dramatic improvements in quality and a 
reduction of diarrhoeal disease (LeChevallier and Au, 2004). Household water 
treatments are often seen as a short-term solution (Jalan et al., 2009), but in 
2
6
0
 
 
112 
 
                                                                                    
 
developing countries they are often the only way of ensuring clean drinking water 
and are therefore an established practice. 
 
The demand for potable water can be understood by studying households’ use of 
market commodities related to water quality, as well as households’ resources and 
preferences (Alberini et al., 1996; Pattanayak et al., 2005). The economic value of 
potable water can be estimated using revealed preference approaches which are 
based on actual choices in the market. Choices based on the perceived costs and 
benefits better reflect the values of the population and provide valid WTP estimates 
(Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Whitehead et al., 2008) that can be used to 
assess the benefits that a water conservation initiative, such as a PES scheme, could 
provide. The presence of water contamination and associated illness gives rise to 
two categories of behaviour-related market costs: averting behaviour and damage 
costs, both revealed preference approaches. Averting behaviour estimates the 
household expenditure associated with the actions taken to reduce exposure to 
contaminated drinking water, e.g. treating water and buying bottled water; and 
damage costs consist of direct, out-of-pocket expenses arising from illness, e.g. 
medical costs, as well as indirectly incurred opportunity costs, e.g. lost earnings 
(Harrington and Portney, 1987; Harrington et al., 1989; Whitehead and Van 
Houtven, 1997; Byford et al., 2000; Um et al., 2002; Dickie, 2003; Haq et al., 2007). 
 
The averting expenditure that would be needed to exactly offset the effects of 
contaminated drinking water is a theoretical correct measure of WTP for clean 
water (Harrington and Portney, 1987; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Hanley et 
al., 1999; Pattanayak et al., 2005). However, in practice this measure is difficult to 
estimate because certain conditions are required; such as no sunk costs, no direct 
utility from the averting behaviour, no joint production, efficient averting 
behaviours and secure property rights to raw water sources (Bartik, 1988; 
Pattanayak et al., 2005; Whitehead et al., 2008). Thus, in the literature the measure 
of averting expenditure is not referred to as a perfect substitute for clean water, 
but as approximating a lower bound of WTP (Courant and Porter, 1981; Bartik, 1988; 
McConnell and Rosado, 2000; Wu and Huang, 2001). Some studies go as far as 
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stating that WTP and averting expenditure are not related, and that inferences from 
averting behaviour are limited (Laughland et al., 1996).  
 
Conversely, there have been a few studies that have found averting expenditure to 
be a true, or upper bound, WTP (Abdalla et al., 1992). For instance, Roy et al., 2004) 
estimated the averting expenditure undertaken by each household to produce one 
litre of clean drinking water in the city of Kolkata, India. Starting from the general 
utility maximising behaviour of an individual they arrived at the conclusion that 
averting behaviour gives a true estimate of WTP. Similarly, Haq et al., 2007) 
estimated the WTP for improved water service levels and for water quality 
improvement with contingent valuation and averting behaviour (including the 
opportunity cost of illness) in the mostly rural district of Abbottabad, Pakistan. They 
assert that averting expenditure provides a true estimate of WTP for good quality 
drinking water.  
 
Furthermore, Urama and Hodge, 2006) compare irrigators' stated WTP for a river 
basin restoration scheme designed to mitigate soil and water pollution problems in 
their farms with their actual expenditures to mitigate the same pollution problems 
in south-eastern Nigeria. They found that the averting expenditure was higher than 
the stated WTP due to farmers’ having higher discount rates and greater risk 
aversion. More generally, Shogren and Crocker, 1991) theoretically showed that the 
lower bound property of averting expenditure was not assured when the results of 
the averting behaviour were uncertain. There is limited empirical literature on 
averting expenditure which is insufficient for making conclusive statements 
regarding their theoretical properties (Pattanayak et al., 2005). Thus, there is still a 
need for research into averting expenditure providing valid WTP estimates for 
water quality improvements.   
 
When averting behaviour is not carried out or is not done effectively, consumption 
of contaminated water can lead to illness. The second revealed preference method 
is illness damage costs, also referred to as cost-of-illness or coping costs. It is 
assumed that damage costs are also likely to be a lower bound WTP because they 
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do not capture the pain and suffering during illness or the value of reduced 
mortality risk (Harrington and Portney, 1987; Kenkel, 1994; Whitehead and Van 
Houtven, 1997; Alberini and Krupnick, 2000; Dasgupta, 2004; Aziz and Aziz, 2012). 
However, available evidence suggests that the relationship between WTP and 
damage costs is not constant, but instead varies by illness and approach (Dickie, 
2003). For instance, Guh et al., 2008) compared damage costs with stated 
preference estimates of WTP associated with shigellosis in a rural area of China. 
They found that damage cost estimates approximate an upper bound estimate of 
WTP and they ascribe this to low preventive expenditures and pain and suffering 
for shigellosis cases. These findings suggest that for some diseases, damage costs 
may approximate more comprehensive measures of economic benefits. Therefore 
the estimation of damage costs as contributing a valid WTP measure requires 
further attention. 
 
Furthermore, several authors report that the true benefits associated with the 
improvement of water quality equal averting expenditure, plus damage costs and 
the net direct disutility of illness (Harrington and Portney, 1987; Pattanayak et al., 
2005; Jalan and Somanathan, 2008). However, so far few studies have attempted to 
estimate such a measure. Alberini et al., 1996) applied a bivariate probit model of 
averting behaviour and waterborne illness to assess the effects of engineering and 
individual behaviour on diarrhoeal disease in Jakarta, Indonesia. They highlight the 
dependent relationship between averting behaviour and illness, but no WTP 
estimate is provided. Similarly, Dasgupta, 2004) uses a bivariate probit model 
following a health production function for the averting behaviour and health 
damages incurred by households in Delhi, India. The author discusses the variables 
determining averting behaviour and illness. Alternatively, Harrington et al., 1989) 
estimated total losses (equivalent to a WTP) due to averting expenditure and illness 
damage costs of a one-off water contamination Giardiasis episode in Pennsylvania, 
USA. The authors found that the lost benefits are substantial and discuss the 
accuracy of estimates. The estimation of a full WTP, based on averting expenditure 
and damage costs, as well as its validity as an estimate of the benefits of improving 
drinking water quality requires further attention. To the researcher’s knowledge, a 
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full revealed WTP, obtained from averting behaviour and illness damage costs, has 
not been employed to inform the demand-side of a PES scheme before. 
 
Many socioeconomic and psychological factors have been found to affect 
households’ averting behaviour, such as income, education, water source and 
water quality (Roy et al., 2004; Haq et al., 2007; Nauges and Van Den Berg, 2009). 
Perceptions and lack of awareness of contamination and the adverse health effects 
of unsafe drinking water are significant barriers to the adoption of averting 
behaviour (Redding et al., 2000; Jalan et al., 2009). According to Nauges and Van 
Den Berg, 2009) the perception of risk related to water consumption by households 
in developing countries has hardly been studied in the applied economics literature. 
Thus, a study on the factors determining a revealed WTP for clean drinking water in 
a developing country will contribute to the understanding of household health 
behaviour and its implications for PES scheme contracting. 
 
This chapter describes the estimation of the WTP or the benefits of reducing 
expenditure on averting actions and illness damages. This chapter contributes to 
the discussion of the use of summing averting expenditure and illness damage costs 
as a valid WTP measure to inform PES scheme design. The socioeconomic factors 
and perceptions determining households’ health behaviour and benefit distribution 
are also analysed. Finally, opportunities and challenges for PES scheme contracting 
are discussed based on the results obtained.  
 
5.2 Study Site and Methods 
5.2.1 Study Site 
This study was conducted in a 4,793 ha watershed of the Güisayote Biological 
Reserve in the westernmost region of Honduras. The watershed was selected based 
on its unsafe drinking water. All community water sources have been found 
contaminated with agrochemicals, bacteria, and/or faecal coliforms at least once in 
the last year by the local health office. This study recognises that a one-off test 
can’t possibly reveal more complex fluctuations in drinking water quality. There is a 
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degree of uncertainty on the exposure to contamination owing to the variability of 
contamination in time and space and to the number of possible contamination 
routes – such as poor hygiene practices (Alberini et al., 1996). However, positive 
water test results are evidence of unreliable water quality. In Honduras, as in most 
other developing countries, diarrhoea is one of the main causes of illness and death.  
The highest rates of diarrhoea hospital consultations were reported for two health 
regions, including the west of Honduras (Solorzano Giron et al., 2006) where the 
study site is located. On the whole the study site is representative of the uncertain 
drinking water quality that prevails in rural Honduras and Latin America.  
 
The Reserve was created for its key hydrological services and is managed by the 
NGO Asociación Ecológica San Marcos de Ocotepeque (AESMO). Although having 
Reserve status means that human activities are strictly prohibited in the core zone 
and restricted in the buffer zone. Landowners in both zones rarely follow these 
restrictions, carrying out productive land uses throughout. These land uses include 
forest, but also extensive cattle ranching, coffee, vegetables, and some maize and 
beans. The study site provides drinking water to fifteen communities with an 
estimated population of 7,725 inhabitants (ESNACIFOR and USAID, 2002). 
Beneficiary communities are mostly rural ranging in size from 11 to 393 houses, and 
only the largest is considered urban. Land ownership of water sources is varied, but 
generally insecure. Each beneficiary community has an autonomous water system 
managed by a locally elected water board. Communities pay their water bill either 
monthly or annually to their water board, amounting to an annual total between 
Lps. 120 - 500, irrespective of water system or water provision. Two communities, 
La Ruda and El Portillo, have no water fee system in place.  
 
This section provides limited study site and methods information relevant to the 
focus of this chapter. For more details on the study site, sampling and methods, see 
chapter 3.   
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5.2.2 Averting Behaviour and Expenditure 
All data on averting behaviour and illness damage costs was obtained through the 
contingent valuation survey (discussed in chapter 4). Questions on averting 
behaviour covered water usage, water sources, perceptions of contamination, 
household water treatments and costs, and expenditure to treat illness. The 
complete survey, including contingent valuation questions, is presented in 
Appendix 10. 
 
The cost of avoiding contaminated drinking water was estimated with a revealed 
preference approach, the averting behaviour method. This method consists of 
calculating the monthly expenditure on household treatment methods: a) 
purchasing bottled water, b) chlorinating water, c) boiling water, or a combination 
of these methods. Four households used either a filter or a purifier, but owing to 
none appearing during 102 pre-tests and incomplete data obtained, these 
observations were included in general descriptive statistics but excluded from 
expenditure estimations. All these actions taken to avoid contaminated drinking 
water are reasonably assumed to allow households to reach the highest level of 
water quality. The monthly averting expenditure per household was thus calculated 
as follows 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = ∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
 
The following sub-sections describe how each of the water treatment methods was 
estimated, the cost of purchasing bottled water, of chlorinating water and of boiling 
water with firewood and electricity. 
 
5.2.2.1 Cost of Purchasing Bottled Water  
Bottled water was purchased in refillable plastic five US gallon containers, except 
for one household that purchased water in 20 litre bags. The survey elicited the 
amount of water purchased per month and the unit price of a container, which 
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varied across households. The majority of respondents purchased bottled water in 
their community, except six respondents, so the opportunity cost of time to 
purchase bottled water was assumed to be zero. The reasoning is that the distance 
within communities is negligible. Thus, the formula for the monthly household cost 
of bottled water is 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝐶𝐵𝑡) = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 
5.2.2.2 Cost of Chlorinating Water  
The most inexpensive water treatment method used at the study site is chlorination 
and its cost was estimated by the number of 210 ml bags of chlorine purchased in a 
month and the unit price of a bag. No time cost is included for chlorination as 
households purchased these small bags of chlorine jointly with other goods at a 
community shop and just added drops of chlorine to tap water. Thus, the formula 
for the monthly household cost of chlorination is 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐶𝐶) = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 
5.2.2.3 Cost of Boiling Water  
The cost of boiling water was estimated using primary and secondary data on water 
consumption per household, the fuel type used, the time value for each fuel, the 
amount of firewood used, and the market value of firewood. 
 
The reported daily drinking water requirement for a person varies widely in the 
literature and ranges from one to six litres (Gleick, 1996; Roy et al., 2004; WBCSD, 
2006; WHO, 2011). Water intake depends on many factors, such as temperature 
and activity level. However, soft drinks like Coca-Cola have become a staple 
commodity in Latin America, as well as the rest of the world (Ismail et al., 1997; 
Leatherman and Goodman, 2005; Malik et al., 2010; Pistochini et al., 2011). A high 
use of soft drinks was observed at the study site, so water consumption is assumed 
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to be low. Furthermore, a rough estimate of water consumption at the study site 
can be calculated based on family size and reported bottled water purchase. The 
median use of bottled water at the study site is 38 litres per person per month 
(mean = 51) only considering households with a consumption over 30 litres per 
person per month as a minimum water requirement. This estimate also likely 
accounts for water used for cooking. Thus, the amount of water boiled was 
determined according to the number of people in the household multiplied by a 
requirement of one litre of water per day, or 30 litres per month, based on 30 days 
in a month. The household water consumption was multiplied by the boiling 
frequency stated by respondents: always (100%), almost always (80%), occasionally 
(50%), and rarely (25%). The formula for determining the amount of water boiled 
monthly per household is 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 (𝑊𝐵)
= 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 30 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
 
Boiling drinking water includes two cost components: fuel and time. The three fuel 
sources used to boil drinking water at the study site were firewood (89%), 
electricity (9%) and liquid petroleum gas (LPG; 2%). Apart from the arrival of 
electricity to the area, these proportions have hardly changed in 30 years (Jones 
and Perez, 1982). The households using LPG as fuel were given the electricity cost 
of boiling drinking water due to low frequency, the difficulties of accurate 
measurement and similar use properties (i.e. no time value as in firewood). 
Following is the estimation of the cost of boiling water using electricity and 
firewood, the latter including a market and a time cost. 
 
a) Cost of Boiling with Electricity 
To determine the cost of boiling water with electricity as fuel source, we use 
Abdalla et al., 1992) and Laughland et al., 1993) estimate that 0.19 KWh of 
electricity is needed to boil one litre of water. However, it is acknowledged that 
electricity consumption will vary depending on many factors, including initial water 
temperature, wattage of stove, amount of water boiled, among others. The 
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electricity tariff applied is Lps.1.95 (US$ 0.10) per kWh, based on the average of the 
first two tariff levels reported by the National Energy Commission of Honduras 
(Lopez Oliva, 2009). The use of the two tariffs assumes low energy consumption at 
the study site due to the high cost of electricity (compared to other fuels available), 
poverty and widespread firewood usage. Based on the above, boiling one litre of 
water is estimated to cost Lps. 0.37 (US$0.02). The time to boil water with 
electricity is assumed to be negligible due to the ease of use of this method. Thus, 
the monthly household cost of boiling water with electricity is estimated as  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐶𝐵𝑒) = 𝑊𝐵 ∗  𝐿𝑝𝑠. 0.37 
 
b) Cost of Boiling with Firewood 
According to the Red Cross (IFRCRCS, 2008), one kilogram of firewood is needed to 
boil one litre of water for a minute. Similarly, Elhadi and Ahmed, 2009) found that 
on average slightly over 700 g of firewood is used to boil water in Sudan. Thus, for 
this study an average of 850 g of firewood to boil one litre of water per minute is 
used. The Honduran unit of firewood measurement is the human “carga” or load, 
studies carried out close to the study site report a load weighing between 35 - 50 kg 
in Copan (Cruz et al., 2011) and 35 kg for Lempira (Ferreira Catrileo et al., 2010). At 
the study site a park guard mentioned an average weight of 35 kg per load (Cabrera, 
2011). Thus, a value of 35 kg per load is used, indicating that a load of firewood can 
boil just over 41 litres of water. At the study site all landholders reported firewood 
collection at a rate of 10 loads per day3, equal to 1 load per 1.25 hours, considering 
an 8 hour working day. Thus, the loads of firewood used per household to boil 
water for a month were determined as 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑 (𝐿𝐹) = (𝑊𝐵 ∗ 0.85𝑘𝑔)  ÷ 35 𝑘𝑔 
 
Boiling drinking water with firewood is the most time-consuming treatment of all, 
as it involves family members’ time collecting firewood and tending the fire. 
                                                          
3 Based on data elicited for the opportunity cost survey discussed in chapter 6. 
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Household production theory suggests this time cost should be part of the averting 
cost measure (Laughland et al., 1993). Two approaches were used to value the cost 
of boiling water with firewood, the time cost, based on firewood collection, and the 
market cost, based on firewood purchase.  
 
The time cost includes the time invested in firewood collection and the time 
invested tending to the fire while the water boils. Two average wage rates were 
used to value time, the “jornal” or labourer wage of Lps. 120 (US$ 6.35) per day and 
the farmer national minimum wage of Lps. 227 (US$ 12.01) per day, both based on 
an 8 hour work day. So, one hour collecting firewood, reported to be done mostly 
by men, has a value of Lps. 15 (US$ 0.79) at a labourer’s wage and Lps. 28.38 
(US$ 1.50) at a farmer’s wage. The time value of tending to the fire is estimated at a 
third of the collection time value. This estimate is based on the assumption that 
household chores are generally carried out by a female homemaker that does not 
work or works from home, and that tending to the fire allows for performing other 
simultaneous activities. Furthermore, large families (4.5 members on average) are 
common in the area and high levels of unemployment (60%) have been reported 
for the study site (ESNACIFOR and USAID, 2002). So it is assumed that at least one 
person remains at home, consistent with a low opportunity cost of time.  
 
Harrington et al., 1989) empirically determined that it takes four minutes to boil 
1.14 litres of water with firewood, McConnell and Rosado, 2000) also used this 
figure. However, according to Laughland et al., 1993) only one fourth of boiling time 
is spent boiling while the remaining time is used for other activities, e.g. food 
preparation, tending to children, watching television. The respondents at the study 
site reported a wide range between 4 – 60 minutes, with an average of 19 minutes, 
boiling water in large saucepans of varied volumes with a minimum capacity of 
approximately 4 litres. Based on the above information, it is assumed that it takes 
approximately 1 minute to boil 1 litre of water. So, one minute of female time 
boiling one litre of water has a value of Lps. 0.08 (US$ 0.004) at a third of a 
labourer’s wage and Lps. 0.16 (US$ 0.01) at a third of a farmer’s wage. Therefore, 
the monthly time cost per household boiling water with firewood is estimated as:  
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𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝑇𝐶𝐹) = 
𝐿𝐹 ∗ 1.25 ℎ𝑟𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑⁄ ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟⁄ ∗ (𝑊𝐵 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒⁄ ) 
   
Studies in neighbouring areas show that the market value of firewood varies from 
Lps. 30 (US$ 1.60) per load in the similarly forested department of Lempira (Ferreira 
Catrileo et al., 2010) to Lps. 50 (US$ 2.65) and Lps. 55 (US$ 2.91) in dry forest areas 
of the towns of Ajuterique and Siguatepeque in Comayagua (Torres Ferrera, 2007). 
In this study a market value of Lps. 30 (US$ 1.60) per load is employed as 
recommended by a Reserve park guard (Cabrera, 2011) and following the literature 
based on similar forest ecosystems. Thus, the monthly market cost of boiling water 
with firewood per household is estimated as: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝑀𝐶𝐹) = 𝐿𝐹 ∗ 𝐿𝑝𝑠. 30 
 
Thus, as explained above, three averting expenditure estimates are presented and 
discussed in this chapter. The labourer estimate uses a labourers wage to value to 
the time involved in boiling water with firewood. The market estimate uses the 
market price for the firewood used to boil water. The national estimate uses the 
national minimum farmer’s wage to value the time involved in boiling water with 
firewood.  
 
5.2.3 Illness Damage Costs 
The cost of drinking contaminated water was estimated with the damage cost 
method, consisting of the household value of treating waterborne illness (direct 
costs) plus the value of the missed work days due to illness (indirect costs). These 
costs were adjusted to per month of illness incidence using a weighting factor. The 
monthly damage cost per household was calculated as  
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
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The direct costs of waterborne illness include medical expenditures on laboratory 
tests, prescribed or self-medicated medicines, doctor or clinic fees, overnight stays 
in health facilities and all relevant transport. Direct damage costs are estimated as 
the sum of all these costs per illness case reported. The indirect costs of 
waterborne illness were calculated as the product of the number of work days 
missed and the appropriate monetary value or opportunity cost of the lost earnings. 
The opportunity cost of the lost earnings was based on a proportion of the average 
daily labourer’s wage of Lps. 120 (US$ 6.35) considering the high levels of 
unemployment mentioned above. All patients were assumed to be hindered from 
performing any work or household activities for the reported missed work days. An 
adult patient could be in the labour force or be a homemaker, so half of a 
labourer’s wage, Lps. 60 (US$ 3.18) was applied to adults. Children, less than 18 
years old, and elderly patients, above 65 years old, were assumed to be taken care 
of by a homemaker, without greatly affecting household activities. Although these 
age groups are less likely to be in the work force, some teenagers and elders might 
engage in work tasks on a regular or intermittent basis. So a third of the labourer’s 
wage, Lps. 40 (US$ 2.12), is applied to these patients.  
 
The prevalent-based costs approach for measuring damage costs is used in this 
study, with the population consisting of all persons who have a condition at a given 
time (Rice, 1994; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Byford et al., 2000). Data 
covers the six-month direct and indirect costs associated with cases of diarrhoea, 
vomit and stomach pain. The diarrhoea peaks in Honduras occur between January – 
April and June – August. The first peak is generally associated to rotavirus and the 
second to bacteria pathogens, such as Escherichia coli (Solorzano Giron et al., 2006; 
Quiroz, 2007). The two main symptoms of rotavirus are diarrhoea (100% of cases) 
followed by vomit (approximately 90% of cases; Quiroz, 2007); other common 
symptoms include stomach pain and fever (Howard and Bartram, 2003). Damage 
costs data cover both diarrhoea peaks and the two seasons, dry from November to 
April and rainy from May to October. This study recognizes that the transmission 
routes of diarrhoea causing pathogens is quite complex and has to be taken into 
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account in assessing the impact of any single intervention to control diarrhoea 
(Briscoe, 1984; Dasgupta, 2004).  
 
Damage cost data was obtained for the six month period prior to the survey 
delivery, and as the survey was applied over a two month period, a total coverage 
of eight months was obtained. However, a differentiated estimate per month is 
needed as the incidence of waterborne illness in rural developing areas varies 
throughout the year depending on certain factors, mainly precipitation and 
temperature (Figueroa, 1990). It is also necessary to ensure damage costs are 
comparable to averting expenditure estimates. Thus, a weighted damage cost for 
each month was estimated using data from the Health Secretariat on diarrhoea and 
dysentery cases for the department of Ocotepeque (department where study site is 
located) between 2011 and 2013 (SSH, 2013). First, an average of the government 
cases was obtained for each month over the three year period covered by the data. 
The monthly averages were divided by the average obtained for the six month 
period covered in this study to obtain a proportion. Then each monthly proportion 
was multiplied times the six-month average damage costs estimated in this study to 
obtain a weighted monthly cost. It is important to note that the weighting factor is 
based on secondary data that reports illness cases for every month of the year and 
only considers cases reported by government facilities. Thus, it is a conservative 
estimate as it does not include untreated cases, cases treated at home or by private 
doctors or clinics. The weighting factor was obtained thus 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
𝑋 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑥 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
  
 
A limitation of the damage costs method is that third parties, such as institutions, 
may bear some of the costs associated with illness. In the study area, paid sick leave 
or medical insurance would be quite rare, only available to those in government (3% 
of respondents and 2% partners) or private employment (3% of respondents and 4% 
partners). Thus, at the study site third party costs mostly accrue to the state when 
patients visited public clinics. However, third party costs are omitted from this 
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study as the visits to private doctors and public clinics were not differentiated. 
Furthermore, due to the high levels of subsistence activity and the complexities of 
estimation no attempt was made to value discomfort or lost leisure time in this 
study. However, it is recognised that some value can accrue to the disutility of 
foregone leisure, and the pain and suffering associated with the illness (Harrington 
et al., 1989; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Roberts, 2007).  
 
5.2.4 Data Analysis 
5.2.4.1 Bivariate Probit Model 
In this study the incidence of illness is modelled as a function of the averting 
behaviour through a bivariate probit model following Alberini et al., 1996). This 
model assumes a correlation between averting behaviour and presence of illness 
(and its associated damage costs; see Briscoe et al., 1990). Likewise, the significance 
of different variables at explaining the presence of averting behaviour and illness is 
analysed with this model. 
 
A household perceives being unfavourably affected by contamination when illness 
occurs and deems averting behaviour necessary. The incidence of illness is a 
function of the level of contamination and the household's averting behaviour. 
Contamination is exogenous to the household but averting behaviour is 
endogenous. So, this model assumes observed independent variables and 
unobserved risk factors, e.g. daily fluctuations in drinking water quality. Such a 
model captures the effect of behaviour on health and is therefore useful for 
analysing real-world situations, since it treats health and behaviour as interlinked 
variables (Alberini et al., 1996; Dasgupta, 2004; Fleming and Kler, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, this model is based on respondents’ water quality perceptions, 
employing a discrete yes or no according if they thought their water was 
contaminated or not; instead of the measure of actual contamination levels which 
are unavailable for the study site (see Um et al., 2002). Following is the formula for 
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the bivariate probit model used and formed by two binary choice models nested 
together 
 
𝑦1
∗ = 𝑥1𝛽1 +  𝛾1𝑅
∗ +  𝜀  
 
𝑦2
∗ =  𝑥2𝛽2 + 𝛾2𝑅
∗ + 𝛿𝑦1
∗  +  𝑣  
 
Presence of averting behaviour is represented by 𝑦1
∗ and presence of illness by 𝑦2
∗. 
Presence of averting behaviour 𝑦1
∗  is determined by individual and household 
characteristics (e.g. monthly income, water bill) and proxies for risk factors known 
to the researcher (e.g. type of toilet available) 𝑥1 and unknown risk factors 𝑅
∗ (e.g. 
fluctuations in water quality). Presence of illness 𝑦2
∗  depends on 𝑥2  , 𝑅
∗  and 
whether a household carries out averting behaviours 𝑦1
∗ or not. There are three 
parameters of interest to be estimated: 𝛽, 𝛾, and 𝛿. While 𝜀 and  𝑣  represent 
normally distributed error terms with mean zero, variance one and correlation 𝜌. 
These two error terms are jointly distributed, but are assumed to be independent 
of each other, and capture the unobserved determinants of presence of illness and 
presence of averting behaviour, respectively. Because the risk factor 𝑅∗ is not 
known to the researcher, it is absorbed into the error terms. In this analysis, the 
independent variables of individual and household characteristics 𝑥1 were selected 
based on the literature and any variables exhibiting significant Pearson correlations 
above 0.4 were excluded from the model to avoid multi-collinearity. The 
independent variables included in the bivariate model are described in Table 5.1, as 
well as the expected sign for the model. 
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Table 5.1. Independent variables included in the bivariate probit model for the presence of averting 
behaviour and illness. Note: the classification of stable and temporal jobs is explained in Appendix 
12. 
Variable 
Expected 
sign AB 
Expected 
sign illness 
Explanation 
Age in years ? ? Expected to be significant, but no 
a priori reason              Continues… 
Education 
above primary 
school 
+ - Education likely to increase desire 
for improved water quality 
At least one 
child under 15 
years 
+ - Children’s health is a family 
concern and  clean drinking water 
is provided to them 
Has toilet or 
latrine 
+ - Having a toilet or latrine is a sign 
of sanitary awareness 
Stable job  + - A stable job is likely linked to 
higher income and education 
Partner has 
stable job 
+ - A stable job is likely linked to 
higher income and education 
Large 
community 
+ - Larger communities have higher 
levels of income and education  
Group member + - Being in groups facilitates social 
and environmental awareness  
Has car + - Richer individuals have greater 
access to averting methods  
Cable television + - Richer individuals with access to 
social media have access to 
averting behaviour methods to 
reduce illness 
Household 
income above 
minimum wage 
+ - Richer individuals have access to 
averting methods to reduce 
illness 
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Variable 
Expected 
sign AB 
Expected 
sign illness 
Explanation 
Water bill  - - Those paying a high water bill 
might expect clean water 
Drinks from 
piped water 
system 
- - The piped system is expected to 
provide cleaner water than other 
sources 
Water quality 
perception 
+ + Thinking water is contaminated is 
one of the main reasons for 
presence of illness and thus 
averting 
Water 
interruptions 
+ + Water interruptions are linked to 
water contamination and illness 
 
5.2.4.2 Averting Expenditure Estimates 
The three averting expenditure estimates (labourer, national minimum wage and 
market) were calculated by first estimating probit models with independent 
variables and subsequently welfare measures  using Nlogit - Limdep 4.0 software 
(same as for the CV probit model, see detailed information on procedure in section 
4.2.5 of chapter 4). Although the significance of the independent variables is not 
discussed, they are employed to obtain a realistic WTP considering the effect of 
these variables on respondents’ preferences.  
 
The consumption of bottled water has risen in the last decade worldwide not only 
because it is being perceived as a source of potable water, but also as water of 
good taste, odour and appearance (e.g. Doria, 2006; Ward et al., 2009; Hu et al., 
2011; Saylor et al., 2011). These multiple benefits of bottled water are referred to 
as joint production, which is an important limitation of averting behaviour. Joint 
production is more likely to exist in studying long-term or persistent drinking water 
contamination situations (Abdalla et al., 1992), as is the case at the study site. 
Bottled water has also become a popular market commodity, a form of cultural 
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consumption driven by status competition or as a lifestyle choice (Wilk, 2006; York 
et al., 2011). This status-derived benefit contributes to jointness but it is believed 
that this is not as great as its utilitarian value as a source of potable water (Knox 
and de Chernatony, 1989). Thus, to account for the jointness of bottled water at the 
study site, averting expenditure on bottled water is reduced by a conservative 11%, 
considering that the study site is a poor rural setting. This proportion is an average 
of Abrahams et al., 2000) findings of bottled water jointness in Georgia, USA.  
 
5.2.4.3 Illness Damage Cost Estimate 
As described in the previous section, data were collected on the damage costs for 
the six months before and up to the survey application. This six month value was 
converted to a weighted monthly value using secondary data from the government. 
However, it is recognised that the symptoms surveyed might be due to other non-
water related causes as evidenced by some high outlier values. In order to account 
for this, 3% is trimmed off at both ends of the initial estimates as a valid method of 
removing outliers (e.g. Ramsey and Ramsey, 2007). Estimates were calculated 
based on all symptoms and for diarrhoea only cases, so that a broad value and a 
more conservative value were obtained.  
 
Common problems with the data from revealed preference methods, such as 
averting behaviour and damage costs, are recall bias and incomplete information. 
Recall bias arises when people are asked to recall expenditures over a long time 
period (Chu et al., 1992); and incomplete information can occur when people do 
not have full information when they make purchase decisions (Boyle, 2003b). These 
limitations are considered when analysing the results and by referring to them as 
conservative estimates. Finally, the revealed WTP was calculated by summing the 
averting expenditure estimate and the damage cost estimate. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Respondents’ Socioeconomic Characteristics and Environmental Awareness  
As described in chapter 4 (see table 4.1 for full socioeconomic characteristics), 
respondents are generally middle-aged males with stable work (mostly farmers), 
but with little education and low affluence. Most households do have a toilet or 
latrine and half have a cable television connection (Table 5.1). Three-quarters of 
households drink water from the piped water system, the rest use their neighbour’s 
water connection, hoses, wells or other sources. Despite the fact that 72% of 
respondents think their drinking water source is contaminated (13% were unsure, 
excluded from Table 5.2) and 40% reported water interruptions, only 20% reported 
illness in the six months prior to the survey and 54% carried out some kind of 
averting behaviour to avoid contaminated water. A small proportion of households 
carrying out averting behaviour still reported illness, as well as some not averting 
and reporting illness (14%). 
 
Table 5.2. Socioeconomic characteristics of water beneficiaries (n = 348, unless otherwise stated). 
Characteristics Proportion 
Stable job  0.63 
Partner has stable job  0.66 
Has toilet or latrine  0.89 
Has cable television  0.52 
Drinks from piped system  0.76 
Reports water interruptions  0.40 
Carries out averting behaviour  0.54 
Presence of illness (n = 352) 0.20 
Thinks water is contaminated (n =308)  0.72 
Averts but reports illness  0.13 
Does not avert and reports illness  0.06 
 
An important decision in health behaviour is the choice of drinking water source. 
Most households drink water from the community piped water system, including a 
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small proportion free-riding on their neighbour’s connection. The second most used 
drinking water source is bottled water with less than a quarter of households; 
followed by other infrequent sources (Table 5.3). There is a clear relationship 
between income and water source. The poor are more likely to use a neighbour’s 
pipe connection (significant X2 (4) = 19.07, p = 0.00, Cramer’s V = 0.23), i.e. free-
riding on the water system, and wealthy households are more disposed to buy 
bottled water (significant X2 (4) = 25.01, p = 0.00, Cramer’s V = 0.27). Although using 
piped water is significantly related to income (X2 (4) =12.53, p = 0.01, Cramer’s V = 
0.19), the relationship is low, as evidenced in the Cramer’s V value and no trend is 
visible. Table 5.3 thus clearly shows that water sources used are distributed by 
income of water beneficiaries. 
 
Table 5.3. Drinking water source by income quintile; 1= Lps. 73,416 – 1,037,600 (US$ 3,886 – 54,914), 
2= Lps. 43,200 – 72,000 (US$ 2,286 – 3,811), 3= Lps. 36,000 – 40,800 (US$ 1,905 – 2,159), 4= Lps. 
24,000 – 35,000 (US$ 1,270 – 1,852), 5= Lps. 700 – 22,000 (US$ 37 - 1,164). * Note: total households 
equals 377 due to 25 households using more than one drinking water source.  
Drinking Water 
Source 
Number of households per income 
quintile Total (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Piped 44 62 62 47 54 269 (76) 
Neighbour (piped) 0 2 2 9 3 16 (5) 
Bottled  30 20 18 8 6 82 (23) 
Hose 3 0 2 1 1 7 (2) 
Well 1 0 0 0 1 2 (0.5) 
Other 1 0 0 0 0 1 (0.3) 
Total 79 84 84 65 65 377* 
 
The choice of water source is based on accessibility but also on respondents’ 
knowledge and understanding of water quality issues. More than half of 
respondents thought their water source was contaminated and the way they 
acquired this information was assessed. Many sources of information were 
mentioned for knowing if water was contaminated, some accurate and some less so 
(Figure 5.1a). Almost half of respondents mentioned having seen the contamination 
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at the water source, but only a small proportion mentioned water test results and 
visual reasons as determinants of water contamination. The low frequency of water 
test reporting is probably due to water users not having access to water test results 
or not grasping the link between contamination evidence and health risk.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. a) Respondents’ ways of knowing that their water source is contaminated (n=256); and b) 
respondents’ opinion on the type of contamination of their water source (n=275; respondents could 
give more than one answer). 
 
The knowledge that respondents’ have on the cause(s) of contamination is also 
important. When respondents stated what they thought the type of contamination 
was (Figure 5.1b), there is evidence of a lack of awareness of threats and 
inconsistency with results in Figure 5.1a. Water tests for the study site report 
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contamination by faecal coliforms and bacteria mainly, followed by nitrates (from 
agrochemicals). Half of respondents mentioned dirt as the cause of contamination, 
followed by agrochemicals and, to a lesser extent, faeces. These findings evidence a 
considerable reliance on visual cues to assess water contamination, but also 
deficiencies in health risk awareness. Thus, there is water contamination awareness 
considering it is a rural setting, but it is largely based on visual cues and 
misinformation which likely influences their health behaviour and the value 
ascribed to improvements in drinking water quality.  
 
5.3.2 Averting Behaviour and Expenditure     
A total of 348 surveys were obtained with averting expenditure information. More 
than half of respondents carried out some kind of averting behaviour to avoid 
contaminated drinking water. The most frequent action was boiling, followed by 
buying bottled water, chlorinating and rarely a combination of two of these actions 
(Table 5.4). Some treatment methods yield higher utility than others, as evidenced 
by pathogens eliminated and taste, but respondents were probably not completely 
aware of utility differences and health risks. Boiled water and buying bottled water 
are believed to provide greater protection against pathogens, but both boiled and 
chlorinated water are known for bad taste. Thus, the water treatment method 
providing greater utility is bottled water, assuming bottling companies follow 
potable water standards.  
 
Table 5.4 Pathogens eliminated and taste provided by each water treatment method, as well as the 
percentage of households utilising each method;
 a
 based on respondents overall views; 
b 
Four 
households (1%) used other treatment excluded from this study, see section 5.2.2 (Source of 
pathogens data: McConnell and Rosado, 2000; LeChevallier and Au, 2004) 
Treatment Pathogens eliminated Tastea 
Percent of 
Householdsb 
Chlorinate bacteria, viruses Bad 7  
Boil protozoa, bacteria, viruses Bad 22 
Bottle protozoa, bacteria, viruses Good 20 
Bottle and boil -- -- 2  
Chlorinate and boil -- -- 1  
Bottle and chlorinate -- -- 1  
No treatment None Varied 46  
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Households carrying out averting behaviour have a positive WTP for clean drinking 
water since they undertake water treatment methods. However, each household 
values drinking water quality differently since their averting expenditure varies 
widely. Individual methods range from a monthly average of Lps. 10.16 (US$ 0.54) 
for chlorination up to Lps. 133.21 (US$ 7.05) for purchased bottled water (Table 
5.5). Averting expenditure mainly depended on the price of the treatment method 
for each household, which ranged widely, and its frequency of use. Total monthly 
household averting expenditure averaged between Lps. 90.02 and 114.51 (US$ 4.76 
– 6.06) based on three estimates. The labourer estimate is based on an agriculture 
labourer’s wage, representing the lowest work time value at the study site. The 
market estimate is based on the market value of firewood and represents a mid-
value averting expenditure. The national estimate is based on the farmer national 
minimum wage defined by the central government and represents the highest 
averting expenditure.  
 
Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics of monthly averting expenditure (AE) in Honduran Lempiras per 
household for each individual method and in total. 
Averting Behaviour Mean  SE SD Range 
Chlorinate (n=19)  10.16 2.60 11.34 0 – 50 
Boil-Labourer (n=89) 
Boil-Market 
Boil-National 
55.06 
73.76 
102.38 
3.19 
4.45 
6.36 
30.07 
42 
60.01 
4.02 – 167.03 
5.46 – 227.31 
7.66 – 318.62  
Bottle (n=78) 133.21 15.05 132.88 20 – 800  
Total AE (n=172) 
Labourer estimate 
Market estimate 
National estimate 
 
90.02 
99.70 
114.51 
 
8.04 
8.12 
8.47 
 
105.38 
106.55 
111.06 
 
0 – 880.30  
0 – 909.29 
0 – 953.18 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
The final mean averting expenditure estimates were obtained through a welfare 
estimate considering the effect of independent variables. These estimates can serve 
as an initial WTP for a change in water quality from the current level to clean 
drinking water. The monthly averting expenditure per household is US$ 0.71 with a 
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labourer estimate, US$ 0.79 with a market estimate, and US$ 0.86 with a national 
estimate. However, the joint production of purchased bottled water needs to be 
considered in the averting expenditure. In order to account for jointness, the 
purchase of bottled water for other reasons beyond quality (such as good taste, 
sight, odour, and as a luxury item), the cost of bottled water was reduced by 11% 
(see section 5.2.4 for more details). The amended averting expenditure estimates 
come to US$ 0.67 with a labourer estimate, US$ 0.74 with a market estimate, and 
US$ 0.79 with a national estimate. Although individual household averting 
expenditure amounts to less than US$ 1, the annual averting expenditure amounts 
to US$ 12,422, 13,720 and 14,647 respectively, for the entire study site. These 
estimates reflect the amount that could be raised for water conservation if water 
quality could be guaranteed. However, a more complete revealed WTP will be 
obtained by accounting for the illness damage costs, presented in the following 
section. 
 
5.3.3 Illness Damage Costs 
Households at the study site were evidently exposed to waterborne illness. When 
asked to report illness, i.e. symptoms of diarrhoea, vomit and stomach pain in the 
six months prior to survey application, 20% of households reported at least one 
case of illness and 14% reported diarrhoea cases. A total of 104 cases were 
reported, with costs largely formed by direct costs or medical expenses. Work days 
were rarely missed due to illness, so the indirect costs were low. The symptoms 
data reported are quite wide-ranging both for individual patients and for 
households and mean values are affected by a few costly cases. However, 
households did not report more than 3 cases for the six month period, patients 
were generally young adults and only two-fifths were under five years old (Table 
5.6). See Appendix 15 for descriptive statistics of diarrhoea only cases. 
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Table 5.6. Descriptive statistics for illness cases per household and per patient for the six months 
prior to survey delivery; all costs in Honduran Lempiras (n = 69). 
Characteristic Mean SE SD Range 
Age of patient  23.84 2.65 21.99 1 – 89 
No. patients under five years old  0.39 0.07 0.60 0 - 3 
No. of cases per household  1.51 0.09 0.72 1 – 3  
Per patient: 
Lost work days  
Indirect costs  
Direct costs 
 
2.94 
176.54 
777.83 
 
1.26 
75.87 
289.39 
 
10.50 
630.22 
2,403.86 
 
0 – 90 
0 – 5,400 
0 – 20,000 
Per household:  
Lost work days  
Indirect costs 
Direct costs 
 
4.43 
266.09 
1,143.87 
 
1.55 
93.19 
367.36 
 
12.90 
774.11 
3,051.51 
 
0 – 90 
0 – 5,400 
0 – 22,300 
 
The above data represents damage costs for the six months prior to the survey 
being administered. However, monthly values are needed to obtain values 
comparable to the averting expenditure estimates and to account for the variability 
of illness incidence throughout the year. To obtain a damage cost representative of 
each month covered in this study, data from the Honduran government was used 
to obtain a monthly weighting factor and a per month damage cost. Table 5.7 
shows that May and June bear the most weight as they exhibit the highest number 
of cases due to being the start of the rainy season, resulting in greater 
contamination of superficial waters. The average damage cost per household is 
US$ 3.04 considering all three symptoms and US$0.28 only for diarrhoea cases. The 
households incurring expenditure to treat diarrhoea are too few (7) to analyse this 
data any further. However, the all symptoms estimates are trimmed by 3% at both 
ends mainly to reduce the effect of high outliers representing more serious and 
costly illnesses. A much reduced overall average of US$ 0.49 is obtained for all 
symptoms and is considered a valid measure of damage costs. The estimated 
damage cost provides an annual expenditure of US$ 9,085 for treating illness across 
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the entire study site. The choice of symptoms, the weighting factor and the 
trimming of outliers are a major source of variation in the damage cost estimates.  
 
Table 5.7. Weighting factor and weighted monthly damage cost in Honduran Lempiras (US$ in 
parenthesis) for all symptoms (A) and only for diarrhoea (D), with all cases and with a 3% trimmed 
data set (see section 5.2.3 for estimation procedure). 
Month Weighting 
factor  
Damage 
Cost-All 
Damage Cost-
Diarrhea only 
Damage Cost-
All 3% trim 
January 0.16 42.42 5.20 9.05 
February  0.14 37.12 4.55 7.92 
March  0.16 42.42 5.20 9.05 
April 0.11 29.16 3.58 6.22 
May  0.17 45.07 5.53 9.62 
June 0.27 71.58 8.78 15.28 
July 0.14 37.12 4.55 7.92 
August 0.15 39.77 4.88 8.49 
Average 57.44 (3.04) 5.29 (0.28) 9.19 (0.49) 
 
5.3.4 Explaining the Presence of Averting Behaviour and Illness 
A bivariate probit model was used to assess the impact of a number of variables on 
the likelihood that respondents carried out some form of averting behaviour and 
that they presented illness cases in the last six months previous and up to the 
survey application (Table 5.8). The full model containing all predictors is statistically 
significant at a 5% level, with a ρ (rho) = 0.29, indicating that data are missing 
randomly or the regression coefficients of the selection model and the regression 
coefficients of the substantive model were estimated by unrelated processes (i.e. 
rho closer to zero indicates little or no selection bias). Moreover, there is a positive 
relationship between presence of averting behaviour and illness.  
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Table 5.8.  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Bivariate Probit Model with averting behaviour and 
illness as discrete dependent variables. Note: *** 0.01 significance, ** 0.05 significance level  
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
b/St.Er. Mean of X 
Equation for presence of averting behaviour 
Constant -1.22***     0.49     -2.50     
Age 0.01 0.01       0.92       45.75 
Education above primary level - 0.07        0.26     - 0.26    0.15 
Stable job 0.15        0.18       0.81    0.63 
Stable job partner 0.11        0.10      1.04    0.65 
Has kids 0.25        0.19  1.31    0.74 
Has toilet or latrine 0.79***  0.26      3.01    0.89 
Cable TV 0.33**        0.17      1.97   0.53 
Has car 0.16 0.22       0.74    0.27 
Income above minimum wage 0.14 0.21       0.65    0.26 
Large community  0.40** 0.17      2.34    0.70 
Group member 0.33        0.21      1.57    0.20 
Drinks piped water -1.02***        0.27     -3.73    0.76 
Water bill 0.00        0.00      1.04    192.37 
Source is contaminated 0.31**        0.13      2.41    0.87 
Source has interruptions - 0.18 0.16 -1.15    0.41 
Equation for presence of illness 
Constant - 0.95        0.58     -1.64   0.10 
Age 0.00        0.01       0.27    45.75 
Education above primary level 0.53**        0.27      1.99      0 .15 
Stable job - 0.42**        0.20     -2.04    0.63 
Stable job partner - 0.27***        0.11     -2.47    0.65 
Has kids 0.13        0.25       0.51   0.74 
Has toilet or latrine 0.42        0.39      1.09    0.89 
Cable TV - 0.15        0.20      - 0.75    0.53 
Has car - 0.16        0.25      - 0.63    0.27 
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Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
b/St.Er. Mean of X 
Equation for presence of illness (continuation) 
Income above minimum wage - 0.07        0.24      - 0.31    0.26 
Large community 0.19        0.24      0.78   0.70 
Group member - 0.20        0.25      - 0.81    0.20 
Drinks piped water - 0.64***        0.24     -2.66    0.76 
Water bill 0.00**        0.00      2.40    192.37 
Source is contaminated - 0.11        0.18      - 0.60    0.87 
Source has interruptions 0.48**        0.22      2.23    0.41 
Disturbance correlation 
Rho (1,2) 0.29**       0.12     2.40    
 
Five variables made a statistically significant contribution to explain the presence of 
averting behaviour: cable television, toilet, community size, drinking water source 
and perception of contamination. As expected, those respondents who thought 
their drinking water source was contaminated, those with a toilet or latrine and 
with cable television were more likely to carry out averting behaviour. Likewise, 
respondents living in a large community, drinking from a different source to the 
piped system were more likely to avert. Furthermore, six variables made a 
statistically significant contribution to explain the presence of illness: education, 
household head’s job, partner’s job, drinking water source, water bill, and water 
supply interruptions. As expected, those respondents with a stable job, which had 
partners with a stable job, that experienced water supply interruptions, and that 
drank water from the piped system were less likely to report illness. However, more 
educated respondents and those with a higher water bill were likelier to report 
illness. The water bill is not correlated to water quality or community size, so even 
those communities with a high water bill have problems securing water quality. The 
implications of these findings are discussed in the following sections.  
 
2
6
0
 
 
140 
 
                                                                                    
 
No direct information was collected on the extent to which a household is informed 
about health risks associated to contaminated water. So, being member of a 
community group, the education level, and having cable TV were intended as 
proxies for health risk awareness. It has also been commonly stated that the 
presence of children in a household and the level of income or wealth can explain 
averting behaviour and illness. However, these variables were not directly 
significant in this study. However, several proxy variables for income are significant: 
toilet, cable television, and job type of respondent and partner. Furthermore, 
variables such as electricity connection or house ownership are not used due to 
their homogeneity in the sample. Gender was excluded as it was highly correlated 
with type of job for both the respondent and partner.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
This section assesses the revealed WTP of water users for clean drinking water 
through actual market expenditure. The WTP estimate is a measure of the benefits 
that would accrue to water users if averting actions and damage costs due to illness 
were reduced by improving drinking water quality, in this study through a 
hypothetical PES scheme. This section also discusses how these benefits are 
distributed among users and what health behaviour factors determine their 
distribution. Results show that the estimated WTP is high in comparison to the 
average water bill, but low in relationship to household income and values reported 
in the literature. The distribution of benefits of having clean drinking water was 
found to be mainly determined by socioeconomic characteristics, perceptions and 
environmental awareness. Key PES scheme contracting implications are discussed 
considering the revealed WTP and the local context.  
 
 5.4.1 Revealed WTP Measure 
A WTP measure was determined by estimating separately, and then summing, the 
values obtained from two revealed preference methods: averting behaviour and 
damage costs. The three monthly averting expenditure estimates, considering joint 
production of bottled water, amounted to US$ 0.67, 0.74 and 0.79 per household, 
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respectively. The labourer estimate represents poor landless households headed by 
individuals that labour for land-owning farmers. The mid-level market estimate 
represents slightly higher-income households that prefer to buy firewood (instead 
of collecting it) or might need to purchase it due to being located in communities 
far from accessible forest areas. The high national estimate is representative of 
land-owning farmers that work their own land or hire labourers to do so. The range 
of estimates for the study site are at the lower end of the ranges reported in the 
literature, between US$0.05 - 204 (McConnell and Rosado, 2000; Wu and Huang, 
2001; Um et al., 2002; Roy et al., 2004; Pattanayak et al., 2005). This is likely due to 
these studies focusing on large urban populations unlike the small rural 
communities examined in this study.  
 
The researcher agrees with Jalan and Somanathan, 2008) finding that averting 
expenditure probably provides only partial protection from contaminated water, as 
evidenced at the study site by the presence of waterborne illness, so it represents 
an incomplete measure of WTP. Some authors consider that the true benefits 
associated with the improvement in water quality actually equal the change in 
averting expenditure plus damage costs plus net direct disutility of illness, i.e. 
monetary value of lost leisure time, pain and suffering (Harrington et al., 1991; 
Pattanayak et al., 2005; Jalan and Somanathan, 2008). The damage costs of illness 
were estimated, but this study did not cover the disutility of illness due to resource 
limitations and it being considered negligible (see section 5.2.3).  
 
The trimmed monthly damage cost due to illness comes to US$ 0.49 considering all 
symptoms. It is recognised that the three symptoms included in the damage cost 
estimate could be due to other causes such as food poisoning. However, national 
health statistics and recent studies in Honduras report much higher diarrhoea 
frequencies than those reported here. For instance, Solorzano Giron et al., 2006) 
                                                          
4 All study figures were converted from US dollars of the publication year to 2011 
US dollars, to compare to this study’s results, using the CPI Inflation Calculator of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm on 5th of November 2013. 
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found that more than 25% of children under five years old have at least one 
hospital consultation for diarrhoea annually in the area of this study. Halder et al., 
2013) found that 30 - 72% of three small rural communities reported diarrhoea in 
the previous 30 days to the study. The potential reasons for the large discrepancy 
between these studies and the results presented here are manifold, so no strong 
assumptions can be made. However, recall bias, not being able to recall 
expenditures over a long time period (Chu et al., 1992), is likely to play a role in the 
results presented here. These studies indicate that the damage costs reported in 
this study are likely to be conservative estimates. This statement is further backed 
by the damage costs being at the lower end of the values reported in the literature. 
For instance, Dasgupta, 2004) found the illness damage cost in Delhi, India to be 
between US$ 0 - 10.38; and Guh et al., 2008) estimated the cost of treating 
Shigellosis in Hebei, China at US$ 7.70.  
 
The revealed WTP obtained by summing the average averting expenditure and the 
trimmed damage costs amounts to US$ 1.22 per month per household. This 
estimate also amounts to a negligible 0.5% of the average household income at the 
study site. This means that current measures to ensure drinking water is clean and 
to treat waterborne illness are overall economically accessible to households as 
long as they are willing to implement them. However, if this revealed WTP is 
considered equal to a WTP for a potential PES scheme, then it is necessary to assess 
the share of income the WTP would represent for the poorest households. If the 
water bill were increased by the revealed WTP, it would affect households in the 
two lowest income quintiles. For instance, a household paying the lowest water bill 
and in the lowest income quintile, would be spending 3% of their income towards 
water. Considering an affordability threshold of 2.5% of income as a reasonable 
upper limit for water bills (OECD, 2003), it is estimated that a total of 20% of 
households5 will not be able to cope with a water bill increase. However, this high 
expenditure to ensure clean water is already being paid by those households who 
carry out averting actions. This evidences a clear ability to pay for improved 
                                                          
5 Based on the proportion of households per quintile per water bill in the sample 
and extrapolated to the entire study site. 
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drinking water quality above current fees for the three highest income quintiles, so 
increases could be made to their water bills but not so for the households in the 
two lowest income quintiles.  
The revealed WTP estimate is also 1.5 times higher than the mean water bill. If 
jointness is accounted for correctly at the study site, this high WTP estimate 
indicates that substantial increases can be made to water bills if water quality can 
be ensured. The relationship between WTP and water bill, and income value, serve 
as measures of affordability for clean drinking water. A revealed WTP is often a 
preferable justification for water conservation policy interventions, than for 
instance a stated WTP, as it represents actual costs incurred by users. This study 
highlights how household income and water bills can serve as measures of 
affordability for clean drinking water, to identify actual WTP expenditure and to 
inform affordable water bill increments. Thus, the revealed WTP for clean drinking 
water comes to US$ 22,619 for the entire study site. This figure represents the 
amount that could be raised from water users if clean drinking water can be 
guaranteed with a PES scheme or other policy intervention.   
 
The value of illness disutility, through lost leisure time, and pain and suffering, has 
been mentioned as a key factor to be considered in illness damage costs 
estimations. However, in this study disutility of illness is considered negligible, as 
evidenced by the few lost days of work due to illness (e.g. Guh et al., 2008). It is also 
clear that the revealed WTP estimate is likely to increase if more information on 
water contamination and household water treatment methods is provided to water 
users (see Jalan and Somanathan, 2008). Similarly, context specific information on 
the joint production of bottled water at the study site might alter the averting 
expenditure estimate. All considered, the values presented in this study are 
considered sound estimates, providing a valid measure of WTP. 
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5.4.2 Revealed Benefits Distribution and Implications for PES Contracting  
Individuals will generally pay for measures that improve their environmental quality 
only if they are willing and able to pay for such improvements. The previous section 
determined that respondents are able and willing to pay for clean drinking water. 
However, as a constant benefit or value across populations based on averting 
actions and illness damage costs is unlikely, this section focuses on the distribution 
of the revealed WTP. Results show that the benefits determined from water users’ 
WTP are distributed unequally. The distribution of benefits, and thus how the water 
quality service is valued, is determined mainly by environmental awareness, 
perceptions and socioeconomic characteristics.  
 
There are several elements that will influence a household’s health behaviour 
related to water quality, and thus the value ascribed to ecosystem service provision. 
First, households need to know that a contamination problem exists, and then it is 
necessary to understand the causes of contamination and the associated health 
risks, i.e. waterborne illness. Second, with their initial awareness, households 
decide whether averting action should be taken or not, based on the perceptions 
they hold on the utility of each kind of action (Akter et al., 2006; Jalan et al., 2009). 
Many socioeconomic and psychological factors have been found to affect 
household health behaviour, not only objective risk measures, i.e. water test results 
(Um et al., 2002; Pattanayak et al., 2005; Whitehead et al., 2008; Nauges and Van 
Den Berg, 2009; Lavee, 2010).  
 
A substantial proportion of respondents are aware of drinking water contamination 
at the study site, but it is characterised by imperfect information and uncertainty. 
Although water tests were carried out at least annually a very small proportion of 
respondents mentioned them as the reason for their awareness of contamination. 
Water test results, an objective measure of contamination, are carried out for all 
water boards by the local health officer. This indicates a problem with communities 
receiving and/or understanding the water test results that should be provided by 
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the water boards and the local health officer. In fact, the awareness of 
contamination was largely based on visual factors, implying that water users do not 
perceive clear water to be contaminated. A visual-based awareness in 
contamination has commonly been reported throughout rural areas of developing 
countries. However, this perception contradicts reality, as the most risky 
contamination at the study site is non-visible, i.e. nitrates from agrochemicals and 
faecal coliforms. This also points towards a potential higher WTP for water quality 
during the rainy season, when water is quite turbid due to runoffs. Alternatively, in 
the summer WTP will be much reduced and focused on scarcity of water not 
quality. In order to ensure PES scheme contracting in such a setting, awareness of 
contamination would need to be enhanced and the causes of contamination 
clarified, to reduce false expectations for clear water. Furthermore, there is a need 
to support the water boards’ role of informing community members and explaining 
the results of water tests. Although a PES scheme per se would not aim to achieve 
these goals, the involvement of the NGO in a scheme could support the water 
boards’ work. Thus, ecosystem service valuations need to take into account the 
potential seasonal variations in WTP and the local complexities of environmental 
perceptions. 
 
Although all communities had water contamination occurrences in the year 
previous to the study, and two thirds of respondents thought their water was 
contaminated, only half carried out averting actions. Similar partial levels of 
averting behaviour were reported by Halder et al., 2013) in two Honduran rural 
communities. The literature mentions many possible variables influencing if 
drinking water is treated or not, such as age, education, occupation, presence of 
children, income, location, family size, house type, water source, type of latrine, 
exposure to media, water shortage, among others (Figueroa, 1990; Abdalla et al., 
1992; WB, 1993; McConnell and Rosado, 2000; Um et al., 2002; Roy et al., 2004; 
Jalan et al., 2009; Nauges and Van Den Berg, 2009). At the study site the decision to 
treat drinking water was found to be dependent on some of these variables and the 
novel variable of community size linked to location. 
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As mentioned in the literature, those respondents who thought their drinking water 
source was contaminated were more likely to avert, a key determinant besides 
ability and willingness to pay for water treatment methods. Households with 
greater income and health risk awareness, evidenced by the presence of toilets and 
cable television, were also more likely to avert. The latter is one of the best sources 
of health risk information in the area, as it is within the home, accessible to 
uneducated people, and constantly available compared to harder to access 
newspapers and government printed material. In line with the literature, those 
respondents drinking water from the piped system were less likely to treat water, 
probably due to respondents’ having strong ownership feelings towards their self-
governed water system and the knowledge that the system provides better water 
quality than other sources. Approximately 13% of households do not avert and 
reported illness, thus likely trading-off their health due to a lack of income or health 
risk awareness. These findings back the previously mentioned recommendation of 
enhancing health risk awareness in order to garner support for a PES scheme. 
Additionally, such a scheme could be hindered by the low income levels and strong 
reliance on water quality from community water systems at the study site.  
 
Furthermore, households located in larger communities, generally located 
downstream and farther from water sources, were more likely to treat water. This 
is probably due to these communities having access to the good quality substitute 
of bottled water, as well as health risk information, health facilities and 
governmental health programs, among other reasons. The more disadvantaged in 
large communities can also benefit from the example of more health-aware 
neighbours. So, despite the greater awareness that smaller communities might 
have due to being close to water sources and able to see the conditions upstream, 
they are less likely to avert. Halder et al., 2013) found that out of three rural 
communities in Honduras, the most rural had the highest overall rate of reported 
diarrhoeal incidence. These findings are probably linked to smaller communities 
having low income and health risk awareness, variables already discussed above. 
Thus, benefit distribution will vary between communities, with a PES scheme 
providing greater benefits to larger communities, through savings on averting 
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expenditure. However, it is important to acknowledge that substitutes are rarely 
perfect (Brown et al., 2007) and an integrated watershed protection through a PES 
scheme would provide other ecosystem services to local inhabitants. 
 
Households perceive varied utilities from the different water treatment methods 
available to them. McConnell and Rosado, 2000) found that households lack 
understanding about the effectiveness of the different methods in eliminating 
pathogens from drinking water. However, at the study site boiling water and 
purchasing bottled water are the preferred averting methods, both of which are 
efficient at eliminating pathogens. Thus, willingly or not, respondents are 
employing the most effective water treatment methods available. Akter et al., 2006) 
also found that the perceived inconveniences of treatment methods are influential 
in determining what methods are employed in rural Bangladesh. Some 
inconveniences to taking averting action include the required time, impaired taste, 
and limited or no access to methods in rural areas. Boiling is probably favoured due 
to its convenience and affordability, but it does produce bad tasting water. In 
contrast, bottled water has good taste but its use is limited by cost and accessibility. 
The choice of averting action(s) influences the benefits perceived by a household, 
and it is clear that higher income households buying bottled water will perceive 
greater benefits from a PES scheme guaranteeing clean drinking water. However, 
although non-averting households won’t perceive economic benefits from averting 
expenditure savings, they would still benefit from clean drinking water and its 
effect on their quality of life. 
 
Once a household chooses to avert, the averting actions may not be carried out in a 
completely effective manner. For instance, Jalan and Somanathan, 2008) found that 
averting expenditure provides only partial protection from unsafe water and that by 
providing information on water quality, averting expenditure increased by 6.5% in 
Gurgaon, New Delhi, India. At the study site a quarter of averting households 
experimented illness, indicating that averting actions are not carried out efficiently, 
either not at all times or not applying the method properly. Thus, these households 
are incurring in double costs as they trade-off, unsuccessfully, income for averting 
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expenditure because their health is still affected. These households would perceive 
double benefits from a PES scheme, as they could save on averting expenditure and 
also on illness damage costs. 
 
The general consensus in the literature is that more education equals less illness 
(e.g. Dasgupta, 2004; Jalan et al., 2009). However, unexpectedly at the study site 
more educated respondents actually reported more illness. This incongruity might 
be explained by the educated having higher expectations of good health and higher 
health risk awareness, and thus being more aware, or just being able to better 
recall the incidence of illness than the uneducated. Additionally, although 
household income is not significant, the proxy of a stable job for the household 
head and his/ her partner is. At the study site households headed by farmers 
owning land or a permanent business were less likely to report illness, as well as 
those drinking from the piped water system. Ahmad et al., 2005) found that 
households where the head is a farmer, or in business or service, are relatively 
more inclined to opt for piped water supply than those where the head is an 
agricultural labourer or a manual worker. Likewise, Dasgupta, 2004) found that 
households that depended on non-piped sources had a higher probability of 
reporting diarrhoeal illness. Consequently, individuals with temporal or unstable 
jobs, such as agriculture labourers, and those using non-piped sources will actually 
perceive more benefits from a PES scheme improving drinking water quality, as 
they will save on illness damage costs.   
 
Furthermore those households experiencing water supply interruptions and with a 
higher water bill were more likely to report illness. Alberini et al., 1996) found that 
interruptions in the water supply interfered with averting behaviour and thus gave 
way to a higher probability of illness in Jakarta, Indonesia. This could help explain 
why water interruptions produce a higher incidence of illness at the study site. 
Often ecosystem service provision depends on appropriate technologies and 
infrastructure in order to meet demand for a service, e.g. water distribution 
network and disinfection. Often, water supply interruptions are not within the 
control of individual households. Thus, for a PES scheme to be effective at the study 
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site, proper maintenance of water systems by community water boards would need 
to be ensured to produce clean water and a constant supply. The significance of the 
water bill at explaining the WTP is unexpected and difficult to explain as the four 
communities with the highest water bills and their respective water sources do not 
seem to have any similarities. Whatever the reason, this finding is likely to create 
conflict in contracting for a PES scheme, as these communities will benefit from 
improved drinking water quality, but are also unlikely to agree to a water bill 
increase as they already have the highest water bills. This study highlights that the 
design of a PES scheme based on a revealed WTP would need to be preceded by 
explaining to water users the benefits of the scheme based on avoided averting and 
illness damage expenditure. 
 
If supply of clean water were unlimited, i.e. not contaminated or abundant 
substitutes available, there would be no incentive for anyone to pay for water 
treatment methods and subsequent illness damage costs because they could get all 
the clean water they want for free (Brown et al., 2007). The households perceiving 
clean drinking water to be scarce will increase demand for it, but an almost equal 
proportion that perceives it to be abundant will lower the demand for it. The 
perception of ecosystem service scarcity and its resulting demand will affect the 
effectiveness of a potential PES scheme because the degree of commodification or 
tradability of the ecosystem service will depend on these perceptions (Muradian et 
al., 2010). Thus, besides thinking that drinking water is contaminated, the 
households’ health risk awareness, perceptions and socioeconomic factors 
mentioned above indicate the level of demand for improved drinking water quality. 
Findings for the study site indicate that clean water is perceived to be locally scarce 
by at least half of respondents, so there is a substantial demand for clean water. 
This study contributes to better understand how a revealed WTP provides different 
insights into PES scheme contracting than those provided by a stated WTP estimate. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the revealed value of an ecosystem 
service is not constant, but can change over time as market demand changes.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
The WTP for clean drinking water through avoiding or dealing with contaminated 
water at the Güisayote Biological Reserve was estimated with an averting behaviour 
and an illness damage cost method. The monthly revealed WTP came to US$ 1.22 
per household which is within the range reported by the literature. This estimate 
represents 0.5% of the average household income and 1.5 times the monthly water 
bill. However, if the current water bills were increased by the revealed WTP, 
approximately 20% of households will not be able to afford it. Overall, there is 
affordability and willingness to pay above current charges, indicating that 
substantial increases could be made to water bills and those households incurring 
in averting and illness damage expenditure are already paying above their water bill.  
 
Users’ benefits reflected by the revealed WTP are distributed unevenly as a 
function of their health risk awareness, perceptions and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Potential PES scheme contracting is likely to be enhanced by current 
levels of health risk awareness and substantial expenditure on averting actions and 
illness damage costs. However, the scheme could be hindered by or will need to 
consider the visual-based and imperfect health risk perceptions, low income levels, 
strong confidence in the water quality from community water systems, uneven 
benefit distribution between large and small communities, improvements needed 
to water system infrastructure. Informing the design of a potential PES scheme 
through a revealed WTP provides a specific distribution of benefits and is based on 
actual market expenditure. The researcher is not aware of any other study using a 
revealed WTP to inform the demand-side of PES scheme contracting. 
 
This chapter contributes key information to discussions in chapter 7 on the use of 
different WTP measures, the feasibility of a PES scheme by contrasting with the 
costs of water provision, and contracting in PES schemes in a wider context. 
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Chapter 6: Costs of Water Provision   
 
This chapter evaluates the opportunity costs of upstream landholders as the costs 
of setting aside land to improve drinking water quality. Opportunity costs are 
estimated using two approaches, the flow and the rent approach. The flow 
approach assesses the net returns of landholders productive land uses and the rent 
approach is based on three land values stated by landholders. The distribution of 
opportunity costs is also assessed based on landholder and land attributes. Then 
PES scheme contracting opportunities and challenges for service providers are 
discussed, considering their opportunity costs and the local context. In chapter 7 
these costs will be compared to the benefits of water conservation, both the stated 
(chapter 4) and revealed WTP (chapter 5) of beneficiaries, to assess the feasibility 
and challenges of a PES scheme. 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Securing drinking water quality is a major issue in developing countries due to a 
complex array of challenges from both the demand and supply side (Rangel Soares 
et al., 2002; Jouravlev, 2004; Trevett et al., 2004; UNICEF and WHO, 2012). The 
contamination affecting water sources comes from point and non-point sources. 
Particularly in rural areas land use polluters, who are also service providers, are 
often numerous, disperse and remote (Olmstead, 2010; Smith and Porter, 2010; 
Smith et al., 2012). Understanding the magnitude of the returns currently received 
by landholders is therefore a prerequisite to designing water conservation 
initiatives. However, there are substantial difficulties in determining precise 
compensation or incentives to service providers due to heterogeneous land costs, 
multiple stakeholders, methodological limitations and inequitable distribution of 
project outcomes, among others (Corbera et al., 2007a; Adams et al., 2010; Dong et 
al., 2011; Bryan, 2013; FFI, 2014).  
 
The cost of conserving ecosystem services can include transaction costs, 
opportunity costs, costs of implementing conservation actions, and monitoring 
costs; and can also take account of more indirect costs such as increased 
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competition for land, reduced employment and food security (Naidoo et al., 2006; 
Coad et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2008; Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). The allocation of 
land to conservation unavoidably competes with the needs of society for 
agriculture and extraction of natural resources (Wünscher et al., 2011). The income 
foregone by a landowner if the land is conserved represents the opportunity costs, 
which are based on scarcity and exclusiveness because one course of action 
prevents another one from happening (Sinden, 2004; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006; 
Pirard, 2008). Opportunity costs are widely accepted as the main cost of 
conservation (e.g. Sinden, 2004; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006). The estimation of 
these costs is useful for a variety of reasons, such as calculating conservation costs 
in protected areas or natural resource management, determining their distribution 
among landholders, assessing trade-offs in land uses, to test methodological issues, 
and more recently to assess the feasibility and design of PES or REDD+ projects 
(Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009).  
 
PES schemes could make conservation more attractive to private landholders who 
supply an ecosystem service. Hence, estimating opportunity costs is a crucial 
starting point to determine the economic viability of PES schemes to effectively 
change land use practices (Plumb et al., 2012). A large challenge exists to 
understand the distribution of opportunity costs among and within different 
ecosystem service provider groups as they have been found to be quite 
heterogeneous (Tallis and Polasky, 2009; Adams et al., 2010; Badola et al., 2010). 
Thus, understanding how opportunity costs are distributed will inform who would 
gain and who would lose from a scheme, which is important both from an equity 
perspective and from a practical one (Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009). Opportunity cost 
analysis has also become an essential tool to determine the most cost-effective 
level of payment required for individuals to alter or halt a land use, and to 
determine where and if schemes should be developed (Plumb et al., 2012). 
However, the estimation of opportunity costs has been done through several 
methods and is a complex process fraught with challenges. 
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Three main approaches have been used in the literature to estimate opportunity 
costs for PES schemes and other conservation initiatives. These approaches include 
the more recent screening contracts and procurement PES auctions, as well as 
more commonly used methods based on land attributes or returns, such as costly 
to fake signals, actual net returns from land uses, and land prices. First, screening 
contracts consist of offering a contract for each of the different types of 
landholders believed to exist and letting them self-select a contract. However, this 
method is limited by requiring detailed knowledge about the distribution of 
landowner types and sophisticated calculations by conservation practitioners. So far, 
no applications of this approach exist in practice (Wünscher et al., 2011). 
 
Second, procurement PES auctions consist of a buyer of ecosystem services inviting 
bids from the suppliers for a specified contract and then buying the contracts with 
the lowest bids (Ferraro, 2008; Tóth et al., 2010). For example, Jack et al., 2009) 
applied a procurement auction to determine how payment contracts can be 
configured during the design-phase of a conservation program for soil erosion 
control in Indonesia. Khalumba et al., 2014) combined procurement auctions for 
reforestation contracts with payments based on contractor performance in 
Western Kenya. Both studies found that this approach helps reveal private 
landholders’ opportunity costs. However, these auctions have disadvantages, such 
as being quite complex to design and requiring a large pool of bidders to be valid.  
 
Third, information can be gathered on observable landholder and land attributes 
that are correlated with opportunity costs and use these attributes to determine 
opportunity costs and establish PES contracts. Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006) 
estimated opportunity costs based on observed spatial patterns in conversion of 
natural habitat to agricultural land and observed net benefits from agricultural plots 
in a Reserve of Paraguay. Collecting information on these attributes can be costly 
and the accuracy of this information will only be as good as the strength of the 
correlations between the attributes and landholder types. Opportunity costs can 
also be estimated using generic or average data often from secondary sources, 
most frequently government data. Many studies have applied this approach, most 
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recently for REDD+ projects (Börner and Wunder, 2008; Börner et al., 2010; Hunt, 
2010; Fisher et al., 2011b; Fisher et al., 2011c). This approach is useful for studies at 
regional or national scale, but does not capture local variation (Grieg-Gran, 2006) 
and can yield quite varied results depending on the data sources. 
 
Land use net returns, also referred to as the flow approach, can be estimated at the 
local or micro level. Local opportunity costs have helped develop payment levels for 
many existing PES programs (Plumb et al., 2012). Among the more recent studies 
we find: Borrego and Skutsch, 2014) that quantified the net returns to land uses 
that degrade dry tropical forests in Jalisco, Mexico. Illukpitiya and Yanagida, 2010) 
estimated farm returns to explore the trade-off between agriculture and extraction 
of forest products and to determine the efficiency improvement necessary to 
compensate the current income generated by non-timber forest products in Sri-
Lanka. Adams et al., 2010) estimated opportunity costs of agriculture and ranching 
focusing on single stakeholder groups at Mbaracayu Forest Biosphere Reserve, 
Paraguay. This widely used approach provides detailed local information and 
variability. However, its drawbacks are that it is not suitable for extrapolating to 
larger areas, it bears the risk of strategic bias, can be quite costly, and a lot of data 
is at a coarse scale and can lack important information (Cattaneo, 2002; Grieg-Gran, 
2006; Börner et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2011c; Wünscher et al., 2011).  
 
Finally, land market prices, also referred to as the rents approach, can be converted 
into values that can serve as proxies for opportunity costs. For example, Chomitz et 
al., 2005) estimated the opportunity costs of conservation in a biodiversity hotspot 
of Brazil using hedonic price model to impute land values. Ando et al., 1998) used 
county-level data on agricultural land values from the USA government to study the 
effect of heterogeneous land prices on the efficient selection of reserve sites. Ma 
and Swinton, 2011) demonstrate how hedonic analysis of agricultural land prices 
can be used to estimate the private values of land-based ecosystem services with 
data from Michigan, USA. The use of land values to determine opportunity costs is 
commonly used, reveals landholders true value for land and is quite straightforward. 
However, this approach is not recommended when no land market exists or it is 
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undeveloped, where land can be obtained for free, or when it may reflect returns 
from potential land use not the actual one (Cattaneo, 2002; Ferraro, 2004; Grieg-
Gran, 2006; Börner et al., 2007).  
 
Further comprehensive studies utilise two or more of the above described 
approaches to obtain more accurate and robust opportunity cost estimates. For 
example, Sinden, 2004) estimated opportunity costs for biodiversity protection in 
Australia using state land values and net returns; and found that the land species 
variables selected were very important in determining opportunity costs. Corbera 
et al., 2007b) estimated opportunity costs through net farm returns, valuation of 
providers’ WTA a price for PES and the expected land rent in three Central 
American countries. They found that the estimation of the opportunity costs may 
differ considerably, depending on the method used, and the assumptions adopted. 
Wünscher, 2008) compared three approaches in Costa Rica: hypothetical annual 
land rents, modelled regressions, and farm net returns. They found that the annual 
land rents and the modelled regressions can be recommended for practical 
application in conservation programs, based on how well the estimates compare to 
the reference farm net returns that were found plausible. These authors 
recommend further research into opportunity cost estimations, particularly the 
flow approach techniques that are applied to deliver farm net returns.  
 
Cost-effective and precise estimation of site-specific opportunity costs is a major 
challenge (Wünscher et al., 2011). This study follows the more comprehensive 
studies described above by employing both a flow and a rent approach. The flow 
approach uses local level net returns from agriculture in order to obtain detailed 
insight into the heterogeneity of landowners and variability of opportunity costs. 
The rent approach employs stated land values that potentially reflect more stable 
longer term values.  
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6.2 Study Site and Methods  
6.2.1 Study Site  
This study was conducted in a watershed of the Güisayote Biological Reserve in the 
westernmost region of Honduras. The area is characterised by moist rainforests 
with a high rainfall rate and an abundance of both permanent and temporal 
streams. The study site covers 4,793 ha including core zone and buffer zone of the 
Reserve, as well as lower unprotected land. The area provides drinking water to 
fifteen communities with an estimated population of 7,725 inhabitants (ESNACIFOR 
and USAID, 2002). The watershed was selected based on its poor water quality 
levels as all water sources, have been found contaminated with excessive nutrients 
(from agrochemicals), bacteria, and/or faecal coliforms at least once in the last year 
by the local health officer.  
 
Reserve status means that de jure anthropogenic activities are strictly prohibited in 
the core zone and restricted in the buffer zone. However, landholders do not 
always follow these restrictions and de facto forest use shows locals making (illicit) 
use of public and private forest land for poles, medicine, firewood, shade and cattle 
grazing (AESMO, 2010). The Reserve is managed by AESMO that, among other 
measures, employs park guards to patrol the Reserve. In the last decade AESMO 
has endeavoured to purchase forested land for conservation in the core zone. Also, 
AESMO and other organizations have implemented some initiatives to reduce soil 
erosion and agrochemical use in agricultural practices, but adoption by farmers is 
varied and unsustainable (AESMO, 2010). Overall, command and control 
approaches have had some success but are far from achieving conservation goals. 
This is a common situation in protected and rural areas of Latin America (Bonham 
et al., 2008; Oestreicher et al., 2009; Pacheco Angulo et al., 2011). 
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The upstream watershed area has an estimated extension of 2086.7 ha, including 
243.6 ha owned by the municipality of La Labor and the Llano Largo community6. 
The most extensive land cover is relatively long-standing rainforests, on average 32 
years. The study area has long been settled and accessible, even before the 
Reserve’s creation in 1987, so the presence of forest is likely an indicator that the 
land is unsuitable for agriculture and that there has been some conservation in the 
area7.  
 
The upstream private landholders have dispersed plots, all with secure land tenure. 
The main productive land uses are coffee at lower heights for national or 
international commerce, vegetables (e.g. potato, cabbage, carrot) at higher and 
colder altitudes for national commerce, extensive cattle ranching throughout for 
subsistence and local commerce (milk and cheese, seldom for meat), and some 
maize and beans for staple subsistence. The cash crops of coffee and vegetables are 
the most profitable land uses but are also affected by quite volatile markets (e.g. 
Charveriat, 2001; Mohan, 2007). Coffee growers are quite organized, generally 
belonging to one of several associations and cooperatives. However, for other land 
uses few communities are organised in informal farmer groups and one has support 
from NGO-based agricultural projects looking at sustainable practices, increasing 
productivity, and marketing. 
 
Coffee is a long-term cultivar and provides the main source of employment at the 
study site (PNUD, 2010a). Coffee plots are, on average, small, involve low herbicide 
and pesticide use (compared to other crops), and often have other trees and 
vegetation. Thus, it is assumed that most, if not all, land suitable for coffee is 
                                                          
6 This land includes 28 ha of Llano Largo, 2.8 ha of AESMO and 212.8 ha of La Labor 
municipality. 
7 A few years back a conservation movement arose in the study site as a mining 
company wanted to start operations with the support of the central government. 
The local communities, with the support of NGOs, were able to stop the mining 
company. 
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already being used as such8. This land use does not require irrigation (AESMO, 2010) 
and if managed sustainably can contribute to reduce erosion (Jansen, 1993) and 
provide many environmental benefits (e.g. shade coffee in Miranda-Castro and 
Padron, 2005). Importantly, coffee is very much influenced by international market 
prices and, as observed in Appendix 16, for the study year the international price 
reached its highest in the last ten years. 
 
This section provides limited study site and methods information relevant to the 
focus of this chapter. For more details on the selection and description of the study 
site, and methods, see chapter 3.   
 
6.2.2 Opportunity Costs Estimation: Two Approaches 
Opportunity costs were estimated employing the flow and rent approaches. The 
use of two different approaches increases estimate confidence that is limited by a 
small sample size and the complexity involved in estimating opportunity costs. 
Landholders were identified by several visits to the watershed and by elaborating a 
land ownership map with several farmers as no registry for cultivated land exists for 
the area. A survey was applied to upstream landholders to collect data on both 
opportunity cost approaches. There are an estimated 95 landholders above the 
lowermost water source in the study site. A total of 62 (67%) landholders 
completed the survey, 23 (23.5%) could not be found despite repeated visits and 10 
(9.5%) refused to participate. It is recognised that the final sample size, although 
representative of service providers at the study site, places a limit on potential data 
analyses and interpretation. 
 
                                                          
8 Coffee is restricted to areas between 1200-1500 m (Lopez Gonzalez 2007); 
vegetable crops are grown in higher areas above 1500 m (personal observation and 
project documents for “Proyecto Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Empresariales” 
funded by BID/FOMIN/ADEVAS, http://www.adevas.org/web/desarrollo.html); and 
cattle throughout the study area. 
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6.2.2.1 Flow Approach 
The opportunity cost survey included questions on landholder socioeconomic 
characteristics, land attributes, inputs (e.g. fertilizer, pesticide, tools, seeds, 
vaccines) and outputs (e.g. yields of vegetables or milk) of all productive land uses 
covering a one year period (2010-11; see survey in Appendix 11). Likewise, 
respondents were asked to draw each of their plots and highlight main features, 
such as land use distribution, neighbours, roads, streams and rivers, and 
infrastructure. The survey covered from one up to three growing seasons that could 
be carried out in a year (2010 – 11) and only crops that had been harvested at the 
time of the survey. Land uses included cattle ranching, maize and beans, vegetable 
crops, coffee, forest use and some crops that only appeared once in the sample, e.g. 
sugar cane. Whenever yields were reported for self-consumption, they were 
ascribed the market value stated by the respondent or the average for all 
landholders reporting that land use. All values were obtained in Honduran Lempiras 
for the local land measurement of Manzana and converted to US dollars per 
hectare at an exchange rate of US$ 1 to Lps. 18.8951 and one Manzana equal to 0.7 
hectares. Although estimating the net present value (NPV) would have been ideal 
to account for the dynamism of opportunity costs, the lack of agricultural data for 
previous years prevented this. Still, the flow approach estimations are believed to 
be relatively accurate and therefore serve as a reference point for the rent 
approach (see Wünscher et al., 2011). 
 
6.2.2.2 Rent Approach 
As the local land market is informal and no records exist for previous land 
transactions, respondents were asked to state three different land values. The 
survey included questions on the price that landholders would rent their land, 
would sell it and at which they actually purchased it. The would sell and actual 
purchase prices are assumed to reflect the highest-value use of land, which is a 
function of several factors, mainly climate and soil properties, and access to roads. 
This value is expected to be an upper bound opportunity cost of dedicating land to 
conservation because it assumes forfeiting all future streams of income (Chomitz et 
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al., 2005). The would rent price is the amount of money that remains from the sale 
of product minus the cash operating costs, depreciation and the opportunity cost of 
labour and management, i.e. the amount which remains to pay the rent (Lazarus, 
2000). 
 
The three 2011 rent values were estimated based on 39 would rent values, 74 
would sell values and 56 actual land purchase values. A total of 10 actual rental 
cases were reported but due to their limited number were excluded from this 
approach. Land is only occasionally rented in order to balance seasonal shortages of 
cattle feed supply or to complement current land use.  
 
6.2.3 Data Analysis of Opportunity Costs 
6.2.3.1 Flow Approach 
The flow opportunity costs were estimated per landholder and per hectare for one 
year by subtracting total costs from total revenue for each land use multiplied by 
the area used to obtain net returns per hectare. Following Fisher et al., 2011c) the 
total opportunity costs were obtained as follows  
 
𝑉 = [∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑃𝑖] −  𝐶𝑖
𝑙
𝑖
 
 
where 𝑉 is the net agricultural returns of the average hectare in US$, summed 
across all land uses; 𝐴𝑖  is the plot size in hectares with land use 𝑖; 𝑦𝑖 is the yield of 
land use 𝑖; 𝑃𝑖  is the price of land use 𝑖 in US$ per yield unit; and 𝐶𝑥 is the cost of 
inputs including labour, tools and agricultural materials.  
 
Several assumptions were made to estimate the flow opportunity costs. First, 
personal and family labour is deducted at 50% of the local worker (“jornal”) wage. 
This proportion was determined based on little readily available off-farm income 
alternatives, the distance to available off-farm employment which is too large to be 
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overcome at a reasonable cost, and the qualification or physical status (e.g. due to 
age) of landholders do not meet the requirements for off-farm work (for further 
discussion on the value of family labour see Wünscher, 2008; Wünscher et al., 
2011). Second, the cost of land conversion is not considered as natural forest 
regeneration is envisioned for the PES scheme. This reduces the costs to 
landholders and project implementers. Third, negative net returns from lost crops 
are included in the analysis to provide a realistic view of the study site and obtain 
insight into local heterogeneity of costs. However, it is acknowledged that 
agricultural returns may vary from year to year. Fourth, although very few forest 
plots were reported as used, all forest plot data is included in the analyses. This is 
because respondents are likely to be influenced by the legal land use restrictions 
applicable to the Reserve. 
 
The total and per land use flow opportunity costs represent net returns at the study 
site for the year 2010 - 11, including negative values due to some land uses 
experiencing low demand or prices. Thus, the data is highly variable for the study 
year and probably does not capture the true long-term values. Therefore, flow 
opportunity costs considering only positive values were also estimated, referred to 
as flow+; and an estimate of the positive values excluding coffee, referred to as 
flow+ woc. The latter estimate served to remove the effect of coffee prices being at 
the highest in the last ten years and thus make the flow opportunity costs 
comparable to the more stable land rent values.   
 
Due to small sample size, the determinants of opportunity costs were analysed at 
landholder and plot levels. The variables tested for landholder and plot opportunity 
costs are listed in Table 6.1 and are based on data availability and the literature. 
Continuous variables were tested through Spearman’s rho correlations and 
categorical variables through Mann-Whitney U tests.  
 
 
 
2
6
0
 
 
162 
 
                                                                                    
 
Table 6.1. Independent variables tested for association with two levels of opportunity costs, per 
landholder and per plot, and their expected sign. 
Landholder variables 
Expected 
sign 
Plot variables 
Expected 
sign 
Age in years + Plot size + 
Years of education  + Time to road - 
Family size + Time to water - 
Female ? Time to house - 
Proportion of household 
income coming from farmer 
+ Altitude ? 
Only agriculture income + Accessibility + 
Number of plots used + Number of plots used + 
Land owned + Years owned  - 
Number of land uses + Presence of forest + 
Presence of coffee + Presence of coffee - 
Presence of cattle  - Presence of cattle + 
Presence of crops  + Presence of crops + 
 
The probability of presence of each productive land use was then tested through 
binary logistic regressions. The independent variables tested include: elevation, 
time to main road, access to land throughout the year, slope and time to water. 
These independent variables were limited to land characteristics and were based 
on data availability and the literature. An attempt was made to collect information 
on soil fertility; however the variable was dropped from analyses due to limited 
responses.  
 
A binary logistic regression allows predictions of a discrete outcome when the 
predictors are continuous, discrete or a mix. Logistic regression allows the 
evaluation of the odds (probability) of membership in one of the groups, in this case 
presence or absence of a land use, based on the combination of values of the 
predictor variables. In this regression predictors do not have to be normally 
distributed, linearly related to the dependent variable, or of equal variance within 
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each group. Further information on this type of regression is widely available, for 
instance in Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
 
6.2.3.2 Rent Approach 
Three rent values were estimated based on would rent value, would sell and actual 
purchase price. In this approach it is assumed that the annual would rent price of a 
plot of agricultural land is equal to its annual net revenue flow, whereas the would 
sell and actual purchase price of a plot of land are equal to the discounted flow of 
net revenue that the parcel is expected to generate into the future (Weersink et al., 
1999; Cavailhes and Wavresky, 2003; Goodwin et al., 2003). 
 
Would rent prices were in 2011 values so they only had to be divided by plot size to 
obtain per hectare rent values (referred to as R1). However, it is recognised that 
some hectares, i.e. productive land, are more valuable than others, i.e. forested or 
steep land. The actual land purchase prices (referred to as R3) were adjusted for 
inflation as they covered transactions carried out between 1961 and 2011. Each 
purchase value was multiplied by the consumer price index (CPI) of the year of 
purchase divided by the 2011 CPI. CPI values were obtained from the Central Bank 
of Honduras (Appendix 17). Thus, the formula to determine 2011 land purchase 
values is 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 2011 (𝐿𝑃𝑉2011) = 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ (
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑥
𝐶𝑃𝐼2011
) 
 
Subsequently, in order to convert the 2011 land purchase values and the would sell 
prices (referred to as R2) to land values, both were multiplied by the average 
general interest rate for 2011 (5.25%) as reported by the Central Bank of Honduras 
(BCH, 2011). Ideally a capitalization rate, a market determined rate of return that 
attracts individuals to invest in the use of land considering all the risks and benefits 
which could be realized (Gwartney, 1999), should be used. However, a 
capitalization rate is not available for Honduras so the interest rate was used as a 
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viable proxy. The use of a one off interest rate for all plots will affect absolute but 
not relative land rental values across the study site. The formula used to convert 
the would sell and purchase prices to rent values follows  
 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑃𝑉2011 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
Additionally, tax reporting was highly inconsistent by respondents, half of rural 
landholders at the study site did not report paying any land tax and the other half 
reported values between US$0.27 and 11.34, with a low mean of US$ 3.64 ha-1 
(median US$ 1.90). Due to this irregularity and variability, tax is excluded from the 
rent approach estimations.  
 
6.3 Results  
6.3.1 Landholder and Land Characteristics 
The landholders that responded to the opportunity cost survey showed similar 
characteristics to the beneficiaries of the water service (described in chapters 4 and 
5). This is due to the majority of respondents (84%) residing in beneficiary 
communities with land plots elsewhere; making them beneficiaries of the service as 
well as providers. The implications of this duality for contracting in PES schemes are 
discussed in section 6.4.2.  
 
Respondents are mostly male (89%) with an average age of 56 years old. Schooling 
levels of respondents are quite low, with an average of four years and families are 
large, with five members on average (Table 6.2). Farmers carried out an average of 
1.5 productive activities probably due to some being specialists (i.e. coffee growing 
and cattle ranching is taught from father to son from an early age) and others 
perhaps limited by land characteristics or little agronomic training. Furthermore, 
the household income is based on few sources, on average 2.5, and the household 
relies largely on the landholder for that income. Landholders have on average one 
plot and these plots have been owned for an average of eighteen years. 
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Table 6.2. Socioeconomic and farmer characteristics for opportunity cost survey respondents (n = 
62). Note: 
1
forest use is not included here; 
2
one observation was removed as the respondent had a 
university degree in agronomy. 
Variable 
Mean/ 
Proportion 
SE SD Range 
Age 56 1.62 12.76 27 - 89 
Female 0.11 0.04 0.32  
Years living in area 54.44 1.79 14.13 25 -89 
Years of education 4.23 0.63 4.93 0 – 18 
Family size 5.35 0.35 2.74 1 – 12 
Productive land uses per farmer1 1.45 0.12 0.95 0 - 4 
Days of agronomic training 
received2 
34.73 12.04 94.79 0 – 481 
Household income sources 2.53 0.22 1.71 0 – 7 
Income contributed by landholder 74.80 4.34 34.21 0 – 100 
Years owning land plots 17.78 1.44 11.32 0.5 – 50 
Plots per farmer 1.13 0.07 0.58 1 - 4 
 
The total amount of land owned by respondents varies widely between 0.7 and 126 
ha, with a mean of 15 ha (Table 6.3). Land plot size has a similar range to land 
owned, but a smaller average of 9 ha. The most abundant land cover is forest (39%) 
which is relatively long-standing as landholders reported forests with an average 
age of 32 years, but up to 89 years for some. Among the productive land uses, 
cattle ranching (35%) is the most wide-ranging land use followed by much smaller 
extensions of coffee (8%) and crops (3%); and very small areas are dedicated to 
renting, loaning, and fallow. Land uses are similarly distributed among farmers: 43% 
had forest, 39% had cattle ranching, 29% had coffee and 25% had crops.  
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Table 6.3. Land and land use distribution for opportunity cost survey respondents (n = 62). Note: 
1
Refers to percentage of net private land represented by each land use, i.e. when coffee is combined 
with maize or beans or when land was used for more than one season it was counted only once, as 
well as when a respondent used land of another respondent; 
2
includes vegetables, maize, beans, 
improved grass and sugar cane; 
3
Approximately 15 ha of vegetable land was used more than once in 
the year, and 5 ha of maize and beans were used more than once or overlapped with coffee.  
Variable Total ha 
(%1) 
Mean land 
area (ha) 
SE SD Range % 
Farmers 
Land per 
farmer 
-- 14.7 3.01 23.72 0.7 – 126  -- 
Plot size -- 9.1 2.37 18.63 0.18 – 126  -- 
Forest 357.28 
(39) 
5.6 1.82 14.34 0 –  64.75   42.7 
Cattle 319.29 (35) 4.9 1.38 10.86 0 – 70 38.5 
Coffee 69.44 (8) 1.4 0.22 1.73 0 – 5.6 29.4 
Rented  54.6 (6) 0.7 0.85 6.67 0 – 52.5 2.1 
Loaned 41.86 (5) 0.7 0.33 2.6 0 – 18.2 13.3 
Fallow  39.7 (4) 0.7 0.21 1.62 0 – 8.58 18.9 
Crops2,3 32.2 (3) 0.7 0.12 0.92 0 – 4.2 25.2 
 
6.3.2 Cost of taking land out of production 
The opportunity cost of water conservation was estimated with the flow approach 
and the rent approach. Figure 6.1 shows the spread of flow opportunity costs or net 
returns per hectare for each productive land use. Cattle ranching and forest show 
the least spread of data and central values, due to low reported forest use and 
cattle farmers reporting a bad year. Also, only ten out of 52 forest plots were 
reported to be used in the study year. Coffee and crops show the widest spread of 
data and highest values, but both cattle and crops reported several negative values 
due to low market prices. Furthermore, the median net return of coffee is two 
orders of magnitude greater than the next highest median land use. Therefore, 
                                                          
9 This amount only includes land used for cattle ranching within the study site, total 
cattle land including land borrowed or rented outside the study site amounted to 
595.88 ha. 
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coffee provides the highest returns possible and largely determines the overall 
opportunity costs of water conservation at the study site.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Net returns in US dollars ha
-1
 for each productive land use for the year 2010-11 at the 
study site; dotted line= origin 0; stars/circles= outliers as defined by IBM SPSS statistics 20 software; 
bold lines= median; forest N= 52, mean= US$35, median= 0; cattle N= 48, mean= US$ 282, median= 
US$ 44; crops N= 58, mean= US$ 1,501, median= US$261; and coffee N=28, mean= US$ 5,710 and 
median= US$2,248.  
 
The mean overall net returns ha-1 using the flow approach is US$ 1,410 and the 
median is US$ 19 per hectare (Table 6.4). The flow estimates are skewed by the 
high coffee returns and by the negative returns of land uses making a loss and the 
zeros from non-used forests. Although the negative values reflect real market 
dynamics, they introduce high variance into the data, only represent the study year 
and provide an unrepresentative median. Hence, two variations of the flow 
approach are estimated, flow+, that only includes positive values and flow+ woc, 
that excludes coffee values. The flow+ and flow+ woc medians are a better 
comparison to the three rent values.  
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The rent approach is based on three per hectare values stated by respondents for 
each land plot: how much a landholder would rent land (R1), would sell land (R2), 
and actual purchase price (R3). The rent values revealed means that are 
substantially lower than those of the flow and flow+ estimates. However, the flow+ 
median is within the range of all three rent median values. Furthermore, the 
standard deviations show that, as expected, the flow estimates have the most 
variability of all measures and R1 is the least variable.  
 
Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics of net returns ha
-1
 in US dollars with the flow and rent approaches. 
Note: flow estimates are per land use and include forest zeros; all R’s included once, no matter how 
many land uses per plot; mean, median, minimum and maximum rounded to zero decimals to 
enhance clarity. 
Values N Mean Median SE SD Range 
Flow  186 1,410 19 402.86 5,494.21 - 21,757 – 
24,086  
Flow+ 139 2,666 263 459.08 5,412.46 0 – 24,086 
Flow+ 
woc 
113 1,839 140 409.04 4,348.16 0 – 24,086 
R1  39 245 151 38.72 241.83 4 – 1,134 
R2  74 546 397 58.82 506.02 15 – 2,977 
R3  56 425 160 92.97 695.74 1 – 2,977 
 
Although the mean per hectare differs widely between estimates, it is possible that 
the approaches deliver estimates that are correlated, i.e. land plots with high value 
estimates in one approach also tend to have high estimates in the other approach 
and vice versa. A two-tailed Spearman’s correlation of net returns per land use 
showed that all the rent values were significantly correlated (Table 6.5). This 
indicates a consistent response by landholders across the three rent values. 
Although the flow returns are not correlated to the rent values, flow+ and flow+ 
woc returns are (Table 6.5). The flow and rent estimates are therefore considered 
valid measures of landholders’ opportunity costs.  
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Careful consideration has to be taken over choosing the most appropriate measure, 
as the flow and flow+ means provide annual estimates of over US$ 2 million for 
water conservation at the study site. These estimates are extremely high due to 
mean values influenced by outlying opportunity costs and are unlikely to represent 
long-term costs. Therefore, to take account of long-term variability the more 
representative flow+ median could be used. However, the effect of the extremely 
high opportunity costs of coffee, due to having an atypical good year, needs to be 
considered also. Thus, the flow+ woc estimate, excluding coffee, is used and is 
found to have stronger correlations with all rent values. The flow+ woc estimate 
provides a greatly reduced, but more realistic, cost of water conservation at the 
study site of US$ 257,057, which is comparable to totals obtained from R1 
(US$ 278,308) and R3 (US$ 294,896), but less so for R2 (US$ 731,711). 
 
Table 6.5. Spearman rho correlations of R1, R2, R3, Flow, Flow+, and Flow+ woc estimates. 
*** 
0.01 
significance level, 
**
 0.05 significance level 
Spearman's 
rho 
R1 R2 R3 Flow Flow+ Flow+ 
woc 
R1 rho  1.00 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.03 0.36*** 0.39*** 
N 86 86 67 82 64 61 
R2 rho  1.00 0.47*** 0.07 0.39*** 0.43*** 
N  146 106 139 104 84 
R3 rho   1.00 - 0.03 0.24** 0.28** 
N   122 116 85 68 
Flow rho    1.00 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N    186 139 113 
Flow+ rho     1.00 1.00*** 
N     139 113 
 
These results make sense as the flow values highlight local land use variability for 
the study year, while the rent values represent the more long-term average and 
variability. R1 or the would rent value is the equivalent of a stated WTA for setting-
aside land without losing ownership or potential non-use benefits, R2 or would sell 
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is the price of forfeiting all future streams of income and nonmarket benefits from 
the land, and R3 is an actual market transaction that reveals the market value, 
although land degradation or other factors may have reduced its value since 
purchase. Thus, R1 is a more comparable measure of opportunity costs for a land 
set-aside PES scheme in relation to the flow+ woc net returns.  
 
6.3.3 Opportunity Cost Determinants 
Opportunity costs can be associated with the landholder, biophysical and land use 
characteristics. To understand the factors associated with high and low opportunity 
costs, flow net returns were assessed per landholder, per plot, and by presence of 
each land use. A two-tailed Spearman’s rho showed significant correlations 
between landholder net returns ha-1 (n = 59) and number of plots used (𝜌 = 0.412, p 
= 0.00), and number of land uses (𝜌 = 0.459, p = 0.00). Mann Whitney U Tests were 
conducted to compare the landholder opportunity costs to gender and the 
presence of each land use (i.e. categorical independent variables). There was only a 
significant difference in opportunity costs between farmers without coffee (median 
= 0.00, n = 36) and with coffee (median = 23,718.48, n = 23; U = 223, z = - 2.97, p = 
0.00, r = - 0.39).  Thus, higher opportunity cost landholders are more likely to grow 
coffee, use more plots of land and employ more land uses.  
 
A two-tailed Spearman’s rho was also applied to examine associations between plot 
net returns ha-1 (n = 75) and several variables, revealing a significant negative 
correlation with elevation (𝜌 = - 0.29, p = 0.01). Mann Whitney U Tests were also 
conducted to compare the plot opportunity costs to the presence of each land use, 
accessibility to the plot throughout the year and location. There was a significant 
difference in opportunity costs between plots with coffee (median = 28,727.52, n = 
29) and without coffee (median = 282.64, n = 60; U = 388, z = - 4.22, p = 0.00, r = - 
0.45); and between plots with access throughout the year (median =2,607.64, n = 
59) and those without access throughout the year (median = 23,843.25, n = 28; U = 
572.5, z = - 2.3, p = 0.02, r = - 0.25).  Thus, higher opportunity cost plots are more 
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likely to be located at lower elevations, without access throughout the year and, as 
mentioned above, have coffee.  
 
Binary logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of five variables 
(elevation, time to road, access, time to water, and slope) on the likelihood that 
respondents would report growing coffee, crops and cattle. The full model for 
coffee was statistically significant, 𝜒2 (6, n = 101) = 65.19, p = 0.00, indicating that 
the model was able to distinguish between respondents who reported growing 
coffee and those that did not. The model as a whole explained between 48% (Cox 
and Snell R2) and 74% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in presence of coffee, and 
correctly classified 92% of cases. As shown in Table 6.6, four of the independent 
variables were significant predictors of the presence of coffee; the strongest were 
elevation and access (odd ratios of 0.99 and 0.04 respectively). This indicates that 
for every meter above sea level, respondents were 0.99 times less likely to report 
coffee; and if respondents reported access to their land throughout the year, they 
were 0.04 times less likely to report coffee, controlling for all other variables in the 
model. Likewise, for every minute farther from the road, respondents were over 1 
time more likely to report coffee than those who were closer to the road; and for 
every minute farther from water, respondents were 0.73 times less likely to report 
coffee than those who were closer to water. 
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Table 6.6. Binary logistic regression predicting the likelihood of growing coffee. Note: slope 0 = flat, 1 
= medium, and 2 = steep; *** 0.01 significance, ** 0.05 significance and * 0.10 significance level.   
 
The binary logistic regression to predict the likelihood of reporting crops was 
statistically significant, 𝜒2 (6, n = 101) = 37.01, p = 0.00, indicating that the model 
was able to distinguish between respondents who reported growing crops and 
those that did not. The model as a whole explained between 31% (Cox and Snell R2) 
and 42% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in presence of crops, and correctly 
classified 75% of cases. As shown in Table 6.7, four independent variables were 
significant predictors of the presence of crops, the strongest was time to water 
(odd ratio of 1.10). This indicates that for every minute farther from water, 
respondents were more than 1 time more likely to report crops, controlling for all 
other variables in the model. Similarly, for every meter above sea level, 
respondents were 1 time more likely to report crops; for every minute farther from 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Odd 
Ratios 
95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Elevation - 0.01*** 0.01 6.88 1 0.99 0.98 1.00 
Time to 
road 
0.02* 0.01 2.99 1 1.02 1.00 1.04 
Access 
(1) 
-3.15*** 1.03 9.33 1 0.04 0.01 0.32 
Slope (0)   0.22 2    
Slope (1) 20.51 6,95
2.08 
0.00 1 8.08E+8 0.00  
Slope (2) 20.97 6,95
2.08 
0.00 1 1.28E+9 0.00  
Time to 
water 
- 0.32** 0.16 4.02 1 0.73 0.53 0.99 
Constant 0.89 6,95
2.09 
0.00 1 2.45   
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the road, respondents were over 1 time less likely to report crops than those who 
were closer to the road; and if respondents had a land use on steep terrain, 
respondents were 0.21 times less likely to report crops than those not reporting 
steep terrain. 
 
Table 6.7. Binary logistic regression predicting the likelihood of growing crops. Note: slope 0 = flat, 1 
= medium, and 2 = steep; *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance level.   
Variable B S.E. Wald df Odd 
Ratios 
95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Elevation 0.00* 0.00 3.24 1 1.00 1.00 1.01 
Time to 
road 
- 0.01* 0.01 2.89 1 0.99 0.98 1.00 
Access (1) 0.64 0.72 0.80 1 1.90 0.46 7.82 
Slope (0)   2.84 2    
Slope (1) - 0.41 0.61 0.45 1 0.66 0.20 2.21 
Slope (2) - 1.59* 0.95 2.81 1 0.21 0.03 1.31 
Time to 
water 
0.09*** 0.03 8.99 1 1.10 1.03 1.16 
Constant - 4.97** 2.56 3.76 1 0.02   
 
The binary logistic regression to predict the likelihood of reporting cattle was 
statistically significant, 𝜒2 (6, n = 101) = 15.31, p = 0.02, indicating that the model 
was able to distinguish between respondents who reported growing cattle and 
those that did not. The model as a whole explained between 14% (Cox and Snell R2) 
and 19% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in presence of cattle, and correctly 
classified 67% of cases. As shown in Table 6.8, two of the independent variables 
made a statistically significant contribution to the model. The strongest predictor of 
reporting cattle is accessibility, if respondents had access to their land throughout 
the year, they were more than 4 times more likely to have cattle, controlling for all 
other variables in the model. Similarly, for every minute farther from water, 
respondents were 0.94 times less likely to report cattle. 
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Table 6.8. Binary logistic regression predicting the likelihood of having cattle. Note: slope 0 = flat, 1 = 
medium, and 2 = steep; *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance level.   
Variable B S.E. Wald df Odd 
Ratios 
95% C.I. for Odd 
Ratios 
Lower Upper 
Elevation 0.00 0.00 0.29 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Time to 
road 
0.00 0.01 0.41 1 1.00 .99 1.01 
Access (1) 1.40** 0.62 5.16 1 4.07 1.21 13.66 
Slope   1.49 2    
Slope (1) - 0.70 0.58 1.49 1 0.50 0.16 1.53 
Slope (2) - 0.54 0.74 0.53 1 0.58 0.14 2.49 
Time to 
water 
- 0.06** 0.03 5.09 1 0.94 0.89 0.99 
Constant - 1.99 2.32 0.74 1 0.14   
 
Thus, the available variables to predict the presence of each productive land use 
best explain the presence of coffee, followed by crops and, to a lesser extent, 
cattle. At the study site, there is a greater probability of finding coffee at lower 
elevations, in areas without access throughout the year, farther from the road and 
closer to water. The presence of crops was more likely farther from water, at higher 
elevations, closer to the road and on flat to medium slope land. The presence of 
cattle was more likely on land with access throughout the year and close to water. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The analysis of opportunity costs brings to the fore several issues that may arise 
when assessing the cost distribution of water service provision. First, identifying 
providers is challenging due to their spatial distribution and heterogeneity, i.e. also 
being beneficiaries of the service, residing far away from their land plots, owning 
several dispersed plots, and plots located in remote and hard to access areas. 
Second, determining the opportunity costs of providers is complex due to different 
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land uses, market and social dynamics. Third, many people are unlikely to respond 
accurately, if at all, to questions regarding their economic affairs, e.g. household 
income.  
 
An important contribution of this chapter is the use of two different approaches to 
estimate the opportunity costs of water conservation. The flow approach provides 
detailed insight into local micro level variability, market dynamics, and the influence 
of individual land user groups. The rent approach provides a less detailed, but 
longer-term and stable view excluding the effect of extreme, market dynamics. The 
use of both approaches adds confidence and robustness to estimates and 
consequently the claims made based on those estimates.  
 
6.4.1 The Cost of Water Provision  
The opportunity costs obtained represent the cost of improving drinking water 
quality through watershed conservation. Despite the Reserve’s strict management 
category, private land opportunity costs within the Reserve reach extremely high 
values. The average flow net returns ha-1 for all land uses is US$ 1,410, mainly due 
to the good year for coffee growers and the losses experienced by crop and cattle 
farmers. This estimate is quite high and seems to be at the upper margin of other 
studies. For instance, Fisher et al., 2011c) found a mean of US$ 1,188 ha-1 from 
government census data for Tanzanian agriculture. Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006) 
report net benefits of US$ 770 for smallholder agriculture and US$ 1,124 for cattle 
ranching at the Mbaracayu Biosphere Reserve in Paraguay based on secondary 
sources.   
 
Some studies report extreme opportunity costs ranging between US$ 2,247 - 
12,750 ha-1, but they are often due to highly commercial cash crops such as oil palm, 
logging and soybean (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006; Bottcher et al., 2009; Börner et 
al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2011b). The average net returns of US$ 5,710 for coffee is 
within this range as a cash crop with high local and national importance, e.g. coffee 
is the main agro-export of Honduras and the study site (IHCAFE, 2012). For the 
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study year, coffee was being bought in the international market at the highest price 
ever in the last ten years, at four times the lowest price (NASDAQ, 2014). Thus, the 
effect of coffee returns on the overall returns is evident, further seen when 
excluding coffee from the flow estimates. Vegetable crops can reach similar high 
values to coffee, as observed in Figure 6.1, but are riskier because losses are 
excessive due to high transaction costs associated with market access and 
substantial upfront investments (as observed in the inputs reported by crop 
farmers in comparison to the other land uses; Blandon et al., 2009; Hellin et al., 
2009).  
 
The flow average estimates are clearly high, thus the use of median values is 
required to obtain more long-term and stable measures. The median flow+, flow+ 
woc and rent net returns are in line with the opportunity costs reported in the 
literature for similar land uses. A large amount of studies report values ranging 
between US$ 39 and 509, for forested areas, cattle ranching, and different types of 
crops in developing countries (Cacho et al., 2005; Chomitz et al., 2005; Börner and 
Wunder, 2008; Wünscher et al., 2008; Bottcher et al., 2009). Thus, an average 
median estimate obtained from the would rent values (R1) and flow+ woc, US$ 145, 
is believed to be a valid and accurate measure of the overall cost of water 
conservation for one hectare of land at the study site. 
 
Determining the opportunity costs of ecosystem service providers is essential for a 
PES scheme. However, the identification of a reliable, sufficiently accurate and cost-
effective method to determine micro level opportunity costs is a complex and 
challenging process (Wünscher et al., 2011). At the study site two methods were 
applied. The flow approach required substantial assumptions (e.g. value of time), 
costly data collection and was time-consuming. Adjustments had to be done to 
account for one-off variability in the flow estimates and substantial knowledge of 
the local context was needed. The rent approach on the other hand is quite 
inexpensive, only required adjusting land values to 2011 values and needed to 
come from a reliable source. So, although several issues had to be considered 
carefully in order to estimate opportunity costs, both methods seem to be 
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appropriate for areas where data is unavailable and opportunity cost heterogeneity 
is a key issue for conservation strategies. Both methods applied to determine 
opportunity costs provided valid and correlated estimates. This indicates that, in 
this case, the choice of opportunity cost method should not influence the general 
pattern of opportunity costs distribution obtained. 
 
6.4.2 Cost Distribution and Implications for PES Scheme Contracting 
As described in chapter 4, a PES scheme scenario was developed and proposed for 
the study site. This scheme proposed paying landowners for land purchase or land 
set-aside in order to ensure water conservation. Land purchase is costly and not all 
landholders are likely to be willing to sell (it also does not constitute a PES scheme); 
and land set-aside is more attractive to landholders. So, it is important to determine 
what are the opportunities and challenges of providers entering into potential 
contracts (Michael, 2003; Knight et al., 2011; Raymond and Brown, 2011) for a land 
set-aside PES scheme. Efficient schemes should ensure the compensation of 
upstream landholders should be at least equal to the opportunity costs of the 
promoted land use and the amount of the payment should be lower than the 
economic value of the environmental externality (Kosoy et al., 2007). However, 
exactly how this compensation will be or can be distributed among providers is a 
fundamental challenge in PES scheme design.  
 
A particular concern that arises for contracting providers at the study site is the 
duality of providers being beneficiaries. This duality could be interpreted as an 
opportunity or a challenge for contracting, as it will have a lot of influence on 
providers’ willingness to enter into contracts. It could be an opportunity if providers 
knowing the effect of upstream activities on their drinking water quality (as 
beneficiaries) may influence them in favour of more conservation-oriented 
activities on their land. On the other hand, it could be a challenge if providers’ 
priority is land use and profit despite the water contamination suffered by 
themselves and other beneficiaries. A split between these two views exists at the 
study site, evident in the WTP results (see chapters 4 and 5). Thus, this is a reality 
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that a potential PES scheme will have to deal with and could work in favour of 
securing the acceptance of the scheme. Generally water services are seen as 
providing directional benefits, where the service provision benefits a specific 
location due to the flow direction, but here we see that also in situ benefits are 
generated, where the services are provided and the benefits are realized in the 
same location (Fisher et al., 2009). The implications of this setting, a complex 
upstream-downstream framework, for PES scheme contracting is further discussed 
in chapter 7. 
 
Another important concern for PES scheme contracting is land tenure security by 
service providers. Land tenure was reported to be formally secure and control over 
used land is quite effective at the study site. The PES literature highlights the 
importance of formal legal tenure over land for the successful contracting of 
providers (e.g. Bremer et al., 2014; Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014), but the 
challenges of monitoring legally owned non-used land have been less discussed (e.g. 
Kroeger, 2013; Segerson, 2013). The non-used land or forest land, especially public 
land in and around the Reserve, is hard to control and is often entered for 
extractive activities despite legally established land-use restrictions. If a land set-
aside PES scheme were implemented it would require providers to guarantee the 
exclusion of others from modifying the service quality and provision on their land, 
often in remote areas. It would seem cost-effective to secure forested areas with 
low opportunity costs for water conservation; as the NGO AESMO has done so far 
through land purchase. However, controlling access to these areas is currently an 
issue for AESMO as the archaic approach of fencing has been implemented recently 
with little success. Thus, if this exclusion is possible, how it will be achieved and 
how it will be monitored are major concerns for contracting in PES schemes, 
especially for agricultural non-point pollution. 
 
Opportunity costs at the study site varied among landholders depending on several 
landholder, plot, and land use characteristics. The literature generally agrees that 
with certain land uses and tenure, as slope and altitude increase, with higher 
precipitation, in poorer soils, as time increases to the main road and as farmers age, 
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then associated net returns diminish (Chomitz et al., 2005; Naidoo and Ricketts, 
2006; Wünscher et al., 2011). Some of these variables were excluded from analysis 
due to homogeneity (e.g. secure land tenure) or unavailable local scale data (e.g. 
precipitation). Although at the study site some characteristics do correspond with 
the above literature conclusions, this is not entirely so, with some unexpected 
findings. 
 
The three main variables that are most likely to explain cost distribution at the 
study site are coffee plantations, number of land uses and number of plots used. 
The two novel variables of number of plots and number of land uses have rarely, if 
at all, been reported in the literature. These variables are somewhat related to each 
other and most likely represent proxies for farmers’ wealth and/or 
entrepreneurship at developing diverse farming portfolios.  For instance, farmers 
that can afford to have several plots on which to have the highly commercial 
cultivars of coffee and crops and also the locally important cattle ranching, will be 
better off than those limited to one plot or one land use. Also, farmers with more 
land plots and more land uses will be financially secure or at least less affected by 
the dip in market prices, such as was the case of crops and cattle during the sudy. 
 
High opportunity cost coffee plots, generally small in size, tend to be located in 
remote and inaccessible areas, at lower elevations and closer to water compared to 
other land uses. This contrasts Wünscher et al., 2011) that claimed that all year 
accessibility with good road conditions and low transportation costs increase 
productive land use returns. It also indicates a possible threat to lower water 
sources due to their location close to water despite not requiring irrigation. So, 
although coffee can provide the highest returns, it is generally located at lower 
elevations and will not affect the upper water sources. It also means that they are 
likely to be located in the buffer zone of the Reserve which has laxer conservation 
legislation and allows for managed land uses. Coffee is also likely to have less 
impact on water quality than other land uses at the study site because of the lower 
use of herbicides and pesticides reported by respondents compared to crop 
cultivation. In addition, due to their remote and inaccessible location coffee plots 
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would be harder to monitor if a PES scheme were implemented. So, if only coffee 
were considered for a PES scheme, water conservation would be prohibitively 
costly, would only protect a small mid- to downstream area, and would likely 
encounter lots of opposition from locals. All these attributes indicate that coffee 
would be too costly to cover with a PES scheme and needs to be managed in a 
different way from other land uses. 
 
Vegetable plots, generally small in size, are the second highest opportunity cost 
land use and are likely to be located farther from water, closer to the road, on flat 
or medium slope terrain, and at higher elevations. The probability of crops being 
located farther from water is hard to explain as irrigation during the dry season was 
reported for crops, but they are favoured by the high levels of precipitation and 
cooler climate at the higher elevations were they are also located. This means that 
vegetable plots are mostly located in the core zone of the Reserve, conflicting with 
the zoning requirement of strict conservation. Vegetable production also has a 
heavy dependence on herbicides and pesticides (as reported by farmers in the 
opportunity cost survey in comparison to coffee; Moreno Mena and Lopez Limon, 
2005; Prasannath and Prasannath, 2013) and the pollution due to these 
agrochemicals is likely to be enhanced by the runoff that high precipitation 
generates in the area. Both an upstream location and the heavy use of 
agrochemicals mean that vegetable crops are very likely to negatively affect water 
sources throughout the watershed. If only crops were considered for a PES scheme, 
water conservation would seem quite costly, and only a small but important 
proportion of the watershed would be protected. 
 
Similar to the crop findings, most forested land is also located at higher elevations 
in the core zone of the Reserve due to private initiative and the NGO’s conservation 
efforts. This is a good starting point for further conservation in the core zone where 
strict conservation is required and where several water sources are found. Although 
not covered in this study due to time constraints, it is important to study the 
condition of these forests (i.e. degradation) and its impact on water quality.   
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Cattle ranching are one of the lowest opportunity cost land uses; it is generally 
carried out in large plots with access throughout the year and close to water. Thus, 
this subsistence and locally commercial land use is more widespread throughout 
the study site, at different elevations and on varied terrain, due to less land 
requirements. A widespread distribution of cattle ranching plots is also favoured by 
the extensive availability of water at the study site. Thus, cattle are likely to affect 
water sources due to their presence in varied locations, their use of streams for 
drinking which creates erosion, and contaminating water sources via animal faeces. 
However, if only cattle were considered for a PES scheme, water conservation 
would seem inexpensive and feasible. Thus, all land uses at a watershed need to be 
considered to accurately measure true opportunity costs, considering their 
distribution, to place conservation costs proportionately on all providers (Adams et 
al., 2010). 
 
Often the most profitable land use is used as a basis to determine opportunity costs 
(Pirard, 2008). In the case of the study site this would mean applying the extremely 
high opportunity costs obtained from coffee to the entire area. However, if limited 
rationality is assumed for landholders and there are barriers to its realization (i.e. 
land is unsuitable), this is likely not the case. The findings for the study site show 
that each upstream hectare cannot be assumed to have the same opportunity cost 
or ecosystem service level due to differing location of plots in relation to water 
sources, the land use, and landholder and land characteristics. It is commonly 
suggested to discriminately align payments with opportunity costs, which is hugely 
cost-effective and more equitable, allowing the conservation of more land and 
spreading resources across a greater number of providers (Börner et al., 2010). 
Determination of appropriate payment for providers and its differentiation in a PES 
scheme has always been challenging and complex. However, at the study site this 
approach seems financially and practically unfeasible due to the inequity in 
opportunity costs across landholders and land uses, particularly where highly 
commercial cash crops are cultivated. Any PES scheme would need to consider any 
inequities that might arise for landholders for ethical and practical reasons, as 
inequities can generate opposition to the scheme. 
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Balmford and Whitten, 2003) highlight the importance of understanding how much 
land can be removed from production while still allowing income growth. Both cash 
crops at the study site, coffee and crops, cover a small proportion of land. However, 
crops seem to have an overall greater negative impact on water quality than coffee. 
Thus, a PES scheme, backed by the enforcement of conservation laws, might be the 
appropriate incentive for crop farmers in the core zone of the Reserve to set-aside 
land for water conservation to reduce one of the largest contaminating activities. 
PES scheme contracting would be better aimed at high environmental impact land 
uses, such as crops, and mid- to low-value agriculture, such as cattle ranching, 
where payments might provide enough incentive for water conservation.  
 
Furthermore, due to the instability of coffee prices and the need to maintain 
income growth, sustainably managed coffee schemes could be encouraged in the 
area. This would be a more feasible approach to manage this high opportunity cost 
land use and at the same time safeguard water sources. Importantly, the availability 
and access to markets that are crucial for agricultural export crops such as coffee 
(Balat et al. 2009), already exist at the study site. Also, coffee growing is carried out 
by only a third of landholders and covers a small proportion of land which is unlikely 
to change much due to land unsuitability. Therefore, if coffee plantations are 
excluded from PES scheme contracting, which only cover 10% of land, the 
opportunity cost amounts to less than a fourth of the initial estimate (US$ 257,057 
per year).  
 
Within the above contracting proposal, subsistence and low income farmers would 
be included in the providers to be contracted. Poor farmers that depend on the 
purchase of basic food goods could live off payments aligned with their opportunity 
costs. Also, the annual and seasonal instability of agriculture net benefits might be 
another factor influencing farmers, especially poor ones, to contract in a water 
conservation scheme with a permanent, stable income. However, the opportunity 
costs of subsistence farmers might not adequately provide for a household to move 
and buy another parcel of land elsewhere, especially if the cost of land is high. 
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Therefore, mobility and access to resources need to be considered carefully to 
avoid detrimental effects on these stakeholder groups (McClanahan et al., 2008; 
Cinner et al., 2009). One way of dealing with this challenge is to promote 
sustainable income alternatives in the area (Balmford and Whitten, 2003). 
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that more global, temporal and spatial 
feedbacks could affect the returns of farmers and their distribution (Wells, 1992; 
Chan et al., 2007; Tallis and Polasky, 2009). For the study year coffee prices were 
high and cattle and crops were low. However, if these prices remained the same or 
altered (increased or decreased), land use dynamics might change and the cost 
distribution with them. Thus, where data is available, as was not the case at the 
study site, these long-term feedbacks should be analysed in future research.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
The cost of water conservation through a land set-aside PES scheme was estimated 
with the opportunity cost flow approach and the rent approach. An overall flow net 
return ha-1 of US$ 1,410 was obtained, with coffee and crops contributing the 
highest values, followed by cattle and forest use. However, due to the spread of the 
data and the losses reported, the median positive returns without coffee (flow+ 
woc), US$ 140, are used as more stable and realistic values. On the other hand, the 
median rent values ranged between US$ 151 – 397, were correlated between 
themselves and with the flow+ woc. The flow+ woc estimate provides a cost for 
water conservation of US$ 257,057 for the entire study site, which is comparable to 
totals obtained from the landholder would rent values (R1) and the actual purchase 
price (R3). These results make sense as the flow values highlight local land use 
variability for the study year, while the rent values represent the more long-term 
average and variability. Identifying a reliable, sufficiently accurate and cost-effective 
method to determine opportunity costs has always been challenging and complex. 
However, at the study site the two methods employed to determine opportunity 
costs provided valid and correlated estimates.  
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Two main concerns arise for contracting providers in a PES scheme at the study site, 
the duality of providers being beneficiaries also and the challenges of monitoring 
set-aside land. Furthermore, the distribution of opportunity costs was analysed for 
landholders, plots and by presence of each land use. Landholder net returns are 
correlated to the presence of coffee, number of plots used, and number of land 
uses. Plot net returns are correlated with altitude and coffee.  Binary logistic 
regressions showed that the presence of coffee was more likely to be found at 
lower elevations, with limited access throughout the year, farther from the road, 
and closer to water. Crops were more likely to be located farther from water, at 
higher elevations, close to the road, and on flat to medium sloped terrain. Cattle 
was more likely to be found with access to their land throughout the year and close 
to water. These results evidence the greater effect of crops and cattle on water 
quality, due to location and other attributes. 
 
The high value of coffee means that a PES scheme probably will not provide enough 
incentive for coffee growers to engage in land set-aside for water conservation. 
Also, coffee has many other attributes, such as being the main source of 
employment and having a smaller effect on water quality, that indicate that 
sustainable coffee schemes encourage income growth in the area. Thus, PES 
scheme contracting, backed by the enforcement of conservation laws, is best aimed 
at high environmental impact land uses and mid- to low-value agriculture where a 
PES scheme might provide enough incentive for water conservation and the most 
damaging land uses are included. Therefore, if coffee plantations, covering a small 
proportion of the study site, are excluded from contracting in a PES scheme, the 
mean opportunity cost amounts to US$ 257,057 per year. This amount proves more 
manageable for conservation practitioners to secure funds for contracting providers.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
There is a growing interest in the economic side of conservation, and costs and 
benefits need to be understood to estimate the value of conservation lands and 
their services (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006). In most cases, these benefits and costs 
are both poorly understood and quantified (Costanza, 2000), and they are not 
evenly spread over all people, places and time (Arrow et al., 2000; Chan et al., 
2007).Thus, it is important to understand what the costs and benefits of a 
conservation policy are, how they are distributed, and the factors influencing this 
distribution and subsequent equity outcomes.   
 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the costs and benefits distribution of a potential 
PES scheme for clean drinking water in Honduras. In order to achieve this aim, the 
specific objectives of this thesis are (1) to determine the costs and benefits of 
drinking water quality use in fifteen rural communities, their distribution and the 
factors determining this distribution; (2) to analyse how the distribution of costs 
and benefits may influence contracting Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes; 
and (3) to contribute to the understanding of different economic valuation methods 
and their use to determine the costs and benefits of ecosystem services.  
 
The first and second objectives of this thesis are met by the three previous chapters 
covering two different measures of benefits (stated and revealed WTP, chapters 4 
and 5 respectively) and costs (flow and rent opportunity costs of landholders; 
chapter 6) of improving drinking water quality. This chapter also contributes to 
objectives 1 and 2 by summarising the findings reported in the three previous 
chapters and further expanding on the benefits of water conservation (section 7.1), 
the costs (7.2) and the resulting financial feasibility of a PES scheme (7.3). Some key 
distributive issues that arise in this thesis are subsequently discussed (7.4), 
including the complex externalities framework, imperfect information, unequal 
water governance and fairness in targeting providers. These issues contribute to 
meeting objective 2 on analysing how the distribution of costs and benefits may 
influence equity. Objective 3, addressing the use of different methods to determine 
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the costs and benefits of ecosystem services, is addressed in chapter 6 (estimating 
opportunity costs with the flow and rent approaches) and here, by discussing the 
use of stated and revealed approaches to estimate WTP measures (7.1). The 
chapter concludes discussing the implications of the results for PES scheme design 
(section 7.5) that brings together objectives 1 and 2. 
 
7.1 Benefits of Water Conservation 
The extensively used stated preference method of contingent valuation was applied 
to determine household WTP for a PES scheme that would improve drinking water 
quality. Contingent valuation responses to a well-designed survey question are 
usually assumed to be an unbiased measure equal to WTP (Laughland et al., 1996). 
This stated preference method offers many advantages, such as allowing a better 
control over the valuation scenario to measure ex-ante WTP, contributing insights 
into the feasibility of proposed projects and policies and is the only valuation 
technique for measuring altruism toward the health of others and other passive use 
values related to drinking water quality (Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997). It is 
also expected to include the pain, suffering and lost leisure time linked to illness in 
the case of contaminated drinking water (Alberini and Krupnick, 2000). In this thesis 
the monthly WTP obtained per household with the contingent valuation survey was 
US$ 0.77.  
 
Contingent valuation has infrequently been estimated alongside, and contrasted 
with, other valuation methods. Choe et al., 1996) applied contingent valuation and 
travel cost method to estimate the value that people in the city of Davao in 
Philippines, place on improving the water quality of rivers and the sea. The authors 
found that both estimates are very close to each other and are quite low, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of household income. Haq et al., 2007) used 
contingent valuation to estimate the WTP for a continuous and potable water 
supply and averting behaviour for water quality improvement in the district of 
Abbottabad, Pakistan. Findings mention that both methods revealed household 
WTP for improved water services and to adopt averting behaviour, but no 
comparison between the methods was attempted. In a different approach, Rosado 
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et al., 2006) estimated WTP for drinking water quality in Brazil by combining 
averting behaviour and contingent valuation data, looking at two covariates, 
income and bid, to explain variance. The authors found that a common underlying 
preference structure behind the stated preference and the revealed preference 
data determines when a linear utility function was used, but significant differences 
between the two WTP estimates were found. Research into the relationships 
between contingent valuation and other valuation methods is still limited and 
needs to be further addressed as results have differed. This section presents and 
compares the WTP estimates obtained with a stated preference approach and a 
revealed preference approach. 
 
The economic value of safe drinking water specifically includes changes in 
expenditure and well-being, such as medical costs, lost earnings, and defensive 
expenditure (Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Haq et al., 2007). These values 
were estimated at the study site using the revealed preference approaches of 
averting behaviour and illness damage costs. These methods allow valid estimates 
of willingness to pay as they are based on actual choices built on perceived costs 
and benefits which better reflect the values of the population (Whitehead and Van 
Houtven, 1997; Whitehead et al., 2008).  
 
The averting behaviour method is the most popular revealed preference approach 
to valuing safe drinking water as it more accurately estimates WTP values over 
other methods (Laughland et al., 1993; Whitehead and Van Houtven, 1997; Um et 
al., 2002). In order to avoid contaminated water, households carry out averting 
behaviours involving home water treatment or the purchase of bottled water. In 
cases when averting actions are not taken or are not efficient, households might 
incur costs to treat water borne illness. Jalan and Somanathan, 2008) found that 
averting expenditure probably provides only partial protection from unsafe water 
so it represents an incomplete measure of WTP. Therefore the true benefits 
associated with improvement in water quality equal the change in averting 
expenditure plus illness damage costs and the net direct disutility of illness 
(Harrington and Portney, 1987; Pattanayak et al., 2005; Jalan and Somanathan, 
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2008).  In this thesis the monthly revealed WTP obtained per household by 
summing averting expenditure and illness damage costs, amounts to US$ 1.22. This 
estimate reflects households’ true WTP for clean drinking water, after controlling 
for joint production of bottled water.  
 
The estimates of household WTP obtained from the analyses of the contingent 
valuation and the revealed preference data were in the same order of magnitude. 
Overall, this increases the confidence that the general magnitude of the estimates 
of household WTP for water quality improvements is correct. Respondents seem to 
be underestimating their stated WTP by 60% compared to the revealed WTP. 
Harrington and Portney, 1987) demonstrated that the sum of changes in averting 
expenditure and illness damage costs might underestimate or overestimate WTP. 
The revealed WTP measure reported in this thesis would increase further if the 
monetary value of illness disutility is included (i.e. pain, suffering and lost leisure 
time) and if more information on health is provided to households, e.g. Jalan and 
Somanathan, 2008) found that providing information increases averting 
expenditure by 11%. The common perception that stated preference methods 
grossly overstate what people are willing to pay does not seem to be supported by 
this analysis.   
 
A Spearman’s correlation applied to the two non-normally distributed WTP 
estimates showed that there is no correlation between the stated and the revealed 
WTP. Furthermore, the results of a Friedman test indicates that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the two values X2 (1, n = 352) = 38.44, p < 
0.01) with a lower ranking mean for the stated WTP. The lack of correlation 
between the stated and revealed WTP means that the averting expenditure or the 
damage costs do not vary with, or are not nearly as responsive as the stated WTP, 
to the determinants of WTP (Laughland et al., 1996). Urama and Hodge, 2006) did 
find a strong correlation between stated WTP and averting expenditure, suggesting 
that these two measures relate to the same theoretical construct. Furthermore, 
most studies agree that averting expenditure is capable of yielding conceptually 
valid estimates of costs of environmental pollution and serve to inform policy 
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alternatives (e.g. Abdalla et al., 1992). However, the results from this thesis support 
the literature explaining that in practice it is difficult to estimate averting behaviour 
and thus obtain a true revealed WTP. For averting behaviour to produce an exact 
welfare measure it would have to: (i) lack jointness in production, (ii) its rise would 
guarantee improved water quality, (iii) its change must be entirely due to a change 
in water quality, (iv) it is the final household good not the inputs used to produce it, 
and (v) it should enter directly into the consumers utility function (Bartik, 1988; 
Hanley et al., 1999; Abrahams et al., 2000).  
 
The comparison of the stated and revealed WTP estimates also serves to test the 
criterion and convergent validity of the contingent valuation method. Criterion 
validity compares CV estimates either to a measurement that is external to the CV 
study, or to a behaviourally-based measure that directly represents the construct 
under investigation. This is considered the surest way to assess the validity of a 
stated preference measure. Convergent or construct validity investigates the 
consistency of CV estimates with estimates provided by another nonmarket 
valuation method (Brown, 2003). The findings reported here indicate that there is 
no convergence between the two methods, so neither the stated WTP nor the 
revealed WTP estimates are regarded as the criterion variable. Such comparisons 
must, however, be interpreted carefully, because the WTP estimates from the two 
valuation approaches are not measuring precisely the same thing. In this context, 
the revealed preferences approach estimates beneficiaries’ actual market 
behaviour to avoid and treat the effects of contaminated water while the stated 
preferences approach reveals their intention to trade-off money for a PES scheme 
to improve drinking water quality.  
 
There are several possible reasons to explain the non-correlation of these estimates, 
including the following: context-dependent preferences for each approach, the 
stated and revealed WTP values are not measures of the same construct, or one or 
both estimates are biased. Biases in the survey application or in timings can 
generate different limitations in survey results (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Urama 
and Hodge, 2006). However, the finding that the mean stated WTP was significantly 
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lower than the mean revealed WTP makes the bias argument unlikely, as the main 
strength of stated approaches is the estimation of option and existence values in 
addition to direct use values (Bateman et al., 2002). An exception to this argument 
could be farmers’ higher discount rates, greater risk aversion, or social 
conformance that could lower the stated WTP (Moser, 2001; Urama and Hodge, 
2006). This is often observed for farmers or poor people that have short-term 
horizons, even living on a day to day basis (Holden and Shiferaw, 2002). Other 
reasons for under-valuation of ecosystem services can include imperfect 
information (in chapter 4 it was found that some respondents preferred to decide 
WTP in a community setting; and in chapter 5 the imperfect awareness and 
information on averting behaviour and water contamination is discussed), insecure 
land tenure (chapter 4 highlights tenure of water sources) and national government 
policy, among others (CAB-International, 2002). The higher revealed WTP in this 
study may therefore have been driven by one or several of these reasons. The 
researcher agrees with Urama and Hodge, 2006) and Choe et al., 1996) in that even 
though the revealed and stated approaches are conceptually similar based on the 
utility preference theory, they are contextually different being based on different 
market scenarios where respondents might have different preferences and hidden 
joint preferences (such as the joint production of bottled water accounted for in 
chapter 5). 
 
7.2 Costs of Water Conservation 
Cost-effective and precise estimation of site-specific opportunity costs is a major 
challenge (Wünscher et al., 2011). Many approaches have been used in the 
literature to estimate opportunity costs for PES schemes and other conservation 
initiatives. Some novel approaches, such as procurement PES auctions, promise to 
help reveal private landholders’ opportunity costs (Jack et al., 2009; Khalumba et al., 
2014). However, this thesis was limited in the methods that could be applied by a 
small sample size and the lack of data availability at the study site. More 
comprehensive studies utilise two or more approaches in order to obtain more 
accurate and robust opportunity cost estimates. This is because the estimation of 
opportunity costs may differ considerably, depending on the method used and the 
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assumptions adopted. In this thesis the flow and the rent approaches were used. 
The flow approach, commonly used in PES scheme design, uses local level net 
returns from agriculture in order to obtain detailed insight into the heterogeneity of 
landowners and variability of opportunity costs (Wünscher et al., 2011). The rent 
approach is based on land values, and in this thesis specifically three stated land 
values that potentially reflect more stable longer term values. The use of land 
values to determine opportunity costs is commonly used, reveals landholders’ true 
value for land and is quite straightforward.  
 
The flow opportunity cost obtained from landholders varied widely with an overall 
average of US$ 1,410 ha-1 and a much lower median of US$ 19 ha-1. Opportunity 
costs varied across individual land uses, and averaged U$ 5,710 ha-1 for coffee, 
US$ 1,501 ha-1 for crops, US$ 282 ha-1 for cattle, and US$ 35 ha-1 for forest. 
However, to account for context-specific factors the median positive returns 
without coffee (flow+ woc) were considered valid estimates and were correlated 
with the median rent values ranging between US$ 151 – 397. 
 
The opportunity costs obtained represent the cost of improving drinking water 
quality through watershed conservation. The average flow net return ha-1 for all 
land uses reported above seems to be at the lower margin of other studies ranging 
between US$ 1,124 and 12,750 ha-1 (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2006; Bottcher et al., 
2009; Börner et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2011b). The higher values are often due to 
highly commercial cash crops, such as was the case of coffee in this thesis. The flow 
average estimates are clearly high, thus the use of median values is required to 
obtain more long-term and stable measures. The average median estimate 
obtained from the “would rent” values (R1) and flow+ woc (US$ 145 ha-1) is in line 
with the opportunity costs reported in the literature for similar land uses. A large 
amount of studies report values ranging between US$ 39 and 509 for forested areas, 
cattle ranching, and different types of crops in developing countries (Cacho et al., 
2005; Chomitz et al., 2005; Börner and Wunder, 2008; Wünscher et al., 2008). Thus, 
the opportunity cost estimates from both approaches are considered valid and 
accurate measures of the overall cost of water conservation at the study site. The 
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flow approach seems to be particularly appropriate for areas where opportunity 
cost heterogeneity is a key issue for conservation strategies, such as PES schemes. 
The rent approach is potentially an inexpensive and quick way of obtaining an 
overall opportunity cost estimate to inform conservation policy more broadly.  
 
7.3 Feasibility of a User-based PES Scheme 
The estimated WTP for watershed protection is significant and evidence that there 
is demand for clean water in the area. The results suggest that a substantial 
proportion of households may be willing to contribute to local watershed 
conservation. However, this demand is currently not adequately met by the supply-
side providers who are mostly private landholders involved in productive land uses. 
The estimated stated WTP, if all 1545 households in the study site are required to 
pay, would amount to US$14,276 per year, or to US$ 22,619 per year with a 
revealed WTP. The private land of the watershed area above the lowest water 
source covers 1,843 ha and would cost over US$ 2 million to protect based on the 
mean flow opportunity cost estimates (including negative and coffee values). Thus, 
a user-based scheme at the study site seems highly unfeasible.  
  
However, the high opportunity costs of coffee mean that a PES scheme probably 
will not provide enough incentive for coffee growers to engage in land set-aside for 
water conservation. Coffee also has many other attributes, such as being the main 
source of employment (PNUD, 2010b) and having a smaller effect on water quality 
(see chapter 6), that suggest sustainable coffee schemes should be promoted to 
encourage income growth in the area. Thus, contracting in a PES scheme, backed by 
the enforcement of conservation laws, is best aimed at high environmental impact 
land uses and mid to low-value agriculture where a scheme might provide enough 
incentive for water conservation and the most damaging land uses are included. 
Therefore, if coffee plantations are excluded from PES scheme contracting the 
(flow+ woc) opportunity cost amounts to US$ 236,492 per year.  
 
Even considering the without coffee opportunity cost estimate, one year’s increase 
to the water bills could not cover payments for the protection of the entire 
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watershed. The stated WTP would only cover 6% of the estimated (flow+ woc) cost 
of the water conservation and the revealed WTP could cover up to 10%. The cost of 
water conservation through land set-aside can be disaggregated further under 
specific land uses with the highest environmental impact. The stated and revealed 
WTP estimates would be able to cover 38% or 61% of cattle opportunity costs 
(based on median values), and 42% or 67% of crop opportunity costs, respectively. 
These findings reinforce the claim that a user-based scheme is unfeasible at the 
study site. This could change in the future if environmental awareness is advanced 
in the area to increase WTP, external support is obtained for a third party-based 
scheme, or other measures for water conservation are explored. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the Net Present Value (NPV) of a 25-year PES scheme based on the 
findings at the study site, calculated with a monthly per household stated WTP 
(US$ 0.77) and with a revealed WTP (US$1.22) as benefits. The NPV utilises an 
average opportunity cost for the flow and rent approaches (US$146 ha-1) as cost, 
excluding negative values and coffee. The use of this average assumes a uniform, 
stable and positive opportunity cost over time, without drops or peaks in the 
market. The NPV thus shows the unfeasibility of a user-based scheme with a low 
benefit-cost ratio between 0.05 and 0.08. In order for a PES scheme to be feasible 
at the study site, Table 7.1 also presents the NPV of a funded scheme, requiring 
US$ 252,500 external funding per year and assuming that in year ten, 10 ha are 
donated to conservation and from then on 1 ha per year. The funded scheme would 
require external funding by the government or private firms operating in the area, 
as well as continuous environmental education campaigns to encourage 
landholders to donate land to conservation.  The discount rates used are based on 
the literature on Latin American studies (Potvin et al., 2008; Fuenzalida and 
Mongrut, 2010; Rondon et al., 2010). Specifically, the mid-value (6.25%) is based on 
the Central Bank of Honduras’ annualised interest rate for 2010 (BCH, 2011). 
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Table 7.1. Net Present Value (NPV) of a 25 year PES scheme at the study site with estimated values 
and an externally funded scheme. 
Assumptions 
25 Year NPV (US$) 
SWTP user-based 
scheme 
RWTP user-based 
scheme 
Externally funded 
scheme 
Discount 
Rate 
3% -4,658,042 -4,504,421 14,833 
6.25% -3,411,409 -3,298,902 7,161 
10% -2,549,226 -2,465,153 2,707 
Benefit-cost ratio 0.05 0.08 1.00 
 
7.4 Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
Anthropogenic activities, such as farming, fuelwood collection, and cattle ranching 
conducted by different stakeholders and in different ways will have varying degrees 
of impact on conservation. Likewise, the type, quality, and quantity of services 
provided by an ecosystem are affected by the resource use decisions of individuals 
and communities. Thus, understanding how the costs and benefits of ecosystem 
service use are distributed is important for conservation and needs special 
attention (Spiteri and Nepal, 2006; He et al., 2008). There is an obvious unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits of water conservation at the study site. This cost-
benefit imbalance is generated due to the existence of many forms of market 
failure, which include: externalities, public goods, imperfect property rights, and 
insufficient knowledge and information (Chan et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Lant et 
al., 2008; Paavola, 2009). In the next three subsections the main market failures 
that arise in this thesis are discussed.  
 
7.4.1 Complex Externalities Framework 
The general claim that drinking water is based on an upstream-downstream 
externalities framework is not as straight-forward as was originally thought (Van 
Hecken et al., 2012). The water service at the study site reveals that hydrological 
services can be omni-directional at a local level. Beneficiaries at the study site are 
not only located downstream but occur throughout the study region, including at 
some distance from their water sources (Figure 7.1). This dispersed spatial location 
of beneficiaries encourages irregular benefit distribution, especially for the more 
distant communities, even more so if those communities lie in a different political 
municipality. Access to water sources and the distance or time from beneficiary 
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communities to water sources have been mentioned as key determinants of benefit 
distribution (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; Tallis and Polasky, 2009).  
 
There is also an asymmetrical benefit distribution between large (downstream) and 
small communities (mostly in upstream areas) at the study site. Larger communities 
were less willing to pay for improved drinking water quality despite their vulnerable 
position in the externalities framework. This is probably due to the many 
advantages accruing to larger communities, e.g. access to alternative sources of 
water. Smaller communities close to water sources are more aware of water 
contamination and depend directly on them. Local benefit estimates such as those 
reported in this thesis can provide the economic value of an ecosystem service and 
locate the inequity or disconnection of benefits across the landscape. 
Understanding the distribution of costs and benefits in space can inform where 
management interventions should be concentrated (Chan et al., 2006; Naidoo and 
Ricketts, 2006; Fisher et al., 2009; Tallis and Polasky, 2009).          
 
        Upstream 
 
 
 
  Downstream                                                                 At a distance from watershed 
Figure 7.1. Diagram exemplifying the complex externality framework at the study site; note: P = 
providers and B = beneficiaries. 
 
In this thesis, most landholders are also beneficiaries of the service which has 
important implications for any water conservation strategy. This duality creates a 
conflict of interests for landholders, who on the one hand want to ensure the 
continuation of their livelihoods and on the other they want to obtain clean 
drinking water. This duality will likely complicate decision making in a PES scheme 
and probably already creates conflicting dynamics in existing conservation efforts. 
For instance, the managers of the service at the study site are in conflict, as the 
NGO managing the Reserve aims to conserve ecosystem services and promote 
B 
B 
P B 
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sustainable development, and the private landholders are focused on farming 
activities that are uncontrolled and cause substantial negative externalities to 
beneficiaries of the ecosystem services.  
 
7.4.2 Imperfect Information 
Perceptions and preferences of drinking water quality are a vital factor determining 
households’ health behaviour, and how they value water quality improvements. If 
awareness and information of health risks is incomplete or erroneous then the 
possibilities of implementing policies to improve water quality will be limited 
(Fisher et al., 2008). Much of individuals’ perceptions on water quality-related 
health risk at the study site were based on incomplete information or 
misinformation. For instance, many people in this study considered “dirt” as the 
main form of water contamination and lacked awareness of water test results. 
Individuals’ health risk perceptions were also often contradictory, similar to 
numerous studies in experimental economics and psychology that have found that 
perceived risks are often inconsistent with actual risks (Um et al., 2002). For 
instance, most respondents expressed satisfaction with their water board’s work 
despite believing their drinking water was contaminated. Thus, it is important to 
enhance people’s health risk awareness. Information about water quality and 
health risk provided through home visits, health education classes, awareness 
campaigns or hygiene promotion programs has been shown to be an effective 
instrument (Cairncross et al., 2005; Nauges and Van Den Berg, 2009). Thus, the 
success of a PES scheme would be greatly enhanced for locations such as the study 
site by the provision of non-biased information beforehand to any project or 
scheme implementation (as found by Jalan and Somanathan, 2008).  
 
Perceptions determine both the values and preferences of people, informing the 
stated preferences approach to WTP, and the health behaviours carried out, inform 
the revealed preferences approach. The valuation of a PES scheme to improve 
drinking water quality (chapter 4) demonstrated that the most significant variable 
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for respondents’ WTP was if they thought the scheme was important for the study 
site. However, although a lack of environmental awareness provides a lower WTP, 
the value that people have for co-benefits associated with the ecosystem service 
might also play a role in determining WTP and the acceptance of a scheme. This 
also supports the recommendation of contracting multiple services in bundles (de 
Groot et al., 2010; Onaindia et al., 2013). For instance, if forests qualify for a 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project 
(see Börner et al., 2010 for discussion on additionality of protected areas; Rendón 
Thompson et al., 2013) the high economic value of standing forests could greatly 
enhance conservation financing. Notwithstanding, previous studies have found 
contradictory results when accounting for several ecosystem services. Fisher et al., 
2011a) found that even adding the values of several ecosystem services for a region 
in Southeast Asia, did not meet opportunity costs of oil palm and timber. However, 
Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006) found that by considering several ecosystem service 
values in a Paraguayan Reserve, 98% of forest land benefits exceeded opportunity 
costs. Thus, bundling ecosystem services could complement beneficiaries WTP for 
improved water quality if their aggregated value exceeds landholders’ opportunity 
costs.  
 
7.4.3 Unequal Water Governance 
The feasibility of a PES scheme is mediated and constrained by the local socio-
institutional context, a claim that is increasingly recognised among PES practitioners 
and scholars, but remains under-researched in the PES literature (Muradian et al., 
2010; Vatn, 2010). Institutional governance, as well as access to networks, plays an 
important role in the distribution of costs and benefits from ecosystem services 
(Igoe, 2006; Paavola, 2007; Cárdenas, 2008). The study site’s water governance was 
characterised by individual community water boards. The small pseudo-markets 
created in each community to charge for piped water have almost complete 
autonomy from each other and the government. This means that communities vary 
according to user fee, level of participation, type of infrastructure (e.g. water source 
and water interruptions), and water source property rights. Watersheds with such 
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disconnected water governance present many opportunities and challenges for 
water conservation. Self-governance could lend itself to more discrimination in user 
fees within the communities, to enhance benefit distribution, due to its reduced 
scope. Currently, a uniform user fee per community is the status quo, either for 
practical or equity reasons. In contrast, state governance can be more cost-effective 
due to economies of scale, and can access more funds for conservation (Paavola, 
2009). The state’s involvement also entails a different distribution of power than 
self-governance, focused on promoting national agendas (Paavola, 2007). Both 
approaches have their limitations and have been found wanting in the literature 
(e.g. Chan, 2009; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010; Bollig and Menestrey Schwieger, 
2014). One option to manage watersheds with independent community water 
management is to bring them together through an association of water boards for 
joint management and conservation, with state support. Overall, it is believed that 
a combined approach to water governance involving local water boards, the NGO 
managing the Reserve and the municipalities, as proposed in the PES scheme 
scenario (chapter 4), would be most effective at achieving water conservation in 
the study site10. 
 
Two features for which a combined governance approach would be particularly 
effective are securing water sources and controlling the influence of powerful 
individuals.  Those communities with entitlements to their water source, generally 
the larger ones, often have municipal support and expect enforcement of rights in 
access and protection of water sources. However, irrespective of water source 
entitlement, de facto use of water source land was widespread at the study site, 
with frequent incursions affecting all water sources. The community water boards 
do not have sufficient authority or capacity to secure water sources and would 
benefit from the support and authority of the NGO and the municipalities. 
Furthermore, members of local groups, which represent the community at 
                                                          
10 The General Honduran Water Law (La Gaceta No. 32,088, 14th December 2009) 
allows for the creation of watershed, sub-watershed and micro-watershed councils 
formed by public and private multi-sector actors involved in watershed 
management. 
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municipal level, are more likely to benefit from projects. These individuals in 
powerful and decision-making positions in the community will influence the 
governance of benefits distribution (Igoe, 2006; Sommerville et al., 2010a). It is 
believed that a combined governance approach could control powerful individuals 
and allow for more participatory water conservation bringing together all relevant 
actors. 
 
7.4.4 Fairness in Targeting Payments to Landholders 
Each hectare of the water conservation area does not provide the same level of 
ecosystem service. Closely aligning payments with providers’ opportunity costs is 
considered hugely cost-effective and more equitable, allowing the conservation of 
more land and spreading resources across a greater number of providers 
(Wünscher et al., 2008; Börner et al., 2010). However, if payments at the study site 
are distributed according to opportunity costs, most money would go to high 
opportunity cost earners and would only conserve a very small area of the 
watershed. If payments are distributed equally across landholders, complete 
watershed conservation might not be achieved and high opportunity cost earners 
might not be incentivised to contract in a scheme.  
 
Another approach is to ensure high opportunity cost providers cover a proportion 
of their total opportunity costs. A reduced payment to high opportunity cost 
earners would be fairer for beneficiaries as then they would not have to pay for the 
entire opportunity costs, especially high ones, and would, to some extent, get the 
polluter to pay. Dual providers, as reported in the study site, could be induced to 
cover part of the costs of conservation by appealing to their dual position as 
beneficiaries. Some ways of encouraging dual landholders include constant 
environmental and health campaigns, by gradually increasing the application of 
command and control in the Reserve, promoting organic farming or other 
environmentally friendly schemes (e.g. ecotourism, carbon projects).  
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7.5 Implications of Results for PES Scheme Design  
PES has been recommended in developing countries where regulatory and taxation 
systems, to account for externalities, are likely to be weak (Fisher et al., 2008). 
Carefully designed PES schemes can help overcome many of the weaknesses that 
continue undermining water management, poverty eradication and equity, such as 
low quality of water services, difficulties targeting the poor and incomplete 
information systems (Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010). At the study site, it is 
obvious that a stand-alone user-based PES scheme is out of the question. As Börner 
et al., 2010) have highlighted, few places have developed PES locally without 
external support.  
 
Other methods mentioned in the literature to achieve water conservation include 
taxing pesticides, water treatment, among others. However, these alternatives, as 
well as PES schemes, have been at times found to be unfeasible at certain locations, 
not cost-effective or hindered by several factors (e.g. Zilberman and Millock, 1997; 
Mackintosh and Colvin, 2003; UNICEF and WHO, 2012). For example, at the study 
site water treatment at source (see section 3.2) and at point of use (see chapter 5), 
as well as tax payment (see section 6.2.4) were irregular despite being required by 
law. Thus, water conservation at the study site is more likely to be possible if 
substantial external support is obtained for a third party-based scheme or a 
different kind of scheme is considered, such as a sustainable land management-
based (SLM) one. 
 
As any human or domestic animal use of upstream land is likely to generate faecal 
contamination of water (Arby, 2008; Jewitt, 2011), the PES scheme in this thesis 
was designed to remove land from production entirely.  However, to protect 
hydrological services, incentives can be offered to landholders to apply more 
sustainable land use practices. These sustainable practices would also require on-
going monitoring and enforcement costs (Kaplowitz et al., 2012). In this thesis 
coffee has been proposed to be managed outside of a PES scheme, mainly due to 
its local importance and relative low environmental impact compared to other land 
uses at the study site. However, the other land uses at the study site still remain too 
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costly to be covered by a user-based set-aside PES scheme. The findings in this 
thesis thus support the development of a SLM PES scheme instead, of which several 
examples currently exist (e.g. Nelson et al., 2010; Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2012; To 
et al., 2012). SLM PES schemes could ensure the provision of ecosystem services, 
improve livelihoods and alleviate poverty (Bulte et al., 2008; Corbera et al., 2009). 
Still, the water quality effects of specific sustainable practices would need to be 
assessed and probably coupled with enforced water disinfection at source. Likewise, 
landholders’ willingness and capacity to contract in sustainable practices for 
improved drinking water quality would need to be determined. SLM-based schemes 
may provide a pragmatic solution that helps to balance providers’ costs and 
beneficiaries’ benefits by providing providers with incentives to implement 
sustainable land practices (covering some of their opportunity costs) and thus 
improving drinking water for beneficiaries.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions  
 
8.1 Summary of Contributions 
This thesis has assessed the costs and benefits distribution of improving drinking water 
quality through a land set-aside PES scheme in Honduras. Additionally, this research 
contributes to the debate on the use of different methods to value ecosystem services. The 
research design combines the ecosystem services framework, distributional issues, 
valuation and payment for ecosystem services approaches, with a mixed-methods 
approach to guide overall data collection and analysis. This integrated approach has 
enabled the investigation of local level supply and demand for a potential PES scheme, 
while embedding them into the broader distributional and PES context, emphasising 
scheme opportunities and challenges. Data was collected using focus groups, semi-
structured interviews, community mapping, and household surveys, as well as using 
secondary data. The use of a mixed-methods approach throughout the thesis has 
contributed to the robustness and validity of results through triangulation of data sources 
and gathering in-depth data to deepen the understanding of the research issues. 
 
While assessing the stated WTP of beneficiaries for improved drinking water quality 
through a contingent valuation method, chapter 4 shows that there is affordability and a 
substantial WTP for clean drinking water at the study site. However, some of the poorest 
households are already paying above the affordability threshold for water and if it were 
increased, 11% of households would not be able to cope. The benefits reflected in the WTP 
are distributed as a function of respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics, spatial location, 
and environmental awareness. The wide range of factors reported in the literature and 
results of this study indicate that case by case analysis is needed when trying to understand 
benefit distribution due to highly context-specific determinants.  
 
The assessment of a revealed WTP for improved drinking water quality through averting 
behaviour and illness damage costs methods (chapter 5) shows that there is WTP for clean 
drinking water through avoiding or dealing with contaminated water. If water bills were 
increased by the revealed WTP, approximately 20% of households would not be able to 
afford water bills. Users’ benefits from the revealed WTP were found to be distributed as a 
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function of their health risk awareness, perceptions and socioeconomic characteristics. 
Informing the design of a potential PES scheme through a revealed WTP provides a 
different distribution of benefits from a stated WTP, as it is based on actual market 
expenditure. The researcher is not aware of any other study using a revealed WTP to 
inform the demand-side of PES scheme contracting. 
 
The two WTP measures obtained for improving drinking water quality (chapters 4 and 5) 
showed no correlation. The non-correlation could be due to many reasons, including 
context-dependent preferences for each approach, the stated and revealed WTP values are 
not measures of the same construct, or one or both estimates are biased. However, the 
finding that the mean stated WTP was significantly less than the mean revealed WTP makes 
the bias argument unlikely. Other reasons for under-valuation of ecosystem services can 
include imperfect information (in chapter 4 some respondents wanted to decide WTP in a 
community setting, and in chapter 5 the imperfect awareness and information on averting 
behaviour and water contamination), and insecure land tenure (chapter 4 for water 
sources). The revealed and stated approaches are conceptually similar based on the utility 
preference theory, but they are contextually different being based on different market 
scenarios. 
 
The cost of water conservation was determined through both flow and rent opportunity 
cost methods (chapter 6). An overall flow net return of US$ 1,410 ha-1 was obtained, with 
coffee and crops exhibiting the highest opportunity costs, followed by cattle and forest use. 
However, due to the spread of the data and the losses reported, the median positive 
returns without coffee (flow+ woc), US$ 140, are used as more stable and realistic values, 
which are correlated to the median rent values. Identifying a reliable, sufficiently accurate 
and cost-effective method to determine opportunity costs has always been challenging and 
complex, but the two methods employed at the study site provided valid estimates. The 
flow approach seems to be particularly appropriate for areas where opportunity cost 
heterogeneity is a key issue for conservation strategies, such as PES schemes. The rent 
approach seems to be an inexpensive and quick way of obtaining an overall estimate to 
inform conservation policy more widely. Two main concerns arose for contracting providers 
in a PES scheme at the study site, the duality of providers being beneficiaries and the 
2
6
0
 
 
204 
 
                                                                                    
 
challenges of monitoring set-aside land. Furthermore, landholder net returns showed 
correlation with coffee and crops, number of plots used, and number of land uses. Land 
uses were associated to particular land attributes that allowed distributing opportunity 
costs across the watershed. The results evidence that contracting is best aimed at high 
environmental impact land uses and mid- to low-value agriculture. The high value of coffee 
and other attributes indicate that a PES scheme probably will not provide enough incentive 
for coffee growers to engage in water conservation, but sustainable coffee schemes should 
be promoted to encourage income growth in the area.  
  
Based on the findings of this study it was concluded that the WTP for improved drinking 
water quality is not sufficient to compensate the opportunity costs of landholders. The 
stated WTP would only cover 6% of the estimated (flow+ woc) cost of the water 
conservation and the revealed WTP could cover up to 10%. Thus, a user-based scheme at 
the study site seems highly unfeasible. Furthermore, this study identifies several factors 
that affect and could help address distributional issues for PES scheme contracting at the 
study site, and beyond. The findings are of particular relevance to developing country areas 
where small community water systems and uncertain water quality prevail (see section 3.2).  
 
First, the upstream-downstream externality framework for water was found to be more 
complex than previously reported. Hydrological services can also be omni-directional at a 
local level, as the water service at the study site revealed. There can also be an 
asymmetrical benefit distribution between large (downstream) and small communities 
(mostly upstream) and based on the distance from water sources. Thus, the local benefit 
estimates reported in this thesis not only provide the economic value of the ecosystem 
service, but uncover the inequity and disconnection of benefits across the watershed. 
Second, peoples’ perceptions determine the values and preferences, and their health 
behaviour. At the study site these perceptions were based on incomplete information or 
misinformation. Thus, it is important to enhance people’s health risk awareness, 
particularly in areas where demand for improvements is low due to long-standing 
contamination, as is common in developing countries. Third, the feasibility of a PES scheme 
is likely to be influenced by the local socio-institutional context. The study site’s water 
governance was characterised by disconnected water governance through independent 
community water boards. One way of improving water management and conservation is to 
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create an association of water boards. Nevertheless, a combined approach to water 
governance involving local water boards, the NGO managing the Reserve and the 
municipalities, as proposed in the PES scheme scenario (chapter 4), would be most 
effective at achieving water conservation in the study site.  
 
It is obvious that a stand-alone user-based PES scheme at the study site is out of the 
question. Water conservation at the study site is more likely to be possible if substantial 
external support is obtained for a third party-based scheme or a different kind of scheme is 
considered, such as a sustainable land management-based (SLM) one. SLM-based schemes 
may provide a pragmatic solution that helps to balance providers’ costs and beneficiaries’ 
benefits by providing providers with incentives to implement sustainable land practices 
(covering some of their opportunity costs) and thus improving drinking water for 
beneficiaries.  
 
8.2 Limitations and Further Research  
While assessing distributional issues in PES scheme contracting is crucial, this research 
highlights that these schemes need to consider other important contracting aspects such as 
efficiency and effectiveness, and their interaction with equity. More generally, the focus of 
this thesis is water conservation through a land set-aside PES scheme. It is important to 
acknowledge that other types of PES schemes exist and are implemented with success, as 
well as other policy approaches to water conservation. 
 
This study had specific reasons to employ the selected methods to determine the cost and 
benefit distribution of improving drinking water quality. The mixed-methods approach used 
in this study does not preclude the use of other, perhaps more novel approaches, such as 
using procurement PES auctions to determine landholders true opportunity costs (Ferraro, 
2004) or deliberative valuations to obtain social values (Kenter et al., 2011). This study 
found that a sustainable land management-based PES scheme (SLM) is more feasible for 
the study site. An interesting step forward in research would be to carry out a procurement 
PES auction to contract providers in a SLM PES scheme for water conservation. 
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Research also needs to look at how the implications suggested in this study fit into the 
wider conservation and development arena. For example, this study highlighted the 
potential of informing PES scheme WTP through revealed preference approaches, 
considering that they are contextually different from stated preference approaches being 
based on different market scenarios where respondents might have different preferences 
and hidden joint preferences. More research is needed with different case studies to 
determine if this method is reliable to inform WTP. Furthermore, the correlation of the 
rents approach to the flow approach to determine opportunity costs indicates that the 
former could be an inexpensive and straightforward method of determining opportunity 
costs. This is another issue that requires further research due to the complexity involved in 
estimating opportunity costs. 
 
Finally, to draw together detailed insights into the cost and benefit distribution of 
improving drinking water quality to inform PES scheme contracting, this research has 
focused at the local scale on small communities in a rural developing country setting. In 
order to draw more general lessons to scale up conclusions on distributional issues and PES 
scheme contracting, a broader range of comparable, in-depth case studies in diverse 
settings and at different stages of development, as well as broader scale studies, would be 
required.  Specifically, much more research is needed on the distribution of both costs and 
benefits of ecosystem services enhanced by the use of spatial tools that highlight 
geographical distributional issues for local stakeholders that can make local planners’ 
conservation efforts more effective.  
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Appendix 1 Photographs of study site landscape and forest type 
 
 
a) Landscape near El Portillo community at approx. 2,100 m showing forest and 
agricultural plots. 
 
b) View of local inhabitant walking through subtropical humid forest type near La 
Granadilla community. 
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Appendix 2 Photographs of community water source infrastructures 
 
 
a) El Portillo water source consisting of a bucket and plastic pipes. 
 
 
b) Santa Cruz community well. 
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c) Open air dam-style water source of Llano Largo community. 
 
 
d) Closed box-style water source of La Labor community, with overflow at left-hand side. 
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e) La Granadilla community box-style water source with stone filter covered by 
sack cloth. 
 
 
f) Las Flores community water tank located near the international highway. 
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Appendix 3 Photographs of main land uses at the study site 
 
 
a) Coffee plantation near La Ruda community. 
 
b) Young corn plantation near Las Flores community. 
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c) Young workers harvesting carrots near La Granadilla community. 
 
 
d) Cabbage plantation near Rio Chiquito community. 
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e) Cattle ranching near La Granadilla community. 
 
 
f) Harvested firewood at a house of the Rio Chiquito community. 
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Appendix 4 Focus group invitation  
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Appendix 5 Three lists of participants for the focus groups 
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Appendix 6 Focus group questions and information, English 
translation 
 
(PP indicates a PowerPoint slide needs to be shown and M indicates a map needs to 
be shown) 
Section A. Environmental Perceptions  
A1. In your opinion, what is the purpose of a protected area?  
A2. Did you know that you live within/close to the Güisayote Biological Reserve? 
(PP: show map of protected area and location of communities) 
A3.In your opinion, do the households in your community receive any benefit or 
damage from the existence of the Güisayote Biological Reserve? Which one(s)?  
A4. Did you know that the El Idolo, El Chupadero and El Potrero rivers originate in 
the Güisayote Biological Reserve?  (PP: show map of protected area and location of 
rivers)  
A5. How would you describe the area that surrounds the El Idolo, El Chupadero and 
El Potrero rivers? 
A6. In your opinion and in order of priority, which are the most important 
environmental problems in the area surrounding the El Idolo, El Chupadero and El 
Potrero rivers? These three rivers and their surrounding areas are within the 
Güisayote Biological Reserve, which means that they should be protected. Why do 
you think that environmental problems, like those you mentioned, persist?  
A7. What drinking water sources do you use in your community, mention them in 
order according to use? Does use vary with the seasons?  
A8. Who owns your community water source?  (Map on A4 paper handed out to a 
representative of each waterboard (M): participants are asked to locate landowners 
on map) How much time do you invest to obtain drinking water for your household 
and what treatment do you give it? (collection, maintenance and treatment) 
A9. Do you think that the drinking water used by your community is contaminated?  
How do you know? (taste, colour, odour, waste/debris) Which are the main 
contamination sources of your drinking water? 
M: Participants are asked to locate water sources on map. 
A10. What are the effects caused by the contaminated drinking water in your 
community? (less biodiversity, more work for water, illness, work days lost, 
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expenses, visits to the clinic). What obstacles keep your household from getting 
water of better quality? 
A11. Do you consider that drinking water supply in your household is fair? Please 
explain. 
A12. Do you think that all the community should have equal access to drinking 
water or should it be according to the needs of each household? Why? 
A13. In your opinion, how can the water quality of the El Idolo, El Chupadero and El 
Potrero rivers be improved? What conflicts has your household and community had 
to obtain drinking water? Please describe. 
Section B. Study Site Description 
Now I am going to describe the area surrounding the El Idolo, El Chupadero and El 
Potrero rivers, please tell me if I am mistaken or if anything is missing.  
These three rivers originate in the core zone of the Güisayote Biological Reserve 
and extend towards La Labor community where they form the Tilo river. The area of 
these three rivers covers almost 5,000 hectares and is characterised for having rain 
forest in its upper part. These watersheds are formed by a network of rivers and 
streams that benefit 15 communities: La Labor, Llano Largo, Santa Lucia, Cerro 
Grande, El Ingenio, El Portillo, La Granadilla, Rio Chiquito, La Ruda, Santa Efigenia, 
Montepeque, El Azufrado, Nueva San Antonio, Los Amates y Santa Cruz, for a total 
of 7,000 inhabitants.  
Generally, communities obtain water through pipes connected to a collection box, a 
small dam, a sand remover, a tank and a chlorinator. 
Other means of obtaining water include hoses coming directly from a spring or river, 
a well, collection from a river or rainwater, purchase of bottled water or in 
wholesale. 
Currently, the land round these rivers is used for different activities, mainly 
agriculture, like potato, cabbage, coffee and corn, as well as cattle ranching. The 
rivers and streams are used as wáter sources for human consumption, animal 
consumption, subsistence fisheries and material extraction (e.g. chalk).  
It has been observed that these rivers are contaminated by chemicals used in 
agriculture, human faeces, animal faeces and agriculture residue. Thus, the water is 
contaminated and is under the national water quality standards for drinking water. 
The government hasn’t been able to solve this problem and this causes 
gastrointestinal and skin illnesses.  
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Section C. Proposed Scenario 
We are proposing to solve the problem of water contamination through a Payment 
for Ecosystem Services (PES) Scheme. An ecosystem service is any benefit that we 
get from the environment, like water, biodiversity, fresh air and timber. 
C1. Had you previously heard about Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes?  
PP of PES: In a Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme there are beneficiaries of 
the service and providers of the service. There is an activity of activities affecting 
the quality or quantity of the service. So, the beneficiaries can offer a payment to 
providers with the aim of changing or completely halting the activities that affect 
the service.  
The payment is possible when both parties agree to participate voluntarily. This 
type of Project is being implemented in different parts of the world, including 
Honduras, for several environmental services, both in cities and in rural areas. 
With the aim of improving the water quality of the Idolo, Chupadero and Potrero 
rivers, we are proposing a Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme. We will carry 
out this survey to find out if this scheme would be valued by your household if 
implemented. This is how it would work: 
The Municipality would charge residents an additional amount on top of the 
current water bill and would use the money to pay upstream landowners that are 
affecting the quality of the water you receive. The payment would serve to buy land 
off those willing to sell and to pay others to stop carrying out activities that 
contaminate the water. This amount would be payed by all residents that use water 
from the Idolo, Chupadero and Potrero rivers. The Municipality and AESMO would 
ensure that upstream landowners comply with the Project through periodic 
monitoring of the area by park guards.  
This Project would be voluntary for both parties: beneficiaries and providers; and 
would be implemented after careful negotiations and signing of contracts. 
C2. What do you think of the project I have described?  
Do you think that the Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme would be fair? Why? 
As the majority of people that use the water in this area will have to cover the cost 
of the payment for ecosystem services, we are using this survey to ask you if you 
would accept to pay if you had the chance. We have found that some people would 
be in favour of it and others against it. 
Sometimes people say they are in favour of the scheme in order to please the 
interviewer or for some other reason, but they can’t really afford it. Some people 
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are against the payment because they need the money for other things that are 
more important to them, like clothes or food. And some people say that the money 
they would have to pay is more than they can pay. Before answering, please think 
carefully about your financial capacity. No answer is right or wrong and I don’t have 
a preference for any answer. I remind you that you can obtain drinking water from 
other sources, such as bottled water. 
This payment for ecosystem services scheme proposal is not real at this moment. 
No one is paying money at the end of this survey. However, I ask you to answer the 
following questions as if the result would involve a real monetary payment from 
you. Please, only agree to pay according to what you can afford to pay. This 
payment will ensure that your home and the rest of the communities receive clean 
drinking water quality all the time. For the payment to be implemented it is 
necessary that 80% of water users agree to pay.  
Section D. Willingness to Pay 
D1. Would you vote in favour of this payment for ecosystem services project if it 
were free? 
D2. Would you vote in favour of this payment for ecosystem services Project if it 
cost you 2 Lempiras per month? How much would you pay each month above your 
current water bill, to implement this PES project? (range)  
Section E: Socioeconomic Characteristics  
E1. What communities do not have electricity? (Even if it is only one house). 
E2. How do you measure the level of wealth of the different families in your 
community?  
(PP with options: monthly income, size of house, material of house, size of land 
plots, land uses, vehicles, electrical appliances- colour TV with cable connection, 
microwave, heated showers, maid, type of mobile phone, amount paid into mobile 
phone). 
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Appendix 7 Map used during Focus Groups  
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Appendix 8 Water board structured interview, English translation. 
 
A. Water board committee 
1. What member types are there in your water board committee? 
Member 
(Yes or No) 
Gender 
Education 
Level 
Works within/ outside 
community 
President 
 
 
  
Vice-president 
 
 
  
Secretary 
 
 
  
Treasurer 
 
 
  
Treasurer controller/ 
assistant 
 
 
  
Substitute member I, II, III 
 
 
  
Other 
 
 
  
 
Member 
 
Very rich, rich, 
middle, low 
Community 
leadership: high, 
medium, low, none 
Past or present 
training/ relevant 
experience  
President 
 
 
  
Vice-president 
 
 
  
Secretary 
 
 
  
Treasurer 
 
 
  
Treasurer 
controller/ 
assistant 
 
 
  
Substitute 
member I, II, 
III 
 
 
  
Other 
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2. Do you have any support committees in the following areas:  
Operation and maintenance, sanitation and user education, micro-watersheds, 
other  
3. Do you have a full-time plumber? (describe arrangement) 
4. What experience and training does the plumber have? 
B. Operational and organizational activities 
5. How do you elect the plumber? 
6. How often does the committee meet? 
7. What are the rules for assigning responsibilities among the different committee 
members? 
8. What are the rules to expel a committee member? 
9. How often do the support committees meet? 
Operation and maintenance, sanitation and user education, micro-watersheds, 
other 
10. What are the rules to gain access to the water system for the first time? (water 
connection) 
11. Is there a clearly established place, day and payment method for users to pay? 
12. Do you have an up-to-date list of beneficiaries? How many beneficiaries are 
there? 
13. What are the water consumption rules? (wasting) 
14. What is considered a delay in payment by users? 
15. What sanctions exist for delays in payment? (fines, cut-offs) 
16. Do you have an up-to-date register of fines and delays?  
17. How do you ensure that water is not used for irrigation and animals? 
18. If an irrigation  project exists, what are the usage rules? 
19. How do you get the community to participate in water board activities?  
20. What rules exist for the maintenance, repairs and protection of the wáter 
system? 
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C. Participation and Accounting Mechanisms 
21. How often do you have general assembly meetings of users?  
22. What percentage of the population attends user meetings?  
23. How are the water board committee members elected? (assembly 
voting/selective) 
24. How often do you have water board elections?  
25. What percentage of the population participates in elections?  
26.  Do you have an up-to-date budget for the water board? 
27. Does the water board present annual reports to water users? Are they 
publically audited?  
D. Financial Sustainability 
28. With what funds was the current water system built? 
Community, donor, central government, local government 
29. Who is considered the owner of the water system?  
30. What is the basis for defining the connection and water price? (including 
irrigation) 
31. How much do you charge for the household and irrigation water, if any? 
32. Do you manage to cover all maintenance and repair costs for the water system 
with what you charge or do you have to ask for extra payments when something 
arises? 
33. Do you have money to invest in improving the water system and other 
community needs? 
34. What percentage of the population pays regularly/on time?  
E. Ecological Sustainability  
35. What rules exist for the maintenance and protection of the natural areas 
surrounding your water source? 
36. How has water quality varied in the past? How is it now? 
37. How do you monitor water quality? (testing?) 
38.  How has water quantity varied in the past? How is it now? 
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39. What ecological and human factors are affecting the water? 
F. Networks and Links 
40. Do you have links with: (describe) central or local government, NGOs, donors 
41. Is there any other organization or group doing water-related work in your 
community? 
42. What objectives are the water board lacking in order to provide a good and 
complete water service? 
G. Water Source and System 
43. When was the current water system established?  
44. Was there another water system before the current one? 
45. How long does it take to get to the water source from the community? Is 
Access easy or difficult? 
46. At what elevation are the water source, the tank and the community? 
47. What kind of infrastructure do you have at the water source? (dam or box, 
filter, fencing, piping) 
48. How old is the water source infrastructure? 
49. What is the condition of the water source infrastructure?  
Very good, good, average, bad, very bad 
50. What type of infrastructure is there between the water source and the 
community? (type of piping, under or aboveground, size of tank, connections) 
51. What is the condition of the pipes? Very good, good, average, bad, very bad 
52. What is the condition of the tank? Very good, good, average, bad, very bad 
53. How often is the tank cleaned? Who does it and how? 
54. How often do you add chlorine to water in the tank and in what quantities? 
H. Final Evaluation 
55. Are the water board rules formal or informal? 
56. Comments? 
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Appendix 9 Sample size formula following Yamane (1967) 
 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
𝑁
1 + 𝑁(𝑒)2
 
 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
1545
1 +  1545 (0.05)2
= 317.74 
 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 = (318 ∗ 30%) + 318 = 413 
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Appendix 10 Survey including contingent valuation, averting 
behaviour and damage costs 
 
Note: bold text, except titles, is emphasised; italic text is not read, it is instructions 
to the interviewer 
Code  __________   Date of Interview  ________________  Interviewer _________ 
Community ________ Gender _____ Start time ________ End time  ____________ 
 
Section A. Perceptions about the Protected Area  
A1. Did you know about the existence of the Güisayote Biological Reserve here in 
the area? 
1   Yes          2   No (go to A6)     
 
A2. Is your community inside or outside the Güisayote Biological Reserve? (Write 
answer and circle the option that applies) _______ 1  Yes                2 No            3   
Does not know 
  
A3. In your opinion, what benefits does your community obtain from the Güisayote 
Biological Reserve?  
(Circle all options mentioned, but do not suggest answers) 
1   Water 
2   Fresh air/good climate                                        
3   Less deforestation/protection of forest or plants         
4   Conservation of animals 
5   Visitors to the Reserve 
6   Telephone services 
7   Vegetable crops/ other crops 
8   Does not know                                                            
9   Other (Write) _______________ 
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A4. Has your community experienced any damage or negative effect from the 
existence of the Güisayote Biological Reserve?         1   Yes             2   No (go to A6)                          
 
A5. What damage or negative effect has your community experienced from the 
existence of the Reserve?   1   We are not allowed to extract firewood              2   
None 
 
A6. What do you think about the work carried out by the Asociación Ecológica San 
Marcos de Ocotepeque – AESMO – managing the Reserve?  (Read options and circle 
one)    
1  Excellent        2   Good         3   Average        4   Bad         5   Does not know AESMO 
(go to A9) 
 
A7. In your opinion, what could AESMO do to improve the management of the 
Reserve? ____________________________________________________________ 
 
A8. Have you attended any meeting or event organised by AESMO in the last year? 
1   Yes       2   No                   
 
A9. Do you know the land that AESMO bought in the Reserve and that are now 
registered to the municipalities of La Labor and Sinuapa? (if they know a part, it is 
equal to a yes) 
1   Yes                 2   I have only heard of them                  3   No                   
 
A10. Did you know that all the water sources of the La Labor municipality, including 
your community’s, originate in the Reserve?  1   Yes                    2   Some, not all                    
3   No        
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CARD 1. Map of the study site (show part of the Güisayote Biological Reserve in green, international highway, location of the interviewee’s 
community; mention that La Labor and all the communities upwards to El Portillo, and Santa Cruz and Los Amates, totalling 15 communities 
shown by the yellow dots, are all the communities that we are including in this study). 
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A11. In your opinion, what is the most serious environmental problem in the study 
site that I have just shown you? (Read options 1 - 5 and circle one; most serious 
refers to the problem with the greatest impact on humans and thus needs attention)    
1   Agrochemicals                                       4   Human faeces        
2   Rubbish/litter                                         5   None (go to section B)     
3   Deforestation (any forest loss)              6   Does not know (go to Section B) 
                                                                    7   Other ____________________ 
 
A12. Ahora, en su opinión, cuál es el segundo problema ambiental más grave en la 
zona que le acabo de mostrar? (leer opciones 1-5 y circular una; no leer respuesta 
de A11)  
1   Agrochemicals                                         4    Human faeces                
2   Rubbish/litter                                           5    None    
3   Deforestation (any forest loss)                6   Does not know 
                                                                      7   Other_________________ 
 
Section B. Perceptions and Current Water Use 
B1. What water sources do you use for all your household activities? (Read options 
and circle those mentioned by respondent; sources used for drinking, washing, 
bathing, watering garden, toilets, etc.) 
1   Piped system                                       2   Hose               3   Bottled water 
4   Neighbour’s connection                    5   Well               6   Other_____________ 
 
B2. What water sources do you use in your house to drink? (Only read the options 
selected in the previous question and circle those mentioned by the respondent) 
1   Piped system                                      2   Hose               3   Bottled water 
4   Neighbour’s connection                  5   Well                6   Other ___________ 
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[If piped system is used:] 
B3. How much do you normally pay for the piped water? (Ask if he/she pays 
monthly or annually; what is paid for the actual service, excluding loans and initial 
connection) 
1 ____Lps/month    2 ____Lps/year    3 Does not pay       4 Does not know or 
remember 
 
B4. Have you noticed any difference in the piped water between summer and 
winter?  
(Circle those mentioned) 
1   Scarcity/ less water in the summer 
2   Dirty water in the winter (any dirt) 
3.  System gets obstructed or breaks in the winter 
4   None 
 
B5. In the last year, have you participated in maintenance activities of the piped 
system when you are asked? (de cualquier forma) 
1   Yes                         2   No (go to B8)                        3   Has not been called (go to B8) 
 
B6. How do you participate in the maintenance activities when you are called?  
(Read options and circle those mentioned) 
1   Pays monetary requests by the water board (includes paying the plumber)  
2   Sends someone of the house or a relative 
3   Pays labourers 
4   Personally carries out the activities 
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B7. How often do you participate in the maintenance activities when you are called? 
(Read options and circle one)  
1   Always                     2   Almost always             3   Occasionally              4   Rarely                            
 
B8. What do you think about the work of your water board? (Read options and 
circle one; it refers to the committee of the water board) 
1   Excellent         2   Good          3   Average            4   Bad      
 
B9.What could the water board do to improve their work? (the committee) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
B10. How many water board meetings have you or someone from your house, 
attended in the last year? (Read options and circle one) 
1   All               2   Some             3   Few           4   None        5   There are no meetings      
 
B11. Have you ever been delayed in paying for the piped water?  
1   Yes                          2   No (go to B13)                      3   Does not pay (go to B13)                    
 
B12. Are you currently up-to-date with your water bills?              1 Yes             2   No                                              
 
B13. Have/are you or a relative in the water board? (Circle those mentioned) 
1   I was              2   I am               3   Relative was            4   Relative is               5   None 
 
B14. Do you think the piped water is contaminated?  
1   Yes            2   No (go to next source or B51)      3   Does not know (go to next 
source or B51) 
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B15. How do you know the piped water is contaminated?  
(Circle those mentioned) 
1   Water test results  
2   Someone told her/him (or heard) 
3   Colour or something visible in the water 
4   Odour or taste of the water 
5   Sees or knows about the contamination near the water source 
6   Does not know  
7   Other__________________________ 
 
B16. What type of contamination do you think is in the piped water?  
(Circle those mentioned)                                     
1   Agrochemicals                             
2   Human faeces                 
3   Animal faeces                                         
4   Dirt of any kind (mud, leaves, Little animals, etc.) 
5   Does not know      
 
B17. In your opinion, how can the water quality of the piped water be improved?  
______________________________________________ (go to next source or B51) 
 
[If hose is used:] 
B18. Besides this house, with how many houses do you share the hose?__________ 
 
B19. Have you noticed any difference in the hose water between summer and 
winter?  
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1   Scarcity or less water in the summer 
2   Dirty water in the winter (any dirt) 
3.  System gets obstructed or breaks in winter 
4   None 
 
B20. Do you or someone from your house , carry out maintenance activities for the 
hose supply? (it refers to the source and the hose)        1   Yes           2   No (go to B22) 
 
B21. How often do you or someone from your house carry out maintenance 
activities of the hose supply?_________ 
 
B22. Do you think the hose water is contaminated?  
1 Yes    2 No (go to next source or B51)      3 Does not know (go to next source or B51) 
 
B23. How do you know that the hose water is contaminated?  
(Circle those mentioned) 
1   Water test results 
2   Someone told her/him (or heard about it) 
3   Colour or something visible in the water  
4   Odour or taste of water 
5   Sees or knows about the contamination near water sources 
6   Does not know 
7   Other ________________ 
 
B24. What do you think is the type of contamination in the hose water?  
(Circle those mentioned)                                     
1   Agrochemicals                           
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2   Human faeces                 
3   Animal faeces                                         
4   Dirt of any kind (mud, leaves, Little animals, etc.) 
5   Does not know      
 
B25. In your opinion, how can the quality of the hose water be improved?  
_____________________________________________ (go to next source or B51) 
 
[if bottled water is used:] 
B26. How much do you pay for the bottled water you purchase?    ___Lps (per unit)             
 
B27. What size is the container of bottled water you purchase?  
1   Five gallon container                             2   Other __________________________ 
 
B28. How many five gallon containers (or other) do you buy per month? ________ 
 
B29. If you have to travel outside your community to buy bottled water, how long 
does it take you in total?   
1 ____minutes        2 Does not travel outside community (go to next source or B57) 
 
[If neighbour’s water is used:] 
B30. Have you noticed any difference in the neighbour’s water between summer 
and winter? 
1   Scarcity or less water in the summer 
2   Dirty water in the winter (due to any substance) 
3.  System gets blocked or breaks in the winter 
4   None                                                                              
2
6
0
 
 
266 
 
                                                                                    
 
B31. Do you think the neighbour’s water is contaminated?  
1 Yes    2 No (go to next source or B51)    3 Does not know (go to next source or B51) 
 
B32. How do you know the neighbour’s water is contaminated? (Circle those 
mentioned) 
1   Water test results 
2   Someone told her/him (or heard about it) 
3   Colour or something visible in the water  
4   Odour or taste of water 
5   Sees or knows about the contamination near water sources 
6   Does not know 
7   Other ________________ 
 
B33. What do you think is the type of contamination in the neighbour’s water?  
(Circle those mentioned)                                     
1   Agrochemicals                           
2   Human faeces                 
3   Animal faeces                                         
4   Dirt of any kind (mud, leaves, little animals, etc.) 
5   Does not know      
 
B34. In your opinion, how can the quality of the neighbour’s water be improved?  
_______________________________________________ (go to next source or B51) 
 
 [If well water is used:] 
B35. Besides this house, with how many houses do you share the well water? _____ 
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B36. Have you noticed any difference in the well water between summer and 
winter?  
1   Scarcity or less water in the summer 
2   Dirty water in the winter (any dirt) 
3.  System gets obstructed or breaks in winter 
4   None 
 
B37. If you have to travel outside your community for well water, how long does it 
take in total?              1   ____ minutes        2   Well in community  
 
B38. Do you or someone in your household carry out well maintenance activities?  
1   Yes                       2   No (go to B40) 
 
B39. How often do you or someone in your household carry out the well 
maintenance activities? _________________ 
 
B40. Do you think the well water is contaminated?  
1 Yes     2 No (go to next source or B51)    3 Does not know (go to next source or B51) 
 
B41. How do you know that the well water is contaminated? (Circle those 
mentioned) 
1   Water test results 
2   Someone told her/him (or heard about it) 
3   Colour or something visible in the water  
4   Odour or taste of water 
5   Sees or knows about the contamination near water sources 
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6   Does not know 
7   Other ________________ 
 
B42. What do you think is the type of contamination in the well water?  
(Circle those mentioned)                                     
1   Agrochemicals                           
2   Human faeces                 
3   Animal faeces                                         
4   Dirt of any kind (mud, leaves, little animals, etc.) 
5   Does not know      
 
B43. In your opinion, how can the quality of the well water be improved?  
______________________________________________ (go to next source or B51) 
 
[If another source is used:] 
B44. Besides this house, with how many houses do you share the other source? ___ 
 
B45. Have you noticed any difference in the other source’s water between summer 
and winter?  
1   Scarcity or less water in the summer 
2   Dirty water in the winter (any dirt) 
3.  System gets obstructed or breaks in winter 
4   None  
 
B46. If you have to travel outside your community for the other source’s water, 
how long does it take in total?  1 ___ min.     2 Does not travel outside community 
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B47. Do you think the other source’s water is contaminated?  
1   Yes                         2   No (go to B51)                        3   Does not know (go to B51) 
 
B48. How do you know that the other source’s water is contaminated? (Circle those 
mentioned) 
1   Water test results 
2   Someone told her/him (or heard about it) 
3   Colour or something visible in the water  
4   Odour or taste of water 
5   Sees or knows about the contamination near water sources 
6   Does not know 
7   Other ________________ 
 
B49. What do you think is the type of contamination in the other source’s water?  
(Circle those mentioned)                                     
1   Agrochemicals                           
2   Human faeces                 
3   Animal faeces                                         
4   Dirt of any kind (mud, leaves, little animals, etc.) 
5   Does not know 
     
B50. In your opinion, how can the quality of the other source’s water be improved? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
[All, except if they only drink bottled water:] 
B51. Which of the following drinking water treatments do you use at home?  
(Read options 1, 3, and 4, and circle those mentioned) 
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1   Boils it for the whole family 
2   Boils it only for the children  
3   Adds chlorine  
4   None (go to B57) 
 
[If water is boiled:] 
B52. How often do you boil drinking water? (Read options and circle one) 
1   Always               2   Almost always              3   Occasionally             4   Rarely 
 
B53. Normally, for how long do you boil the drinking water?    
1 __Min.   2 Does not know  
 
B54. What fuel do you use the most to boil drinking water? (Read options and circle 
one) 
1   Firewood             2   Electricity               3   Gas           (go to next treatment or B57) 
 
[If chlorine is added:] 
B55. How often do you add chlorine to drinking water? (Read options and circle one) 
1   Always                    2   Almost always                  3   Occasionally                    4   Rarely 
 
B56. How much do you pay for the chlorine your household uses in a month?  
___ Lps    (If needed, calculate total based on monthly use and unit price)  
 
[All:] 
B57. How many cases of stomach pain, diarrhoea or vomit have thre been in your 
household in the last six months? (if they associate illness to food, do not include; if 
the patient was a child, ask if any adult lost work days to look after the child, 
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indicate with “A”; calculate expenses to doctor or health clinic by considering the 
total number of visits; “M”= shared transport; “?” =does not know). 
Stomach 
pain, 
diarrhoea, 
vomit  
Age 
Lost work 
days (or of 
carer = A) 
Expenses for 
health clinic 
and doctor 
visits, plus 
transport 
Expenses 
for hospital 
stay 
Expenses for 
medicines and 
transport to buy 
them  
 
 
     
 
B58. Which of the following do you have (Read options 1, 3, and 5; then as kif inside 
or outside and circle those mentioned): 
1   Flushable toilet (inside the house)    
2   Flushable toilet (outside the house)    
3   Latrine (inside the house)    
4   Latrine (outside the house)    
5   None 
 
B59. How often do you urinate or defecate out in the open? (Read options and 
circle one) 
1   Always          2   Almost always        3   Occasionally        4   Rarely     5   Never 
 
Section C. Description of the Area and the Water Problem 
Allow the interviewee time to think between text segments and cards, and ensure 
the interviewee understands the information given. 
Now I will tell you a Little about the area covered in this study. Maybe you know 
something or everything of what I am about to tell you but we need to ensure that 
everyone being interviewed has the same information for this survey.
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CARD 2. Map used to describe the study area (Show the green area representing the Güisayote Biological Reserve, the main road, the location 
of interviewee’s community, reinforce the area included in this study). The rivers and streams, the blue lines, originate in the Reserve and 
extend towards La Labor where they form the Tilo River. These rivers and streams supply water to 15 communities with 7,000 inhabitants and 
their animals; and they also are used for the extraction of materials, such as sand and stone. 
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Generally, the communities obtain water through a small dam or collection box at 
the water source, then the water is transported through piping to a tank where it 
might be chlorinated and then it finally reaches the houses by taps.  
CARD 3. Photos of the water systems (as you read the above, show images). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other means of obtaining water in this area include hoses to a source, wells or 
bottled water. 
Currently, different activities are carried out in this area, mainly agriculture – such 
as cabbage, potato, coffee, beans and maize – as well as cattle ranching.  
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CARD 4. Main activities of this study area (Read the above and show images). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experts and community representatives think that the water sources are 
contaminated by chemicals used in agriculture, and by human and animal faeces. 
Several water tests carried out to water sources in the area have reported 
contaminated water. The Health Department has registered people with intestinal 
parasites and diarrhoeas in several communities.  
We are proposing to solve the problem of water contamination through a payment 
for ecosystem services. The idea behind a payment for ecosystem services is to 
give farmers a payment so that they do not contaminate, and for them to look after 
the area that is important for water conservation. This money would come from the 
families that would benefit from the improved drinking water quality. Your family 
could be one of the families that benefits. 
C1. Had you previously heard about payments for ecosystem services?     
1  Yes             2   No  
 
Section D. Scenario 
With the aim of improving water quality in this area, a payment for ecosystem 
services is being proposed; this is how it would work:  
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The water board of each community would charge a monthly amount to all those 
that benefit from the water in this area. The families that are connected to the 
piped system would pay this increase of money above their current water bill. This 
money would be used for two things: to buy land or top provide a monthly 
payment to upstream landowners that are affecting water quality. This amount 
would be paid by all those who benefit from the water in this area. The water 
boards and AESMO, with the support of the municipality, would frequently monitor 
the area to ensure that those landowners who are receiving a payment comply with 
water conservation. This payment would be approved after careful negotiations 
and signing of contracts (pause).  
 
D1. Do you have any question about the payment for ecosystem services that I have 
just explained to you? (Write and answer any questions or misunderstandings about 
the PES) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
D2. After what I have explained to you, do you think that the PES is important for 
this area? (Why do you think it is [not] important?) 
1   Important because _________2   Not important because _______   3   Not sure 
 
Since the majority of people that use the water in this area will have to pay for the 
PES, we are using this survey to ask you if you would accept to pay if you had the 
opportunity. We have found that some people would be in favour of the payment 
and some would be against it.  
Sometimes people say they are in favour just to please the interviewer o for some 
other reason, but they cannot really afford it. Some are against the payment 
because they need the money for other things that are more important to them, 
such as food and clothes. And some say that the money they would have to pay is 
more than they can afford. I ask that you answer thinking carefully about your 
economic capacity. No answer is right or wrong and I do not have a preference for 
an answer. I remind you that you can get water through other means, such as 
buying bottled water. 
This proposal of PES is not real at this moment. Nobody will pay money at the end 
of this survey. However, I ask you to answer the next questions as if the result 
would involve an actual payment for you. Please, only accept to pay according to 
what you could pay. This payment would ensure that your household and the rest 
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of the communities in this area receive better water quality all the time. For this 
payment to be implemented it is necessary that 80% of users accept to pay (Pause). 
 
Section E. Willingness to pay 
E1. If the implementation of this payment for ecosystem services to improve water 
quality would cost your household # Lempiras [increase on your water bill] every 
month, equal to # Lempiras per year, would you accept to pay?   
1    Yes                                  2   No (go to E3)                         3   Does not know (go to E3) 
   
Section F. Understanding and Motivation 
F1. Can you tell me why you answered the way you did (yes/no)? ____________ 
 
F2. How sure are you about your willingness to pay answer? (Read options and 
circle one)  1   Very sure             2   Half sure             3   Unsure              4   Very unsure 
 
F3. Do you or someone in your household, own land near a water source in this 
area? (source for human consumption)           1  Yes                             2   No                             
 
F4. Do you belong to any municipal or communal group? (If yes, ask groups and 
positions)    1   Yes;   Groups_______           Positions ________                       2   No 
 
Section G: Socioeconomic characteristics 
G1. How old are you? _________________ 
 
G2. How long have you lived in this area? _______ Years (confirm previous address) 
 
G3. What do you do for a living? (Circle those mentioned) 
1   Government employee                     
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2   Private employee                            
3   Owner of informal business (at home or on the road, small scale, occasional)                                               
4   Owner of formal business (shop, large scale, permanent)                                               
5   Owner of pulpería (Little community shop) 
6   Farmer                              
7  Labourer (temporal/occasional work for other, farming, building, driver, etc.)                            
8   Does not work (housekeeper, elderly, etc.)                           
9   Other ___________________ 
 
G4. What is your civil status? (Read options and circle one) 
1   Single (go to G6)        
2   Widow (go to G6)  
3   Separated (go to G6) 
4   Living together 
5   Married          
 
G5. What does your partner do for a living? (Circle those mentioned) 
1   Government employee                     
2   Private employee                            
3   Owner of informal business (at home or on the road, small scale, occasional)                                               
4   Owner of formal business (shop, large scale, permanent)                                               
5   Owner of pulpería (Little community shop) 
6   Farmer                              
7  Labourer (temporal/occasional work for other, farming, building, driver, etc.)                            
8   Does not work (housekeeper, elderly, etc.)                           
9   Other ___________________ 
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G6. What education level have you achieved? (Circle one) 
0. None                               1. < 6th grade                         2. 6th grade      
3.  Incomplete ciclo común (1 – 3 high school)            4. Ciclo común 
5. Incompleto diversifiedd (4 – 6 high school)              6. Diversified 
7. University 
 
G7. How many children under 15 years of age are there in your household?       
 1   Boys _____         2   Girls _____                                   
 
G8. How many adults are there in your household?   1   Women ___   2    Men ___ 
 
G9. Your house is: (Read options and circle one)     
1    Owned                                                       2    Rented         
3    Not owned (relatives or friends)           4    House watcher 
 
G10. How much land do you and your household own?  ____ manzanas                              
 
G11. Besides this house, how many houses and empty plots do you and your 
household own?                    1   ____ empty plots          2   ____ houses 
 
G12. How much did you pay in your last water bill?  
1   ___ Lempiras          2  Just connected ___ Lempiras (connection cost)                                   
3   Does not pay          4   No connection          5   Does not know/does not remember 
 
G13. How much did you pay in your last electricity bill?  
1 ____ Lempiras                  2   Just connected (no payment yet)              
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3   Uses neighbour’s             4   No connection (go to G15)         
5   Does not know/does not remember 
 
G14. If you have cable or satellite television, how much did you pay in your last bill?  
1 ___ Lempiras                    2   Just installed __ Lempiras (cost of installation)             
3   Not owned                       4  Does not know/does not remember 
 
G15. How many working cars does your household own?    
1   None (go to G17)                           2   Number of cars _________ 
 
G16. What year are your cars from?  ____________ 
 
G17. [If house is owned:] What is the value of your house?  
[If renting:] How much do you pay per month? 
1 House value   ___ Lempiras                    2 Rental Price  ___ Lempiras/ month    
3   House watcher/does not pay               4 Does not know/does not say 
 
Now, the last questions… 
G18. Considering all the people earning an income in your household, what is the 
household income before any expenditure? (wages, rentals, relatives, etc.). 
1 ___ Lps/month      2  ___ Lps/year     3   Does not know/does not say (go to G20) 
 
G19. How sure are you about the income just mentioned? (Read options and circle 
one)    1   Very sure               2   Half sure                 3   Unsure                 4   Very unsure 
 
G20. Do you owe money to any person or institution?           1   Yes                   2    No 
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G21. Do you have a phone number in case we need to contact you later on? ___ 
WELL, THE SURVEY HAS ENDED, THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION. 
GOOD DAY! (note end time and hand in information sheet) 
Section H. Interviewer Evaluation 
H1. How would you judge the overall quality of the survey? (Circle one) 
1   Excellent        2   Good          3   Average        4   Bad         5   Unsure/ difficult to say 
 
H2. Were there people listening in on the survey?   1   Yes, # _____             2   No 
 
H3. Did other people participate in the survey? 
1   Yes, household members; # _____                 
2   Yes, non-household people; # _____              
3   No (go to H5) 
 
H4. When did these other people participate?  
1   Throughout the survey          2   At the beginning                     3   At the end                                                       
4   Varied questions                    5   Willingness to pay                  6  Many questions 
7   Few questions 
 
H5. Do you think the interviewee thought carefully about the willingness to pay 
question and made an effort to provide truthful answers? Circle one. 
1  Definitely yes            2  Probably yes                      3  Unsure/ difficult to say 
4  Probably no               5  Definitely no                                                                                            
 
H6. Was the interviewee the head of the household?  1   Yes      2   No      3   Unsure 
 
H7. Add any comment about the survey ___________ 
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Appendix 11. Opportunity cost survey, Spanish version. 
 
Hoja Informativa/Consentimiento 
Buenos días/tardes, me llamo _____________ y estoy trabajando para la 
Universidad de Leeds de Inglaterra. Lo(a) estamos invitando a participar en una 
entrevista que busca conocer la práctica y los costos y beneficios de los diferentes 
usos del suelo en la zona de Güisayote.  
Sus respuestas y comentarios serán utilizados para la investigación académica y 
podrían ayudar a informar a las autoridades y organizaciones locales. Su opinión 
honesta es esencial para entender el uso del suelo en Güisayote. La entrevista es 
totalmente confidencial, o sea, no daremos a conocer sus datos personales a nadie 
y sus respuestas solo se conocerán por un código. La entrevista durara 
aproximadamente 40 minutos. 
Debo hacer énfasis en que no hay ninguna desventaja para usted al participar en 
esta entrevista. Tampoco hay beneficios inmediatos, pero se espera que este 
estudio contribuya a mejorar el manejo de la Reserva Biológica Güisayote. 
Si desea contactar a la investigadora encargada del estudio (Olivia Rendón) aquí en 
esta hoja le dejo el número telefónico (3251-7068). Por favor pregúnteme si algo no 
está claro o si quiere más información (Pausa). 
Formulario de Participación  
1. Estoy de acuerdo en tomar parte en esta entrevista.                    
2. Confirmo que me han leído y entiendo la información de la entrevista. 
3. Afirmo que he tenido la oportunidad de hacer preguntas. 
4. Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria. 
5. Comprendo que mis respuestas se mantendrán estrictamente 
confidenciales.  
 
____________________________                  _______________________________         
  Nombre completo del participante                         Firma/huella del participante                         
____________________________                  _______________________________ 
  Nombre de la entrevistadora                                         Firma de la entrevistadora                  
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CUESTIONARIO SOBRE EL USO DEL SUELO EN LA RESERVA BIOLOGICA GUISAYOTE Y 
SUS ALREDEDORES 
Code___ Date _____  Interviewer____ Start time____ End time ________ 
GPS point at centre of plot___ Altitude ___ Gender___ Address ___Phone _____ 
Years of schooling___ Age ___ Years living in the Ocotepeque department ______ 
 
Sección A. Datos Generales de Uso de Suelo y Tenencia 
A1.  Cuantas propiedades [posee/usa] usted en el área de Güisayote y sus 
alrededores? ( clarificar que no es para impuestos)    
No. 
Propiedad 
A1. Tipo propiedad 
(propiedad privada, 
alquilada, prestada, 
prestada) 
A2. Posee 
(manzanas) 
A3. Usa 
(manzanas) 
A4. Años de 
propiedad 
P1 
  
 
  
P2 
  
 
  
P3 
  
 
  
P4 
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Distancias No. 
Kilómetros  
(u otra unidad) 
Minutos 
a pie 
Entrada vehículo todo 
el año? Explique si no. 
A5. Distancia desde 
la propiedad a la 
calle transitable más 
cercana? (Antes de 
llegar a la carretera) 
P1    
P2    
P3    
P4    
A6. Distancia desde 
la propiedad a la 
carretera 
internacional? (que 
corre de la frontera 
a SPS) 
P1    
P2    
P3    
P4    
A7. Distancia desde 
la propiedad a la 
fuente de agua más 
cercana? (agua que 
usa) 
P1    
P2    
P3    
P4    
              
A8. Favor dibuje la propiedad, incluya calles, construcciones, nacientes, quebradas, 
nombre y residencia de vecinos; y  ubique las parcelas para sept. 2010 – agosto 
2011: bosque (BL=latifoliado, BP=de pino, BM=latifoliado y pino), animales (A), maíz 
(M), frijol (F), café (C), hortaliza (P=papa, R=repollo, Z=zanahoria, Rm=remolacha, 
etc.), en descanso (D); poner código a cada parcela de uso; y Norte o salida/ puesta 
de sol. Mencionar actividades de conservación de suelo y agua. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                                                    
 
A9. Usos de Suelo  
Uso del 
Suelo 
Código  
Área 
Actual 
(Mz) 
Cultivos 
combinados 
(% c/u) 
Meses 
Años 
experiencia 
Días 
Asesoramiento 
técnico en vida 
Fertilidad 
suelo 
Pendiente 
Riego 
(%) 
Uso 
2009
-10 
Uso  
2008
-09 
Café            
Hortaliza            
Maíz            
Frijol            
Animales            
En 
descanso 
  
    
  
   
Bosque            
Total           
28
5 
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Seccion B: Costos e Ingresos de Café 
B1. Mano de Obra Café 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Año cafetal   
Valor Jornal/Día   
Semillero 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Vivero 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Preparación (examen de suelo) 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Trasplante 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Fertilización 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Eliminación malezas 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Eliminación de plagas 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Regulación de sombra, manejo 
suelo 
Días   
Costo total   
Cosecha 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
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B2. Insumos para café  (vivero, preparación de la tierra, trasplante/ siembra, control de 
malezas y plagas, riego, cosecha) 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Vivero (Semilla café, plántulas, 
sombra) 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Trasplante (semilla de sombra) Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Fertilizantes (en todo el proceso) Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Pesticidas (en todo el proceso) Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Materiales Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
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B3. Producción y uso de residuos de Café 
Código Parcela    
Cosecha 2010-11 (húmeda-seca/unidad)    
Cosecha consumida (%)    
Cosecha vendida (%)    
Cosecha regalada (%)    
Cosecha almacenada (%)    
Residuo producido (Kg)    
Residuo en suelo (%)    
Residuo para animales (%)    
Residuo para leña (%)    
Residuo quemado (%)    
Cosecha  2009-10 (húmeda-seca/unidad)    
Cosecha vendida 2009-10 (%)    
Cosecha 2008-09 (húmeda-seca/unidad)    
Cosecha vendida 2008-09 (%)    
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B4. Mercadeo de Café 
Código Parcela    
Calidad Producto    
Precio/Unidad    
Impuesto venta     
Impuesto Tierra/año     
Mercado    
Comprador    
Periodo Pago, días    
Tiempo vender (min.)    
Tiempo al Mercado (min.)    
Modo de transporte    
Costo transporte (Ida y vuelta)    
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Seccion C. Costos e Ingresos de Cultivos 
C1. Mano de Obra de cultivos (Maíz, frijol, hortaliza) 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Valor Jornal/Día   
Semillero/ Vivero 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Preparación 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Trasplante/ Siembra 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Fertilización 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Eliminación malezas (limpia y 
fumigación) 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Eliminación de plagas 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Actividades Especificas 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Riego 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Cosecha 
(+ vigilancia) 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
 
 
 
 
 
 290    
 
                                                                                    
 
C2. Insumos para Cultivos (Maíz, frijol, hortaliza) 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Semilla o plántula, y de 
barrera viva 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Preparación 
(cal, fertilizante, otros) 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Trasplante/ Siembra (semilla, 
solución arrancadora) 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Fertilizantes (todo el proceso, 
excepto preparación) 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Pesticidas 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Riego (agua, cloro, melaza) 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Materiales 
Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
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C3. Producción y uso de residuos de cultivos (Maíz, Frijol, Hortalizas) 
C
ó
d
ig
o
 P
ar
ce
la
 
C
o
se
ch
a 
p
ro
d
u
ci
d
a 
  
 (
ca
n
ti
d
ad
/U
n
id
ad
) 
C
o
se
ch
a 
co
n
su
m
id
a 
(%
) 
C
o
se
ch
a 
V
en
d
id
a 
(%
) 
C
o
se
ch
a 
re
ga
la
d
a 
(%
) 
R
es
id
u
o
 p
ro
d
u
ci
d
o
 (
C
an
ti
d
ad
/ 
U
n
id
ad
) 
R
es
id
u
o
 q
u
em
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o
 (
%
) 
R
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id
u
o
 p
ar
a 
le
ñ
a 
(%
) 
R
es
id
u
o
 e
n
 s
u
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o
 (
%
) 
R
es
id
u
o
 p
ar
a 
an
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es
 (
%
) 
R
es
id
u
o
 o
tr
o
 (
%
) 
  
 
         
 
          
 
C4. Mercadeo de cultivos (Maíz, Frijol, Hortalizas) 
Código Parcela    
Calidad Producto    
Precio/Unidad    
Impuesto venta     
Impuesto Tierra/año    
Mercado    
Comprador    
Periodo Pago, días    
Tiempo vender (min.)    
Tiempo al Mercado (min.)    
Modo de transporte    
Costo transporte    
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Seccion D. Costos e Ingresos de Animales 
D1.  Producción de Animales 
Tipo de Animal 
C
ó
d
ig
o
 p
ar
ce
la
 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 a
 la
 f
ec
h
a 
En
 c
u
an
to
 v
en
d
er
ía
 u
n
a?
 Salida sin Venta Compra 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 c
o
n
su
m
id
a 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 R
eg
al
ad
a 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 M
u
er
ta
 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 R
o
b
ad
a 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 c
o
m
p
ra
d
a 
P
re
ci
o
/ 
u
n
id
ad
 
Vaca madura criolla 
         
Vaca madura hibrida 
         
Vaca madura exótica 
         
Terneros/ novillas 
         
Toros 
         
Bueyes 
         
Caballos  
         
Burro/mula adulto 
         
Burro/mula joven 
         
Gallinas maduras 
         
Cerdos Maduros  
         
Cerdos jóvenes 
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D2. Mercadeo de animales  
Tipo de 
Animal 
Venta Mercadeo 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 V
en
d
id
a 
P
re
ci
o
/ 
u
n
id
ad
 
C
al
id
ad
 P
ro
d
u
ct
o
 
M
er
ca
d
o
 
C
o
m
p
ra
d
o
r 
Im
p
u
es
to
 d
e 
ve
n
ta
/ 
ti
er
ra
 
P
e
ri
o
d
o
 P
ag
o
, d
ía
s 
Ti
em
p
o
 v
en
d
er
 
(m
in
.)
 
M
o
d
o
 T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
e 
C
o
st
o
 T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
e 
Vaca 
madura 
 criolla 
          
Vaca adulta 
 hibrida 
          
Vaca adulta 
 exótica 
          
Terneros/ 
novillas 
          
Toros           
Bueyes           
Caballos           
Burra/ 
mula 
 adulto 
          
Burra/mula 
joven 
          
Gallinas 
maduras 
          
Cerdos 
Maduros 
          
Cerdos 
jóvenes 
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D3. Mano de Obra Animales 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Valor Jornal/Día   
Manejo (alimentación, apartar, 
ordenar, chapear, manejo suelo y 
agua) 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Veterinario (vacunar, 
desparasitar, etc.) 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Destace 
Actividad   
Días   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
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D4. Insumos para animales 
Código Parcela  Total de procesos 
Alimentación Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Suplementos  Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Medicina Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Agua Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Materiales Insumo   
Cantidad   
Costo total   
Total por parcela   
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                                                    
 
D5. Producción y Mercadeo de Sub-productos 
Sub-producto 
C
ó
d
ig
o
 P
ar
ce
la
 
Salida sin Venta Venta Mercadeo 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
co
n
su
m
id
a 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 R
eg
al
ad
a 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 V
en
d
id
a 
U
n
id
ad
 
P
re
ci
o
/ 
u
n
id
ad
 
C
al
id
ad
 P
ro
d
u
ct
o
 
M
er
ca
d
o
 
C
o
m
p
ra
d
o
r 
Im
p
u
es
to
s/
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ar
go
s 
d
e 
ve
n
ta
 
P
e
ri
o
d
o
 P
ag
o
, d
ía
s 
Ti
em
p
o
 v
en
d
er
 
(m
in
.)
 
M
o
d
o
 t
ra
n
sp
o
rt
e 
C
o
st
o
 t
ra
n
sp
o
rt
e 
Leche 
 
 
 
             
Huevos 
 
 
 
             
Mantequilla 
 
 
 
             
Queso (varios) 
 
 
 
             
Carne 
 
 
 
             
Abono 
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Seccion E. Costos e Ingresos de Bosque  
E1. Beneficios del Bosque 
C
ó
d
ig
o
 P
ar
ce
la
 
Mano de 
Obra 
Leña 
Material 
construcción 
Pasto/ 
follaje 
Medicina Frutas Animales 
Conservación 
suelo/agua 
Otro 
D
ía
s 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 (
ca
rg
as
) 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
re
m
ed
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s 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
C
an
ti
d
ad
 
C
o
st
o
 t
o
ta
l 
Si
 o
 N
o
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[Si tiene bosque] 
Código 
parcela 
E2. Porque ha 
mantenido el bosque? 
E3. Desde que año existe 
este bosque? 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Seccion F. Tenencia Especifica 
[Para los que alquilan:] 
No. 
Propiedad 
F1. Cuanto paga de 
alquiler por 
propiedad? 
(Lempiras/unidad) 
F2. Cuantas veces 
al año alquila esta 
propiedad? 
F3. Si fuese a comprar la 
propiedad, cuanto cree 
que costaría? (Lempiras) 
P1   
 
 
P2   
 
 
P3 
 
   
  
[Para dueños:] 
No. 
Propiedad 
F4. Como 
adquirió esta 
propiedad? 
(Ocupación,                                                            
herencia, 
comprada a un 
tercero, otro) 
F5. Cuanto 
le costó la 
propiedad 
cuando la
adquirió? 
(Lempiras) 
F6. En cuanto 
vendería esta 
propiedad si 
tuviera la
oportunidad? 
(Lempiras) 
F7. En cuanto 
alquilaría esta 
propiedad si 
tuviera la 
oportunidad? 
(Lempiras/año) 
P1     
P2     
P3     
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F8. Parcelas alquiladas: 
Nombre a quien 
le alquila 
Residencia 
Tamaño de la 
parcela  
(manzanas) 
Código 
de 
parcela 
Valor de alquiler 
(Lempiras/unidad) 
1. 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
   
 
F9.  Parcelas prestadas (sin cobrarles): 
Nombre a quien le 
presta y relación 
(pariente, amigo, etc.) 
Residencia 
Tamaño de la 
parcela  
(manzanas) 
Código 
de 
parcela 
Por cuánto 
tiempo presta la 
parcela (unidad) 
1. 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
   
 
Seccion G. Preguntas Finales 
No. 
Propiedad 
G1. Tiene previsto usted algún 
cambio en el patrón de uso de suelo 
de su propiedad en los próximos 
años? Cual? 
G2. Porque prevé el cambio 
en el patrón de uso de 
suelo? 
P1   
P2   
P3   
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G3. A que se dedica usted y las personas de su casa?  
Persona (Anotar 
parentesco) 
Actividad 
Porcentaje de 
Ingreso Total 
Ingreso en 
especies 
1. Entrevistado 
1. 
 
  
2. 
 
  
3.  
 
  
4.  
 
  
2. 
 
   
3. 
  
   
4. 
 
   
No trabajan #      
 
 G4. Donde está su propiedad: en la zona núcleo de la Reserva Biológica Güisayote, 
en la zona de amortiguamiento de la Reserva Biológica Güisayote, o fuera de la 
Reserva? (Marcar con una  X)  
No. 
Propiedad 
Dentro de la 
Zona núcleo 
Dentro de la Zona 
amortiguamiento 
Dentro de la 
Reserva 
Fuera de la 
Reserva 
P1     
P2     
P3     
 
G5. Conoce usted las tierras que AESMO compro en la Reserva y que ahora están a 
nombre de la Municipalidad de La Labor y de Sinuapa? (si conoce una parte, 
equivale a un sí) 
1   Si                      2   Si he escuchado, pero no conozco              3   No      
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Seccion H. Evaluacion de la Entrevistadora 
H1. Cree usted que el entrevistado(a) pensó cuidadosamente sobre las preguntas e 
hizo un esfuerzo por dar respuestas verdaderas? (Circular una) 
1  Definitivamente Si          
2  Probablemente Si               
3  Inseguro(a); Difícil de decir   
4  Probablemente No                
5  Definitivamente No  
                                                                                                   
H2. La persona entrevistada manejaba toda la información solicitada?   
1   Si                                   2   No                                 3   Insegura 
 
H3. Agregar cualquier comentario sobre aspectos resaltables de la entrevista 
(describa lo bueno/malo; si lo/la conoce, estado de ánimo del entrevistado, 
confusiones, etc.)._______________________________________________ 
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Appendix 12 Respondent’s and partner’s work categories  
 
 
Work categories 
Percent 
Respondent 
Percent 
Partner 
0= non- stable                            37 76.6 
No work 20.7 60.8 
Owner of informal business (at home or road seller, small 
scale, or occasional)     
4.6 5.8 
Pulpería owner (small neighbourhood shop for basic 
items)  
1.7 4.2 
Labourer (temporary/occasional worker for other in 
farming, construction, etc.) 
8.5 5.8 
A combination of the above 1.5 0 
1= stable  63 23.5 
Government  employee 2.8 1.9 
Private employee                             2.8 3.8 
Owner of formal business (shop, large scale, permanent)                                                3.7 5
Farmer (own crops and/or cattle) 42.5 5 
Working in the USA 0 5.4 
A combination of the above, with at least one stable 
category                              
11.2 2.4 
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Appendix 13 Probit model of CV WTP to check for interviewer bias  
Note: n = 352; the interviewer variable was also significant in a model including 
income; *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, and * 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient SE P value Mean of X 
Constant - 0.31        0.52      0.55  
Bid - 0.02***        0.00     0.00    35.78 
Age - 0.01        0.01     0.13    46.05 
Education is high 0.49**        0.23      0.03     0.15 
Child 0.03        0.19       0.86     0.74 
Community size - 0.00        0.00     0.11    231.15 
Contamination - 0.25        0.17     0.14     0.63 
Group member 0.44**        0.19      0.02     0.20 
Number of cars 0.23***        0.09      0.01     0.41 
Water bill - 0.00        0.00      0.35    247.12 
Importance of PES 1.20***       0.28      0.00     0.88 
NGO1 
NGO2 
NGO3  
- 0.19    
0.01     
0.04               
0.22  
0.22  
0.22                
0.39  
0.96  
0.87         
0.24 
0.26 
0.24 
Water board1 
Water board2 
Water board3 
0.14     
0.10     
0.12              
0.22  
0.22  
0.22                 
0.52  
0.64  
0.59           
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
Interviewer 0.36**        0.16      0.02     0.46 
Chi2 test 94.54    
Prob[ChiSqd > value]  0.00    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.20    
Correct Predictions 74.72%    
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Appendix 14 Probit model of CV WTP including income variable  
Note: n = 305; the estimated WTP basedon this model is Lps. 15.68 with a SD of 28; 
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, and * 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient SE P value Mean of X 
Constant 0.08       0.55       0.88  
Bid - 0.02***        0.00     0.00    36.85 
Age - 0.01        0.01     0.13    45.26 
Education is high 0.41*        0.24      0.08     0.16 
Child - 0.01        0.22      0.97     0.76 
Community size - 0.00*        0.00     0.06   230.60 
Contamination - 0.20        0.18     0.26     0.64 
Group member 0.57***        0.20      0.01     0.21 
Number of cars 0.16       0.12       0.32     0.42 
Water bill - 0.00**       0.00     0.04    249.49 
Monthly income 0.58  0.12 0.62    5369.21 
Importance of PES 1.08***        0.31      0.00     0.89 
NGO1 
NGO2 
NGO3  
- 0.22    
- 0.03 
0.18                  
0.24  
0.23  
0.23               
0.36 
0.90 
0.43             
0.26 
0.26 
0.24 
Water board1 
Water board2 
Water board3 
0.30 
0.28 
0.24 
0.24  
0.23  
0.24               
0.21  
0.22  
0.33          
0.25 
0.28 
0.23 
Chi2 test 80.81    
Prob[ChiSqd > value]  0.00    
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.20    
Correct Predictions 74.10    
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Appendix 15 Descriptive statistics for diarrhoea cases per household 
and per patient 
Note: for the six months prior to survey delivery; all costs in Honduran Lempiras  
(n = 48).  
 
Characteristic Mean Range SE SD 
Age of patient  20.28 1 – 83 3.13 21.70 
No. patients under five years old   
(n = 23) 
0.48 0 – 3 0.14 0.65 
No. of cases per household  1.4 1 – 3 0.09 0.61 
Households with at least one patient 
under five years old (% yes; n = 20) 
0.42 0 – 1  0.11 0.50 
Per patient: 
Lost work days  
Indirect costs  
Direct costs 
 
2.19 
131.64 
801.99 
 
0 – 50 
60 – 3,000 
0 – 20,000 
 
1.04 
102.4
8 
408.6
0 
 
7.20 
710 
2,830.89 
Per household:  
Lost work days  
Indirect costs 
Direct costs 
 
3.06 
183.75 
1,168.11 
 
0 – 50 
0 – 3,000 
0 – 20,500 
 
1.25 
74.72 
489.1
2 
 
8.63 
517.68 
3,388.72 
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Appendix 16 Coffee Prices between 2004-2014 
(Source accessed 30th April 2014: 
http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/coffee.aspx?timeframe=10y) 
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Appendix 17 Consumer Price index for Honduras 
(Honduran Central Bank, source accessed 30th April 2014: 
http://www.bch.hn/indice_precios_pub.php)  
 
Consumer Price Index 1979 - 2011 
Year Mean Base =2011 
1979 7.95 3.38 
1980 9.39 3.99 
1981 10.27 4.37 
1982 11.20 4.76 
1983 12.12 5.15 
1984 12.69 5.40 
1985 13.12 5.58 
1986 13.69 5.82 
1987 14.03 5.97 
1988 14.66 6.24 
1989 16.11 6.85 
1990 19.86 8.45 
1991 26.61 11.32 
1992 28.94 12.31 
1993 32.05 13.63 
1994 39.01 16.59 
1995 50.51 21.48 
1996 62.55 26.60 
1997 75.17 31.97 
1998 85.46 36.35 
1999 95.41 40.58 
2000 105.97 45.07 
2001 116.21 49.43 
2002 125.15 53.23 
2003 134.75 57.31 
2004 145.68 61.96 
2005 158.52 67.42 
2006 167.36 71.18 
2007 178.97 76.12 
2008 199.38 84.80 
2009 210.33 89.46 
2010 220.22 93.67 
2011 235.11 100.00 
 
 
 
 
